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“Something On Women For the Crime Bill”: 
The Construction and Passage of the Violence Against Women Act,  
1990-1994 
By Irene Meisel 
Advisor: Professor Sandi E. Cooper 
“Something on Women for the Crime Bill” examines the legislative and theoretical 
history of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), signed into law in 1994. It explores the 
deeply intertwined relationship between the tough-on-crime and feminist movements that shaped 
both the bill itself and the political discussion surrounding it. The bill inherited a host of ideas 
about crime, criminality, and race from the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 
leading to a very particular representation of the rapist as a black criminal inhabiting the streets. 
It merged the categories of rape and domestic violence into one classification of “violence 
against women,” eliminating the need to address the particular characteristics of either and 
resulting in even greater erosion of the feminist anti-rape message.  
This dissertation also details the role of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund 
(NOW LDEF) in the bill’s crafting and passage. NOW LDEF’s participation in VAWA’s 
creation represented a political coming of age for second-wave feminism, but the organization’s 
eagerness to pass a civil rights remedy for addressing rape caused its staff to view the very 
damaging effects of the bill’s other provisions as mere collateral.  
Finally, “Something on Women for the Crime Bill” describes the hitherto undocumented 
efforts of a number of the ACLU, the NAACP, and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, 
all of which warned against VAWA’s destructive measures, to worked behind the scenes to halt 
its passage, and or to ameliorate its effects. 
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“Something On Women for the Crime Bill” examines the legislative and 
theoretical history of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) in an effort to 
understand how the deeply intertwined relationship between the tough-on-crime and 
feminist movements shaped both the content of the bill and the political discussion 
surrounding it.1 VAWA’s close relationship to earlier anti-crime strategies ensured that 
the bill focused not on empowering women but punishing their attackers; the language of 
VAWA construed women as generic crime victims, eroding the empowering message of 
feminism.  
The NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund (NOW LDEF) played a much 
greater role in shaping the bill than has previously been appreciated. NOW LDEF’s 
pivotal role in VAWA’s creation and passage represented a political coming of age for 
second-wave feminist institutions and ideas, but was not uncontroversial. The 
organization hadn’t worked extensively on either rape or domestic violence legislation 
before, so was viewed with suspicion by many of those who had. Because NOW LDEF 
was historically a majority white organization working on a crime bill with deep racial 
undertones, both public and private conversations about VAWA stirred up old 
animosities about who truly represents feminism.  
Opposition to the bill from both civil rights and women’s legal advocacy groups 
represented a larger and potentially more dangerous obstacle to its passage than 
previously documented. While hesitant to publicly oppose VAWA because of the peril of 
                                                
1 VAWA was Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, H.R. 3355 103rd Cong. 
(1993) passed as Pub. L. 103-322 103rd Cong. (1994). 
2 
appearing to be “pro violence against women,” they nonetheless worked assiduously 
behind the scenes to prevent VAWA’s passage and, in lieu of that, to ameliorate what 
they saw as the bill’s far-too-punitive measures.  
The particularities of VAWA’s construction made understandings of rape 
vulnerable to further revision to better conform to the law-and-order worldview in new 
and alarming ways. For instance, VAWA merged the categories of rape and domestic 
violence into one classification “violence against women,” a previously unheard of 
legislative entity. The elision of the two removed the need to address the particular 
characteristics of either and resulted in even greater erosion of the feminist anti-rape 
message by the law-and-order impulse. In addition, the fact that several of the 
legislation’s titles amended the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (the 
1968 crime bill) guaranteed that VAWA inherited a host of ideas about crime, 
criminality, and race from that bill.2  
Not coincidentally, the driving ideas behind VAWA can be linked to two 1968 
developments. The first is the emergence of rape as a feminist issue symbolized by 
feminist Kate Millet’s essay “Sexual Politics,” which asserted that, “Like every system of 
oppression, male supremacy rests finally on force, physical power, rape, assault and the 
threat of assault.”3 Millett and others in the organization she belonged to, New York 
Radical Women (NYRW) offered a radically new interpretation of rape as part of a 
continuum of women’s oppression. Millett suggested that the solution to the scourge of 
rape was nothing less than a social and cultural revolution. The revolution Millett called 
                                                
2 Pub. L. 90-351 90th Cong. (1968). 
3 Kate Millet, Sexual Politics, (Millet’s essay was circulated by hand before it was first published in book 
form. New York: Doubleday, 1970), accessed April 9, 2014, https://www.marxists.org/subject/women/ 
authors /millett-kate/sexual-politics.htm.  
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for would be marked by a “change of consciousness of which a new relationship between 
the sexes and a new definition of humanity and human personality are an integral part.”4 
The second was the passage of the 1968 crime bill, which marked the federal 
government’s entrée into fighting state and local crime. Tough-on-crime proponents 
conflated street the street protests of the 1960s with street crime and saw a more punitive 
justice system as the solution to the social protests that had spread across American cities. 
As noted sociologist Kenneth B. Clark pointed out, there was “a tendency to make crime 
in the streets synonymous with racial threats or the need to control the urban Negro 
problem.”5 Several scholars have documented the extent to which 1960s political 
ideology linked blackness to criminality.”6 
While “Sexual Politics” and the 1968 crime bill were poles apart in 1968, when 
VAWA was introduced in 1990, its main rape provision would be called the Safe Streets 
for Women Act—after the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act—and at its 
center would be a title creating prosecution grants modeled on those in the 1968 bill.  
Millett’s essay signaled the beginning of a robust anti-rape movement.7 Over the 
next few years, addressing rape became a major feminist priority. Across the nation, 
feminist activists held speak-outs and protests to demand change. They created volunteer-
run rape crisis centers that addressed the needs of survivors and modeled the type of non-
hierarchical society they hoped to create. By 1979, the number of rape crisis centers 
                                                
4 Ibid. 
5 Vesla Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American 
Political Development, no. 21 (2007): 230–65. 
6 Weaver, 230; Jonathan Simon, “Governing through Crime Metaphors,” Brooklyn Law Review 67 (2001): 
1052. 
7 Historian Liz Kelly describes one of the hallmarks of the rape crisis movement—stressing the agency of 
those who have been raped by replacing the description of “victim” with “survivor.” I have chosen to 
follow this practice. Liz Kelly, Surviving Sexual Violence (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988). 
4 
across the country had grown to over 400.8 In addition, state rape laws across the country 
had been revised and subdivisions of police departments and state attorney general 
offices were dedicated to investigating sex crimes. 
While the second-wave feminists who first publicly addressed rape identified as 
radical, rape quickly became an issue that not only crossed over boundaries between 
multiple feminisms but also helped to erase those boundaries.9 The previously 
mainstream National Organization for Women (NOW) started its own rape task force in 
1973. In 1974, the New York Radical Feminists (NYRF), a successor group to NYRW, 
and the National Black Feminist Organization (NBFO) held a joint speak-out.10 
Nevertheless, how exactly to fight rape and even whether or not rape should be the target 
of feminist anti-violence efforts were issues that caused great consternation between 
feminists and feminisms.  
To those who wanted to target rape law itself, collaboration with law enforcement 
to get legislation passed—and the concurrent reframing of rape law as crime control—
seemed the most efficient route to meaningful legislative action.11 In this way, rape was 
split off as a discrete target of legislative change, separate from the social justice goals of 
the wider feminist movement. The decision to ally with law enforcement to reform rape 
laws was controversial. While many feminists supported state-based solutions, such as 
                                                
8Maria Bevacqua, Rape on the Public Agenda: Feminism and the Politics of Sexual Assault (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 2000), 35. 
9 In her study of black, Chicana, and white second-wave feminist movements, Benita Roth replaces the 
standard narrative of a two-branch (radical and liberal) middle class white movement with one of a 
movement comprised of multiple feminist mobilizations. Benita Roth, Separate Roads to Feminism: Black, 
Chicana, and White Feminist Movements in America’s Second Wave (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). 
10 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), 
XI. 
11 Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 210.  
5 
law reform, in the fight against rape, just as many fiercely contested this strategy, 
preferring to remain faithful to the original movement politics that rejected state 
mediation of any kind. Although they maintained their political commitment to ending 
sexism, some women argued that reforming the criminal justice system was so far 
removed from the root aims of the feminist movement as to invert the movement’s 
original message.12 
Scholars Marie Gottschalk, Kristin Bumiller, and Jonathan Simon have explored 
the growth of the tough-on-crime movement and its intricate relationship to the anti-rape 
and domestic violence movements at length. These scholars stand at the forefront of a 
larger effort to document the history of what scholars term the “carceral” state—a phrase 
referring to the explosive growth of the prison population and the retributive turn in 
United States penal policy since the late 1960s.13  
The work of these scholars elegantly explores the mechanisms through which the 
feminist anti-rape movement was ultimately subsumed under the banner of a highly 
racialized law-and-order movement. They posit that, in response to the social challenges 
of the 1960s, conservative political leaders—both locally and at the national level—
began to highlight street crime in an attempt to steer state policy toward social control 
and away from social welfare. Eventually rape was framed as just one of many street 
crimes to be tackled by the state criminal justice apparatus. 
Gottschalk, in particular, shows how Johnson’s 1968 crime bill, central to this 
                                                
12 Catherine Olga Jacquet, “Responding to Rape: Contesting the Meanings of Sexual Violence in the United 
States, 1950-1980” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2012), 17. 
13 Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Kristin Bumiller, In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism 
Appropriated the Feminist Movement against Sexual Violence (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); 
Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
6 
drive, created policies and funding structures that would lead to a greatly expanded role 
for government in rape crisis centers. Centers were gradually transformed from 
expressions of a social movement to social service providers. This transformation 
accelerated during the 1980s when the volunteer-run revolutionary ethos of rape crisis 
centers was slowly drained of its potent transformative message.  
By 1990, rape’s metamorphosis into a criminal justice issue would make it an 
appropriate focus for the omnibus crime bill then-Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) had 
recently introduced.14 There are several conflicting published accounts that detail Biden’s 
decision to introduce VAWA to this crime bill, but Biden himself anchored his decision 
to his career-long preoccupation with fighting crime.15 In May 1990 Biden, who was then 
chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the self-proclaimed Democratic “point man 
on crime,” decided he wanted to include a measure targeting crimes against women in his 
sprawling crime bill.16 He turned for help to a new lawyer on the Judiciary Committee 
staff, Victoria Nourse, who was asked to get him “something on women for the crime 
bill.”17  
Nourse crafted VAWA’s first two titles to fit into the already existing template of 
the crime bill, so that the majority of VAWA’s provisions were refracted through that 
bill’s tough-on-crime lens. VAWA’s first title, Safe Streets for Women, created grants for 
law enforcement that ate up the majority of VAWA’s funding and introduced mandatory 
minimum sentences. VAWA’s second title, Safe Homes for Women, implemented 
                                                
14 S.1972 101st Cong. (1989). 
15 Joseph R. Biden, Promises to Keep: On Life and Politics (New York: Random House, 2007), 224. 
16 Ibid., 234. 
17 Nourse described her work on VAWA in an essay titled “The Accidental Feminist.” Victoria Nourse, 
“The Accidental Feminist,” in Transcending the Boundaries of Law: Generations of Feminism and Legal 
Theory, ed. Martha Fineman (New York: Routledge, 2011), 339–351. 
7 
mandatory arrest policies and made orders of protection for domestic violence valid 
across state lines. 
VAWA’s most controversial third title, Civil Rights For Women—a legal remedy 
that made it possible for women who had been the victims of gender-based violence to 
sue their attackers in civil court—did not fit this template.18 While crafting VAWA, 
Nourse contacted NOW LDEF’s Senior Counsel Sally Goldfarb. Goldfarb, intrigued by 
the civil rights remedy, threw herself wholeheartedly into VAWA’s passage. Ultimately 
her investment in the civil rights remedy gave her and others at NOW LDEF a fierce 
sense of loyalty to the bill. Their belief that the remedy would be landmark feminist 
legislation caused them to view the possible damaging effects of the bill’s other 
provisions as merely collateral. Hypnotized by the holy grail of a civil rights cause of 
action, these feminists were deaf to warnings from the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), the NAACP, and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR)—an 
umbrella organization that included both the ACLU and NAACP, among others—about 
the overly-punitive nature of the bill.  
Because NOW LDEF was focused on litigation, it did not have the lobbying or 
grassroots organizing experience that had helped make its one-time parent organization, 
the National Organization for Women (NOW), considered by many to be the standard 
bearer for modern American feminism. Therefore NOW LDEF hired veteran lobbyist 
Patricia Reuss. Together, Goldfarb and Reuss created and helped enlarge what would 
become a national VAWA task force. Goldfarb operated behind the scenes, frequently 
meeting with both lawmakers and other advocates and often serving as a bridge between 
                                                
18 Several different people take credit for sparking the idea that shaped the civil rights remedy, including 
Victoria Nourse herself; Ron Klain, her boss on the Judiciary Committee and Catharine MacKinnon, the 
famed feminist scholar and activist known for her work on sexual harassment and pornography. 
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the two. Reuss masterminded not only lobbying efforts on the Hill, but also the task 
force’s broad-based nationwide outreach strategy. 
The punitiveness of VAWA’s measures lead to a concerted effort by several at the 
ACLU, NAACP LDF and the National Women’s Law Center (NWLC) to thwart 
VAWA’s passage. While unwilling to speak out publicly, lawyers for these organizations 
worked assiduously first to thwart the bill’s passage and, when passage seemed 
inevitable, to temper the harsh provisions of the bill. 
VAWA’s retributive content notwithstanding, during the bill’s sojourn in 
Congress it frequently came under attack by politicians eager to add additional and more 
stringent punishments. 19 Thus members of the VAWA task force created a working 
alliance with the Congressional Caucus on Women’s issues to try to rebuff efforts to pull 
VAWA to the right. President Clinton signed the bill into law as Title IV of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (the crime bill) on September 13, 1994. 
Despite NOW LDEF’s best intentions, VAWA was ultimately an anti-crime bill, 
rather than pro-woman legislation. Early anti-rape activists’ worst fears of criminal 
justice co-optation had come true. 
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE  
Chapter One begins with an examination of American stereotypes about rape and 
the rapist. It pays particular attention to the centrality of race to the political history of 
rape in the United States, exploring the rhetorical construction of black men as constantly 
                                                
19 Particularly Robert Dole (R-KS) and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) 
9 
threatening sexual attacks, black women as always consenting to sex, and white women 
as consistently duplicitous.20  
Catherine Jacquet was one of the first scholars to consider both the civil rights and 
feminist responses to rape, contextualizing the second wave in a larger history of social 
movement response to sexual violence. While the history of anti-rape activism has often 
been described as propelled entirely by white women in the radical arm of the feminist 
movement, in fact anti-rape crusading had been one of the goals of the civil rights 
movement. Despite this, the anti-rape efforts of the two movements frequently focused on 
different aspects of the crime. Civil rights groups’ race-based framework thoroughly 
informed their understandings and strategies in response to sexual violence to such an 
extent that they often viewed rape as a tool of racial oppression, and focused their efforts 
on the discrepancy in punishment between white and black convicted rapists. In contrast, 
radical feminist activists like conceptualized it as the most exaggerated form of 
patriarchal control, and often ignored the racial undertones in public discussions of rape. 
At times the two approaches could and did intersect, but the difference in emphasis was 
almost always a stumbling block to joint activism.  
Kimberlé Crenshaw popularized the term “intersectionality” to describe a theory 
that takes into account the cumulative influence of racism, sexism, and classism. At a 
1993 meeting of the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault (NCASA), a national 
coalition of rape crisis centers, Crenshaw gave a keynote that addressed the disastrous 
effects of a theory of gender that excludes race and vice versa.21 She pointed out that the 
lack of an intersectional analysis leaves the needs of black women ignored and insures 
                                                
20 Ibid., 2. 
21 Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “The Marginalization of Sexual Violence Against Black Women.” 
NCASA Journal 2, no. 1 (1994): 1, 2, 15. 
10 
that black men are overly penalized. She warned that a penal solution to rape was overly 
simplistic, as the violence suffered by women comes from several different sources, and 
thus needs to be addressed with a complex set of solutions.22  
Early in the life of the feminist movement, activists held an antagonistic view of 
the legal system and law enforcement. Many radicals argued stridently against any kind 
of collaboration with the government, including working with law enforcement and 
accepting money from the state. Leery of such alliances, these feminists argued that their 
independence was both implicitly and explicitly empowering. Still, many activists 
conceded that working to reform the government’s approach to rape was a necessary evil.  
The chapter then looks at the anti-rape movement’s incorporation into the tough-
on-crime movement, which was in part a byproduct of the anti-rape movement’s 
mainstream success. Maria Bevacqua’s Rape on the Public Agenda: Feminism and the 
Politics of Sexual Assault examines what happens to feminist aspirations when they are 
reconfigured as legislative goals. 23 Bevacqua points out that moving anti-rape efforts 
from the feminist agenda to the public agenda changes the understanding of rape in many 
ways. For instance, gone is the impetus to revamp gender structures; in its place is the 
drive to punish and stigmatize the individual rapist. In Bevacqua’s words, rape is 
converted “from an expression of patriarchy to a heinous crime, and from a tool for the 
control of women’s bodies to the province of a few criminally minded individuals.”24 
Efforts to police blackness that began with the introduction of the 1968 crime bill 
                                                
22 Ibid. 
23 Bevacqua, Rape On the Public Agenda, 134.  
24 Ibid.  
11 
continued into the 1970s, when President Nixon declared a “war on drugs.”25 Michelle 
Alexander’s The New Jim Crow makes the bold claim that the United States criminal 
justice system has used the war on drugs as a tool for discrimination and repression to 
such an extent that mass incarceration has become “a stunningly comprehensive and 
well-disguised system of racialized social control.”26  
Because women could be narratively framed as perfect victims, the anti-rape 
movement was in many ways a perfect vehicle for furthering the victims’ rights 
movement and vice versa.27 While it initially started as a parallel but deeply related 
spinoff of the tough-on-crime movement, victims; rights soon developed its own separate 
agenda. The first hallmark accomplishment of the movement was the passage of the 1984 
Victims Of Crime Act (VOCA). Rape crisis centers, in desperate need of money, 
represented their activities in such a way as to make themselves ideal candidates for 
VOCA funding. Nancy Matthews’ history of the anti-rape movement’s relationship with 
the state, Confronting Rape: the Feminist Anti-Rape Movement and the State contends 
that feminist demands and concurrent state responses ultimately “converged at the point 
of what happens after the fact of violence, a convergence Matthews terms “managing 
rape.”28 Managing rape is, of course, in stark contrast to stopping violence. Matthews’ 
work uses a study of rape crisis centers in California to demonstrate the extent to which 
the state—under the aegis of the Office of Criminal Justice Programs (OCJP) in this 
case—influenced the direction of rape crisis work by supporting the therapeutic aspects 
                                                
25 Andrew B. Whitford and Jeff Yates, Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda: Constructing the War 
on Drugs (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). 
26 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: 
New Press, 2010). 
27 Gottschalk, 215. 
28 Nancy A. Matthews, Confronting Rape: The Feminist Anti-rape Movement and the State, (New York: 
Routledge, 1994), 149–165. 
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of the anti-rape movement’s agenda while simultaneously pushing rape crisis centers’ 
more political messages to the side. As a consequence, rape crisis centers were 
transformed from sites of feminist activism to social service providers. Organizations that 
did not go along with the wishes of the OCJP or were too interested in maintaining a 
collectivist, rather than hierarchical structure, did not receive funding and had a severely 
shortened lifespan.29 
While radical feminists originally brought the issue of rape to the fore, Maria 
Bevacqua shows that anti-rape activism sometimes allowed feminists to collaborate 
across ideological lines.30 Despite this, throughout the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s 
NOW had an ongoing if slightly complicated relationship with anti-rape activists. 
Maryann Barakso’s Governing NOW explores the fluidity of NOW’s politics. The 
organization mutated from the 1960s, when it was relatively mainstream, to radicalism 
and heavy involvement in anti-rape activism in the 1970s, and once more in the 1980s 
when it again became more mainstream, focusing on electoral politics. This fluidity 
affected the extent and quality of NOW and NOW LDEF’s alliance with groups focused 
entirely on sexual violence. 
 
Rape and the Law 
The relationship between violence against women and the law was famously 
addressed by a number of pioneering feminist theorists. Estelle Freedman’s Redefining 
Rape points out the extent to which understandings of rape have been tied to ideas about 
                                                
29 Barbara Levy Simon, “Social Movements and Institutionalization: Rape As A Case Study” (Ph.D. Diss., 
Bryn Mawr College, 1981). 
30 Maria Bevacqua, “Coalition Politics in the Antirape Movement,” in Feminist Coalitions: Historical 
Perspectives on Second-Wave Feminism in the United States (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 
163–177. 
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who is—and is not—a citizen. 31 The exclusion of women from voting and lawmaking 
contributed to the sense that sexual crimes against them (by men enjoying these 
privileges) were immune to prosecution. Indeed Catharine MacKinnon’s Feminism 
Unmodified contends that because the American legal system uses maleness as the 
standard, women are always judged by the extent to which they are different from men.32 
These differences, MacKinnon argues, ultimately create a system of inherent inequality 
when they are used to disadvantage women. Carol Smart’s Law, Crime and Sexuality: 
Essays in Feminism examines the reciprocal constitutive relationship between the public 
and legal understandings of rape.33 Smart explores the means by which the legal 
construction of rape shapes the wider understanding of the crime just as the layman’s 
understanding of the crime necessarily helps construct the law. Smart agrees with 
MacKinnon that the hidden gendering of concepts is widespread and applies this concept 
to the rape trial itself, which she understands as a mode of sexualization of women’s 
bodies.34 Women’s overly sexualized bodies, Smart argues, are presented as open or 
vulnerable to the desires of men. Indeed, Smart argues that women’s bodies are what she 
terms “sexed,” meaning that sexualized meanings are attributed to the corporeality of 
women. 
Chapter Two begins by asking several questions about the introduction of 
VAWA. Why did Biden decide to introduce VAWA at all? Why did he decide to 
introduce VAWA when and in the form that he did? Who wrote the bill’s different 
                                                
31 Estelle B. Freedman, Redefining Rape: Sexual Violence in the Era of Suffrage and Segregation 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 8. 
32 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987). 
33 Carol Smart, Law, Crime and Sexuality: Essays in Feminism (London: Sage Publications, 1995). 
34 Ibid, 84. 
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sections and what was the relationship between authorship and content? How were those 
who worked at NOW LDEF, an organization that had not been actively involved in the 
anti-rape movement, galvanized to work for VAWA’s passage? And why was Nourse so 
eager to enlist NOW LDEF’s services and support? A close look at competing and 
contradictory claims about VAWA’s introduction and authorship reveals a great deal 
about the complex juggling act used by those who supported the legislation to prove their 
feminist credentials.  
Next, the chapter examines VAWA’s individual titles. In addition to Safe Streets 
for Women, Safe Homes for Women, and Civil Rights for Women, VAWA included 
Equal Justice for Women in the Courts, which included measures for judicial education; 
National Stalker and Domestic Violence Reduction, which authorized the federal 
government to access criminal justice databases; and Protections for Battered Immigrant 
Women and Children, which allowed beaten immigrant women to sue for United States 
citizenship.  
Chapter Three explores the strategy Goldfarb and Reuss employed to help the task 
force garner support for VAWA both from members of Congress and from the public at 
large. Because VAWA could be packaged as two bills in one—one part law enforcement 
measures and one part civil rights remedy—task force members could present the bill as a 
civil rights coup or a blow against crime, tailoring their message to their audience or 
audiences. Because the task force was in the unusual position of having to gather support 
for a bill supposedly promoting civil and women’s rights that many civil rights and 
women’s groups shied away from, Reuss worked to gather the support of unions, 
15 
religious groups, and others less concerned with the legal construction of civil rights law 
and more prone to endorse law enforcement measures.  
Indeed, some of the fiercest opposition that VAWA faced was from the ACLU’s 
Women’s Rights Project (WRP) and the NWLC, both of which saw a host of dangers 
inherent in VAWA. Among the things they feared were the hyper-punitive nature of 
VAWA’s law enforcement and mandatory arrest measures and what they saw as the 
troublesome construction of the civil rights remedy. Isabelle Katz Pinzler of the WRP and 
Brenda Smith of the NWLC worried that a remedy covering only gender could 
potentially erode the civil rights of blacks and other minorities. Evidence of feminists 
vying for legitimacy can be found in the fraught relationship between NOW LDEF and 
anti-rape and anti-domestic violence groups outside Washington D.C. When writing her 
dissertation, “Legal Momentum: NOW-LDEF’s Role in Shaping Policy on Domestic 
Violence and Welfare Reform,” sociologist Margaret Holmes conducted extensive 
interviews with politicians, advocates, and activists.35 Many anti-rape activists were, at 
best, perplexed and, at worst, chagrined by NOW LDEF’s outsized role in VAWA.36 
Because NOW LDEF itself had no history of working on either rape or domestic violence 
legislation, smaller rape crisis groups and some domestic violence groups questioned the 
authenticity of NOW LDEF’s effort to pass rape-related legislation. 
Chapter Four expands upon other analyses of VAWA’s discursive structure to 
shine a light on the entrenched representation of women’s victimization, the rapist’s 
                                                
35 Margaret Ann Holmes, “Legal Momentum: NOW-LDEF’s Role in Shaping Policy on Domestic Violence 
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criminality, and the politician’s redemptive qualities.37 It provide a close textual reading 
of VAWA itself as well as of the reports and hearings from the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd 
Congresses that make up VAWA’s official historical record.  
Caroline Picart’s work highlights the difficulty of presenting women who have 
been raped or experienced domestic violence as anything besides victims, and those who 
have not as maintaining agency.38 She suggests that in presenting a strict dichotomy 
between women who are victims and women who are not, VAWA oversimplifies the 
complexity of women’s role(s) in society, ignoring a central message of feminism.39 
Indeed VAWA’s vision of women as generic crime victims reified women’s 
victimization to a degree that anti-rape activists—who purposefully tried to excise the 
word “victim” from their vernacular, replacing it with the less evocative and more 
empowering term “survivor”—had gone to great lengths to avoid. Furthermore, VAWA’s 
merging of the two very different crimes of rape and domestic violence into the single 
category “violence against women” put added emphasis on women’s supposed 
victimization, something these terms shared. Nor have scholars addressed the extent to 
which women were encouraged to perform their victimization during hearings, and the 
multiple ways in which the writers of Congressional reports capitalized on the image of 
the woman as victim to bolster their case for VAWA’s necessity.  
In a similar manner, VAWA included intrinsic assumptions about the nature of 
the rapist. Several scholars have already examined how VAWA itself rhetorically 
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constructs the rapist. For instance, “Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A 
Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation” by law professor Christina E. Wells and 
lawyer Erin Elliott Motley posits that VAWA, while presented as feminist, in reality 
substantially undermined feminist efforts by reinforcing the notion that men who rape are 
“brutish male aggressors and sex-crazed deviant sociopaths.”40 Aya Gruber’s “Rape, 
Feminism and the War on Crime” is of a piece with “Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed 
Rapist.”41 Gruber argues that the act of addressing sexualized violence solely through 
criminal law supports the view that the prevalence of sexual abuse is a the result of 
individual deviance and not the result of women’s impoverished socio-economic status 
and men’s “normal” behavioral practices. In this way anti-rape legislation has privileged 
a criminal, rather than a feminist, understanding of rape.  
None of these scholars has examined the extent to which the actual architecture of 
VAWA itself—moored to the historic framework of the 1968 crime bill and further 
embedding anti-rape efforts in the structure of anti-criminality—reinforced the idea that 
the rapist was a crazed black stranger stalking the streets. The imagery of women 
victimized by criminals lurking in the streets set the stage perfectly for the idealized 
politician/savior to step in and save the day; in one hearing and report after another 
politicians indeed presented themselves as doing just that. The message of women’s 
empowerment that had been woven into the fabric of early rape crisis centers had all but 
disappeared in the rush to prosecute, supposedly on women’s behalf. 
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DESCRIPTION OF SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
Claire Bond Potter begins her introduction to Doing Recent History with a quote 
by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. exhorting historians of the recent past to be completely aware 
of “the inadequacy of the present moment for any sort of lasting judgments.”42 Indeed, 
writing about the recent past can put severe limits on one’s perspective, as well as limit 
the number of books available to support and contextualize research. It also means facing 
limits on archives that are closed or restricted to researchers for a specified period of time 
that ends many years in the future.  
As a plus, writing a history of the recent past makes it possible to interview live 
sources. I gained invaluable information speaking to those involved in the day-to-day 
machinations of VAWA’s passage. I spoke to NOW LDEF’s Sally Goldfarb and Patricia 
Reuss. Brenda Smith, who played a central role in attempts to prevent VAWA’s passage 
while working at the NWLC, helped me flesh out my understanding of those efforts. I 
learned more about the relationship between NOW LDEF and domestic violence 
advocates by speaking to Karen Artichoker of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and Joan Zorza 
of the National Center on Women and Family Law, both of whom traveled to 
Washington D.C. to work on the bill. Zorza redlined the first version of VAWA for 
Nourse. Joanne Howes, who owned a public relations firm active in Washington D.C.43 
told me about being hired by the Family Violence Prevention Fund (FVPF) to lobby for 
VAWA. Members of Bass and Howes were involved in last-minute negotiations between 
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Biden’s office, NOW LDEF, and the LCCR over the wording of the civil rights remedy.  
Primary sources consulted included NOW’s and NOW LDEF’s records. The 
minutes of the meetings of the VAWA task force made it possible to plot the 
development and growth of task force membership to discern the relationship between 
task force members and track the relationship between the task force and congressional 
staff. Most of the minutes were typed for distribution, but in several instances 
handwritten notes were particularly revealing. Margaret Holmes gave me copies of the 
transcripts of her interviews with a range of subjects, including NOW LDEF staff, 
congressional staff, and activists. These interviews helped me clarify my understanding 
of grassroots activists’ attitudes toward NOW LDEF’s central role in VAWA’s passage. 
In addition to investigating the above sources, I also examined VAWA’s various 
drafts as well as the bill’s collateral materials—the reports and hearings that make up its 
official historical record. I provide a close reading of these in an effort to uncover their 
implicit and explicit assumptions about women’s vulnerability, the identity of the rapist, 
and the role of politicians embedded in both the bill’s language and structure. 
Ultimately VAWA’s passage narrowed the range of possible federal responses to 
rape and domestic violence at the same time that it pushed the national conversation 
about these crimes to the right. Because lawyers steeped in the tradition of civil rights, 
such as Brenda Smith and Isabel Katz Pinzler, were more accustomed to focusing on 
rape’s role as a tool of racial oppression, they were particularly attuned to the possibility 
that efforts to craft anti-rape legislation could go devastatingly off course. Those who 
came from a stricter—and whiter— tradition of feminist jurisprudence were focused 
more narrowly on women’s rights and could perhaps too easily lay aside the worries of 
20 
their peers. That VAWA was supported by the latter over the objections of the former 
seems in hindsight to implicate legal feminists in the creation of the carceral state, but it 
is nowhere evident that those working on VAWA twenty-five years ago could have 
foreseen the extent to which it would push the movement they were so dedicated to one 
step closer to co-optation by those bent on pursuing law and order. Instead, that some 
feminists wholeheartedly supported VAWA is a reminder that even actions taken with the 




THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 
 
THE RISE OF SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM 
 
Between the mid-1950s and early 1960s, civil rights activists brought racial justice to the 
center of the nation’s political consciousness through direct action protests, non-violent 
resistance, and state and federal legal battles. The civil rights movement’s success in eliciting a 
federal response to race-based discrimination raised expectations among feminist activists for a 
comparable response, causing President Kennedy to create the Presidential Commission on the 
Status of Women (PCSW) by executive order in December 1961.44 With the commission’s 
creation, feminists felt ready to tackle the impasse between those who favored and those who 
opposed passage of an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Organized labor’s support for 
protective legislation made union members particularly outspoken opponents of the ERA.  
Pauli Murray, a civil rights lawyer whose career trajectory would be shaped by the 
tensions between the feminist and civil rights movements, was on the commission’s Committee 
on Civil Rights. Murray recommended the creation of a litigation campaign for equal rights for  
women’s similar to that used by the NAACP to fight for equal rights for blacks.45 Murray called 
for stronger ties between advocates for women’s and civil rights. The PCSW’s final report 
incorporating Murray’s ideas was published in 1963, the same year as Betty Friedan’s The 
Feminine Mystique. While the runaway success of Friedan’s book is widely known, the PCSW’s 
report, too, was something of a hit. Over 200,000 copies were ordered from the Government 
Printing Office in the first year of publication, bringing a wide number of previously-ignored 
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into the realm of public debate.46 The PCSW’s final report, “American Women,” declared that 
equality should be achieved through a Supreme Court decision supporting women’s protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. It was noncommittal on the ERA, 
stating that as women were already entitled to constitutional protection against discrimination, it 
could not immediately endorse a constitutional amendment. By not explicitly objecting to the 
ERA, the committee pointedly left it on the table as an option. At issue was the extent to which 
race and gender should receive similar treatment and the benefits of equal protection promised 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to the prohibition on classification by gender 
proposed by the ERA.  
Legally-minded feminists were much more successful at creating legal precepts based on 
a specific class of injury to particular women than at establishing more universal protections 
based on gender. One of their few unequivocal successes was the addition of the category of 
sex—joining race, color, religion and national origin—in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill, 
which prohibited employment discrimination. Inclusion of sex undermined the necessity for 
further protective legislation and formalized a connection between the fights for black and 
women’s rights. In response to Title VII’s passage, Murray penned a piece called  “Jane Crow 
and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII,” which drew comparisons between Jim Crow 
laws and discriminatory laws against women.47 
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Murray and several other women who had been on the PCSW created a loose network, 
known in feminist circles as the “Washington Underground,” to continue the PCSW’s 
momentum.48 In 1966 a number Murray and a number of fellow Washington Undergrounders 
attended the Third National Conference of State Commissions on the Status of Women, a 
successor to the PCSW. Frustrated at the slow pace with which the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was responding to Title VII cases, several of these women 
met hastily in the hotel room of another attendee, political activist Betty Friedan, where they 
decided to form what one feminist called a “NAACP for women.” Murray contributed to NOW’s 
statement of purpose, which proclaimed that the goal of the organization was to bring women 
into full participation in the mainstream of American society. 49 The statement railed against the 
EEOC’s unwillingness to enforce Title VII on behalf of women, many of who were “Negro 
women, who are the victims of the double discrimination of race and sex.” It continued: 
There is no civil rights movement to speak for women, as there has been for Negroes and 
other victims of discrimination. The National Organization for Women must therefore 
begin to speak. We believe that the power of American law, and the protection 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution to the civil rights of all individuals, must be 
effectively applied and enforced to isolate and remove patterns of sex discrimination, to 
ensure equality of opportunity in employment and education, and equality of civil and 
political rights and responsibilities on behalf of women, as well as for Negroes and other 
deprived groups.50 
 
From the beginning, legal change was central to NOW’s goals and identity. Also from the 
beginning, NOW had an intricate and confused relationship with the civil rights movement. 
Although its statement of purpose pointed out the double bind of black women, it also distanced 
itself from them by referencing the separate categories of “women” and “Negroes.” It also 
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actively linked the struggle for women’s rights to that of civil rights, in this instance positing a 
direct parallel between the two.  
During its first years, NOW focused on petitioning the EEOC to hold hearings to enforce 
Title VII. By 1967, the EEOC agreed to hold hearings, and NOW had set up picket lines at five 
national EEOC offices to protest newspapers’ routine publication of sex-specific “Help Wanted” 
ads. The following February, a member of NOW’s legal committee filed a suit against the 
commission. In August 1968 the EEOC bowed to pressure and barred segregated ads. 
At NOW’s second national conference, in 1967, members voted to endorse passage of the 
ERA. Several women who had been working for ERA passage for decades thwarted attempts 
made by younger activists to create more expansive wording for the amendment. Working 
toward ERA passage ultimately monopolized the collective attention and energy of NOW 
members, and drained their attention and resources from other battles. Historian Serena Mayeri 
argues that decisions such as these help to explain the emergence of a formalistic, exclusive, and 
impoverished notion of equality that severed NOW’s activities from those of other social justice 
causes and ensured that NOW’s victories benefited the privileged classes at the expense of the 
poor and women of color.51 Disappointed with what she saw as NOW’s shortsighted decision, 
Murray resigned from the NOW board.52  
NOW’s legal committee began its life by working for the Title VII litigation for the 
employment equality that had been at the root of its founding.53 To focus more sharply on 
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legislation, the committee formally split off in 1970 to become the NOW Legal Defense and 
Education Fund.54 Over time it expanded its legislative focus to include abortion rights and Title 
IX, and worked with NOW to promote passage of the ERA. 55 
Because of the fractious and volatile nature of early second-wave feminist politics, NOW 
LDEF was just one of no fewer than nine organizations that broke away from NOW in its early 
years. Of these, four—including NOW LDEF—were created as friendly spin-offs and five were 
created as the result of angry schisms. In the schism category, Women’s Equity Action League 
(WEAL) —the organization that would give Reuss her entrée into Washington politics—split off 
from the National Organization for Women in 1968 because of its objection to NOW’s stance on 
abortion and frequent use of picketing as a political tactic.56   
 
PRE-FEMINIST IDEAS ABOUT RAPE 
From the nation’s early years, rape had been represented as a crime of lust, and men 
depicted as unable to control themselves. Beginning in the twentieth century, Sigmund Freud and 
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his peers, as well a coterie of newly minted sexologists, began to explore the motivations behind 
rapists’ behavior. As Estelle Freedman has documented, while theories abounded, most included 
the belief that rape was a perversion and that rapists—termed sexual psychopaths—were 
mentally ill.57 All of these theories negated the rapist’s responsibility for his actions since he was 
considered unable to control his impulses. During the immediate post war years, twenty-one 
states passed laws calling for rapists to be confined indefinitely to mental institutions rather than 
locked up. The idea that those who raped were mentally ill helped to police boundaries between 
supposedly normal and abnormal sexual behavior.58 
Representations of rape were often inextricably bound to ideas about race. In the South, 
the fusion of sexual and racial violence served as a tool of social coercion by which whites 
intimidated blacks into submission.59 Black male sexuality was considered dangerous and 
threatening, and rapists were often assumed to be black men. While black women were seen as 
“loose” and “rapeable,” white females were portrayed as pure and virtuous.60 The many public 
depictions and discussions of rape, of men who raped, and of women who were raped all shared 
an emphasis on the individuals involved in the crime. Little or no attention was paid to the social 
factors contributing to the crime and its frequency. At its core, much of the conflict about rape’s 
definition was a struggle over gender roles, ownership of women’s bodies, and contested access 
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to female sexuality.  
Because of the forbidding thicket of rape laws and the taboo nature of the subject, NOW 
did not immediately a see rape as a target for legislative change. In the late 1960s, judicial 
understandings of rape had remained virtually unchanged from their origins in eighteenth-
century British common law.61 Rape laws in most states covered only those instances in which a 
man forced a woman who was not his wife to have sexual intercourse under the threat of bodily 
injury, she resisted strenuously, and there was outside corroboration.62 Before rape became the 
subject of feminist anger and inquiry, there had been no legal check on the assumption that 
women were complicit in the act. The idea that women were “asking for it” underwrote common 
and even legal understandings of the law. Almost always, the burden of proof for convincing a 
jury that a rape had occurred lay entirely on the survivor. Widespread corroboration requirements 
were hard to meet in a crime that, more often than not, is committed in isolation. Because of the 
skepticism they met in court, and the low rate of conviction for rape, survivors often hesitated to 
report the crime.63  
 
Radical Feminism and The Emergence of Rape as a Feminist Issue 
The impulse to examine rape grew among radical feminists who were part of a subset of 
the feminist movement as a whole. These activists had their start in the political movement 
known as the New Left, a largely white youth movement that coalesced around the fight for 
racial justice and against the Vietnam War. They chose the name New Left to emphasize their 
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relationship to the socialists and communists of the 1930s and 1940s and found connections 
between personal oppression and politics at large.64 Women in the movement were sorely 
disappointed when they began pushing for a New Left analysis of liberation to incorporate 
gender oppression and were heartily rebuffed.65 They were particularly disturbed by their 
treatment as they began challenging male supremacy inside the movement. Arguing that they 
were exploited as sexual objects, denied access to leadership roles, and consigned to menial 
tasks, many of these women became disaffected with the New Left and left to form radical 
feminist groups, which maintained a focus on the political nature of the personal.66  
Unhappy with the measured legal reform of those who had started the feminist 
movement, these groups called for a complete restructuring of society. In her 1970 book The 
Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution, Shulamith Firestone argued that the feminist 
revolution is based on—and surpasses—the socialist revolution.67 While existing socialist 
societies had tried to expand women’s roles without fundamentally altering them, the goal of the 
feminist revolution as defined by Firestone and others was to end the performance of 
manufactured gender roles.68 
In the words of historian Maria Bevacqua, radical feminists loved “to analyze, politicize, 
and publicize the most personal and potentially offensive issues in women’s lives.”69 They 
quickly began hosting private consciousness-raising groups as well as larger public speak-outs. 
At these events, women openly discussed their own experiences, including the enormous 
problem of rape, which they saw as symptomatic of fundamental economic and power 
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imbalances between men and women. Unlike larger national feminist organizations—
understandably constrained by pre-existing commitments to a particular brand of legal change 
and by a fear of appearing too outlandish or militant to their legislative and administrative 
partners—these radical feminists spoke bluntly about the problem of rape. In addition, radical 
feminism’s belief that “the personal is political” made those inspired by it eager to talk about the 
particulars of their own experiences.70  
Susan Brownmiller, who wrote the groundbreaking book Against Our Will and helped 
make rape a national topic, attributed her sensitization to the issue of rape to her involvement in 
such a consciousness-raising group. 71 Her totalizing description of rape in Against Our Will 
exemplifies radical feminist thought on the topic, “From prehistoric times to the present…rape 
has played a critical function. It is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation 
by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.”72 The radical feminist movement gave birth 
to a body of feminist scholarship that articulated a new theoretical understanding of rape. Against 
Our Will set the stage for much of the scholarship that emerged from the movement, many of 
which recognized rape as an act of violence, not a crime of passion.73 Scholars and activists 
redefined rape as a power-motivated act of violence rather than one of unbridled sexuality, one 
of many mechanisms for men to control women in a society where anyone can rape and anyone 
can be raped.74 
In 1972, activists in Washington, D.C. and Berkeley created the first two rape crisis 
centers. They sought to address the issue of rape as radical feminists understood it, and as such 
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both provided advocacy for survivors and tried to restore the sense of control that sexual assault 
had destroyed. 75 Employing principles of participatory democracy borrowed from the New Left, 
rape crisis center volunteers tried not only to make day-to-day life easier for rape survivors, but 
also to embody on a micro level the kind of society they hoped feminism could create. To this 
end, they were run as collectives with all members taking part in decision-making.76 Women 
survivors were seen as new recruits to the movement as a whole. The first centers prompted the 
founding of other centers around the country; by 1976 more than 400 had been created. 77  
 
Black Feminism and Rape  
Despite the fact that several of the founders and early members of NOW saw the 
correlation between feminism and civil rights and considered themselves both feminists and civil 
rights activists, there was always a complicated relationship between the mainstream feminist 
and civil rights movements. At times black women active in the civil rights movement did not 
believe that NOW and other majority white feminist organizations represented them, fearing that 
white women did not see the interconnection between sexism and racism. As one early black 
anti-rape activist remembered, “I certainly saw the urge to try to make people split and choose; if 
you’re black, you can’t be a feminist and if you’re a feminist, you’re not black.”78 
For this reason, in the early 1970s black feminists created their own predominantly 
feminist groups, such as the National Black Feminist Organization (NBFO), to address issues 
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that were unique to black women.79 NBFO members were not only frequently alienated from 
white feminists, but like white women who had departed the New Left, also frustrated with the 
misogyny they found in the black power movement. NBFO’s statement of purpose declared: 
We will continue to remind the Black Liberation Movement that there can’t be liberation 
for half the race. We must, together, as a people, work to eliminate racism, from without 
the black community, which is trying to destroy us as an entire people; but we must 
remember that sexism is destroying and crippling us from within.80 
 
Many black feminist activists recognized that race was essential to discourse about rape 
and had to be considered when constructing a history of rape in this country.81 For instance, 
Angela Davis’s 1975 piece in Ms. magazine, “Joan Little—The Dialectics of Rape,” was a case 
study of the many ways that racism and sexism fed off of one another.82 Joan Little was a black 
prisoner who had, in self-defense, killed the white jailer who tried to rape her. When discussing 
the Little case, Davis argued that the one feature that remained constant in different rape cases 
was “the overt and flagrant treatment of women, through rape, as property.”83 If particular rape 
cases expressed the different modes in which women were handled as property, Davis reasoned,  
…when a white man rapes a black woman, the underlying meaning of this crime remains 
inaccessible if one is blind to the historical dimensions of the act…Whenever a campaign 
is erected around a black woman who has been raped by a white man, therefore, the 
content of the campaign must be explicitly antiracist. And, as incorrect as it would be to 
fail to attack racism, it would be equally incorrect to make light of the antisexist content 
of the movement.  
 
Because white women ran the majority of rape crisis centers, the complicated relationship 
between black and white feminists extended to the movement’s on-the-ground presence. 
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For instance, the founders of Philadelphia’s first rape crisis center, Women Organized Against 
Rape, who were themselves predominantly white, told a researcher that expanding their 
membership base to include black and working class women was difficult largely because local 
blacks were wary of the anti-rape movement and saw it as involved in a political fight that 
ultimately served whites and imprisoned blacks.84 They also had trouble recruiting black women 
leery of the fraught tradition of blacks lynched for the imagined rape of whites.85  
 This tension ebbed and flowed throughout the history of the second wave and had not 
disappeared by the time VAWA was introduced in 1990. Even some points of contention 
remained consistent; black women consistently had a more holistic view of women’s oppression 
and—as both a cause and effect of this fact—placed more emphasis on civil rights. 
 
Rape and Law Enforcement 
From the start of the anti-rape movement, activists worried about whether and to what 
extent they should ally themselves with law enforcement efforts to address rape and domestic 
violence. Although aware of the compromises inherent in working with public officialswhose 
apathy and disregard many believed had contributed to and helped perpetuate a culture that 
condoned rapemany feminists believed compromise was necessary to smooth the path for 
women who wished to prosecute their attackers. Likewise, police and prosecutors saw the utility 
of a working relationship with members of a radical feminist movement whose politics they did 
not always support. Mary Ann Largen, an activist involved in NOWs first forays into anti-rape 
activism, pointed out the bind radical feminists faced when they worked with those whom they 
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had implicated in rapes existence to try to address the problem of rape itself:  
…while the women’s movement continues to focus upon the societal sexism 
inherent in rape, society itself is taking up the rape issue under the “law and 
order” banner. This banner provokes emotion but fails to deal with the source of 
the problem; it is a Band-Aid solution to a problem which requires major 
surgery.86 
Over time, advocates and members of law enforcement began collaborating on numerous 
projects., and rape was added to the agenda of police precincts and district attorneys offices 
throughout the country. New York was at the forefront of many such endeavors. In 1972 the 
New York City Police Department formed one of the first rape analysis units in the country.87 
Then, in 1974, the Manhattan District Attorney founded the countrys first sex crimes 
prosecution unit, dedicating an entire bureau to prosecuting rapesomething previously not 
heard of.  
 
Rape As A Mainstream Feminist Issue 
While it is not untrue that the feminist movement consisted of a more conservative liberal 
branch represented by NOW and a radical fringe, at times the movement could be much more 
fluid. NOW, NOW LDEF, and other feminist organizations could and did change strategies to 
suit the issue they were working on or the political climate they faced.88 By 1973, amidst all the 
publicity that anti-rape activists had garnered, the New York City chapter of NOW began 
working with the local group New York Women Against Rape to develop a legislative campaign 
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to lobby for rape law reform.89 In addition, the national conference of NOW formed the NOW 
Task Force on Rape to propose revisions to state laws.90 In many cities throughout the country 
local NOW groups had their own local rape task forces that coordinated with the national NOW 
Task Force on Rape.  
The first reformed state law in the country, Michigan’s Criminal Sexual Conduct Act, 
was passed in 1974 as the result of the efforts of the members of the Michigan Women’s Task 
Force on Rape. They reached out to the Ann Arbor City Council, which approved the creation of 
a community-wide anti-rape alliance.91 Two years later, the Ann Arbor group joined others from 
southeastern Michigan to create a statewide women’s task force on rape. The task force met with 
the Judiciary Committee of the state’s House of Representatives and local law enforcement 
agencies, and together worked to pass the Criminal Sexual Conduct Act.92 The act bucked the 
legislative trend of focusing on the consent or resistance of the survivor and instead focused on 
the behavior of the rapist.93 It also served as a template for those working to reform state laws 
throughout the country.  
To those who collaborated with law enforcement to pass legislation, framing rape law 
reform as crime control seemed to be the most efficient route to meaningful legislative action.94 
Reform efforts had four main components. First activists tried to remove the “non-consent 
requirement,” so that the prosecution no longer had to prove that the survivors of rape had 
actively resisted their attackers. Next, instead of one umbrella category of rape, activists sought 
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to create a hierarchy of sexual offenses, with a gradated system of penalties. Third, through so-
called “rape shield laws,” activists tried to limit defense teams’ ability to bring to trial 
information about a survivor’s supposedly lurid sexual history as evidence that she had somehow 
prompted her attack, because such evidence was deemed relevant only when the past sexual 
activity in question was the defendant. Finally, activists attempted to make sure that the law 
would protect previously vulnerable groups.95  
Following Michigan’s lead, activists across the country worked to change the architecture 
of their own state legislation. By the end of the decade, thirty-eight states had removed 
corroboration requirements from their rape laws.96 Because reform was enacted state by state, 
there were huge variations in its depth and breadth. In many states, it was nearly impossible to 
institute gender neutrality, and it remained legal for a man to rape his wife. Within 20 years, 
every state had adapted legislation similar to Michigan’s groundbreaking rape shield law.97 
However, state rape shield laws were far from complete.98  
These cooperative efforts of feminist activists and theorists allied with the juridical and 
law enforcement apparatus led to the first changes in rape laws. However, while a portion of the 
movement saw the utility of partnering with law enforcement, many would ultimately choose not 
to maintain the alliances they had created. Having brought rape to the attention of a broader 
public, including that of the police, they chose to look elsewhere for support because of concerns 
about having their movement subsumed. The same year the Michigan law was passed, members 
of the pioneering Washington D.C. Rape Crisis Center founded the Feminist Alliance Against 
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Rape (FAAR) to address the potential co-optation of the movement by government agencies.99 
FAAR’s founding document stated: 
We feel there is a need for communication nationally (and internationally) and for more 
solidarity among our projects. This is particularly important at a time when government 
agencies and politicians are beginning to take an interest in the issue of rape. Because we 
see this interest as a potential threat to feminist control of the rape issue, we wish to form 
a united front to ensure that the interest in rape works for us rather than against us.100 
 
FAAR emphasized rape prevention—as opposed to the prosecution of the crime once it 
had already occurred—and sought to maximize the impact of feminist institutional reform to 
increase women’s control.101 Early FAAR members worried that: 
Incarceration does not change the societal attitudes that promote rape. In a society that 
deals with symptoms rather than causes of problems, prisons make perfect sense. 
Confronting the causes of rape would threaten the basic structure of society. By actively 
encouraging women to prosecute a rape we are helping to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system…102 
 
In 1973, Largen, who’d become the coordinator of NOW’s Task Force on Rape, worked 
closely with liberal Republican Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD) to craft a bill for the federal 
funding of rape crisis centers and the establishment of a national center for rape prevention that 
would run under the auspices of the National Institute of Mental Health.103 The bill was 
introduced to the Senate Committee of Labor and Public Welfare’s Subcommittee on Health. It 
called for the center to serve as a clearinghouse for studies on rape and offer training programs 
for various professionals who came into contact with rape survivors, such as doctors and 
policemen. In addition to funding rape crisis centers and creating a national center, the bill 
authorized a national study of the efficacy of state rape laws and was incorporated into a bigger 
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health services act.  
As a piece of anti-rape legislation, the bill framed rape as a public health issue and thus 
can be used as a point of comparison to underscore the implications of the varying approaches to 
such legislation. It is easier to consider rape a systemic societal concern, rather than merely a 
gendered crime problem, when one sees how it affects the public. As if to emphasize this, the 
text of the bill called for an “examination of the relationship, if any, between traditional legal and 
social attitudes toward sexual roles, the act of rape, and the formulation of laws dealing with 
rape.”104 Thus, the bill suggested the possibility of a causal relationship between socially dictated 
sex roles and the high incidence of rape.  
In 1977, Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY) introduced a federal rape shield 
law, the Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, which limited a defendant’s ability to cross-
examine rape complainants about their past sexual behavior.105 Holtzman argued that the 
amendment would “protect women from both injustice and indignity” by restricting “the 
vulnerability of rape victims to such humiliating cross-examination of their past sexual 
experiences and intimate personal histories.”106 With the Privacy Protection Act, federal 
legislation followed a trend that had begun at the state level as an effort to counteract the 
common defense tactic of implying that women who had been raped had somehow invited the 
attack through their promiscuity. President Carter signed the bill into law, lauding its value for 
ending “public degradation of rape victims” and for encouraging the reporting of rape.107 
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Domestic Violence on the Federal Agenda  
From the start, domestic violence activists were less radical than their anti-rape 
counterparts.108 Gottschalk explains that the domestic violence movement was more vulnerable 
to co-optation and compromise than the anti-rape movement for several reasons.109 The domestic 
violence movement started several years after the rape movement, and was rooted in 
organizations that were service-oriented rather than strictly feminist in scope.110 Early shelters 
were established by churches, YWCAs, and Junior Chambers of Commerce and often did not 
have a blatantly feminist culture.111 Because activists framed domestic violence as a “family 
issue,” and delivered a deliberately subdued feminist message, law enforcement and legislators 
were less squeamish about working with them than with their anti-rape counterparts. To a certain 
extent, the issue of domestic violence was easier to broach in a public venue than rape. As one 
rape crisis advocate explained, “Police don’t want to talk about anything related to sex.”112  
The perception of domestic violence as a non-sexual gendered public crime issue would 
translate into more consistent funding for domestic violence shelters than for rape crisis centers. 
The funding, in turn, led domestic violence centers and shelters to align their activities more 
closely with government priorities.113 Feminists succeeded in turning the federal government’s 
attention to the issue of domestic violence when, in 1979, President Carter established the 
national Office of Domestic Violence. The Family Violence Prevention Fund put lobbying for 
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direct shelter funding at the top of its agenda. This funding became a reality in 1984 with the 
passage of the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act.114 
There was prolonged tension between anti-domestic violence and anti-rape activists. 
Anti-domestic violence proponents worried that the stigma attached to the sometimes more 
radical techniques of anti-rape groups, and the greater discomfort associated with speaking about 
the explicitly sexual crime of rape would make anti-rape activists harmful allies. As one anti-
rape activist remembered:  
It got to a place around funding and access to systems and policy makers where the 
domestic violence people actually told the sexual assault people, you can’t, we don't want 
to go with you to talk to these people, and we don't want you there, and we don't want 
you to align yourselves with us because that will give us domestic violence attention but 
they won’t around sexual assault.115 
 
Perhaps because of the distinct histories of rape crisis centers and domestic violence 
shelters, rape and domestic violence were most frequently addressed in scholarship and practice 
as completely separate entities. This was not always the case, however. Both activists and 
scholars at times used the phrase “violence against women.” In 1977, hundreds of women 
marched against violence against women in Washington D.C. That same year the Metropolitan 
Detroit Chapter of NOW cosponsored a public policy conference on violence against women, as 
did Metropolitan State Conference in Denver. However, this approach—combining rape and 
domestic violence under one umbrella category—was the exception rather than the rule. 
Post-War Law and Order Meets Feminism: 
The Emergence of A Victims’ Rights Movement 
The feminist attention to rape emerged at a time when local, state and federal authorities 
were aggressively pursuing a “tough-on-crime” agenda. The next section of this chapter 
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examines the birth of the tough-on-crime movement and subsequent creation of the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in the 1968 crime bill. A discussion of the 
LEAA is also central to any understanding of the trajectory of the anti-rape and anti-domestic 
violence movements since it not only became a consistent source of funding for feminist centers, 
it also helped birth the victims’ rights movement, which quickly claimed the violence against 
women issue as its own. The tendency of feminist organizations—sometimes against their own 
instincts—to ally with law enforcement initiated the reframing of anti-rape legislation as anti-
crime. The creation of the LEAA pushed the feminist movement further along this path and 
would help to usher in an understanding of women who experienced rape or domestic violence 
as quintessential victims. Historian Kristin Bumiller has demonstrated how the LEAA ultimately 
helped secure what she calls “the neoliberal appropriation of the feminist movement against 
sexual violence.”116 
Beginning in the 1960s, conservative politicians such as Barry Goldwater, George 
Wallace, and Richard Nixon made the issue of crime a national priority and pursued a rigorous 
campaign against crime that continued unabated into the 1970s. In the face of powerful social 
movements, grassroots protest, the decay of urban centers, and growing civil strife—particularly 
the race riots which exploded out of urban ghettos—conservative politicians used a “law and 
order” approach to exploit the public’s concerns over rising crime and civil unrest.8 The concept 
of law and order was an amorphous one, blurring the line between unease over the rise of crime 
with discomfort over changes wrought by the Civil Rights Movement, urban riots, and antiwar 
protests.117 
Because of the conflation of civil riots, protests, and crime, tough-on-crime language 
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often included coded references to race. As historian Michael Flamm observes: “Law and 
order…became the vehicle by which urban whites transmitted their antipathy to neighborhood 
integration and racial violence from the municipal to the presidential arena.”118 Vesla Weaver 
extends Flamm’s argument, noting that this strategy both imbued crime with race and 
depoliticized racial struggle.119 Proponents of law and order pushed for punishment and control 
as the primary response to crime. The main policies in the law-and-order playbook were 
mandatory sentencing lengths, mandatory arrest, mandatory restitution, increased law 
enforcement presence, and prison expansion.120 
In 1964, Republican Barry Goldwater made law and order a central theme of his 
presidential campaign, elevating the fight against crime to a national issue. In the fall of 1964, 
President Johnson cast his war on poverty as a war on crime. This renewed focus on crime and 
protection led the federal government to establish several national commissions to study the 
problem of crime and criminals. President Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration, convened from 1965-1967, carried out three significant pilot studies of victims 
in 1965. These studies found that crime was going both unreported and unprosecuted and urged 
increased efficiency for the criminal justice system.121 
 Johnson sent Congress the 1968 crime bill termed by one historian the “mother of all 
contemporary crime legislation.”122. One of the bill’s stated goals was allowing Congress to 
ensure the greater safety of the American people by better coordinating, intensifying, and 
optimizing state and local law enforcement efforts. For the first time in American history, direct 
                                                
118 Ibid., 13. 
119 Weaver, 235. 
120 Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 125. 
121 Gottschalk, 84. 
122 Simon, Governing Through Crime, 10; H.R. 5037, 90th Cong. (1968). 
42 
funding channels were created between the federal government and the criminal justice system. 
To this end, one of its main objectives was encouraging the adoption of more comprehensive 
anti-crime strategies. Because it had been formed partially to address urban riots and civil rights 
protests, it stipulated that monies could be used for the organization of law enforcement units 
specifically for the prevention and control of violent civil disorders.123 In addition, the bill 
encouraged the training of community service officers to assist law enforcement agencies and  
encourage neighborhood participation in crime prevention.124 It also funded the research and 
development of new approaches to modernize law enforcement and improve statistical record 
keeping to accommodate the Johnson Administration’s goal of helping local police departments 
update their data-gathering abilities and, some scholars have argued, enabling them to build 
criminal profiles of residents and target street patrols more effectively.125  
The LEAA was the grant-making body that would fund such plans. It provided more than 
$8 billion in federal grants to police departments for equipment, training, and pilot programs. 
The legislation that ultimately emerged had a distinctly Republican shape.126 Signing the act into 
law, Johnson declared, 
Today, I ask every Governor, every mayor, and every county and city commissioner and 
councilman to examine the adequacy of their State and local law enforcement systems to 
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move promptly to support the policemen, the law enforcement officers, and the men who 
wage the war on crime day after day in all the streets and roads and alleys in America.127 
 
Of particular relevance to later anti-crime legislation was the bill’s reimagining of the 
crime victim as a privileged subject for government protection and its restructuring of national 
fiscal priorities.128 The LEAA provided a structure for funding to be given directly to state and 
local criminal justice bureaus, bypassing more liberal city agencies. Block grants were received 
by state planning agencies to be distributed as they saw fit. Mayors were rightfully leery of block 
grant distribution, worrying that state governments would bypass cities when divvying federal 
funds.129 Increased penalties and other sentencing reforms went hand-in-hand with the 
augmentation of state and federal crime-fighting capacity. 
Much of the LEAA’s funding ultimately went to rape crisis centers. While increased 
financial resources were a boon for centers, the money did not come without exacting its own 
particular form of payment. Marie Gottschalk explains that the LEAA’s Crime Victim Initiative 
ultimate helped the government co-opt the women’s movement and conscript it in the war on 
crime.130 As the LEAA and other arms of the state became more involved in addressing rape, 
they successfully “recast the feminist definition of rape as a political issue into the problem of an 
individual victim in need of adequate services from the state so as to increase her willingness to 
help in the successful prosecution of her case.”131 LEAA money encouraged government 
absorption of many formerly independent rape crisis centers and their radical, volunteer, 
grassroots orientation into its professional, hierarchical bureaucracy.132  
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Feminist activists had at first been quite wary of accepting LEAA funding. In the early 
1970s, the NOW Task Force on Rape conducted an investigation into LEAA spending to better 
understand its effects.133 The task force found evidence pointing to LEAA’s bias against private 
women’s groups, which translated into these groups’ inability to obtain funding as autonomous 
entities.134 In order to be considered for LEAA grant money, independent rape crisis centers 
needed to partner with another institution, such as the local police department. Once funds were 
dispersed, the task force discovered, the majority of money was distributed to the partner 
institution. The task force also found that once funding was dispersed, the institutional view of 
women’s groups as being “non-professional” often led to the partner institutions maintaining 
firm control of joint projects.135 Foreshadowing changes that would haunt the founders of rape 
crisis centers for years to come, the act contained a provision that mandated that all grantees had 
to receive the approval of the local government or local law enforcement agencies. This rule 
gave local law enforcement officials default control over which groups received federal money. 
Rape crisis centers ran the risk of not receiving funding if they were perceived as too radical or 
out of step with the local law enforcement community, creating financial pressure on them to 
conform. In addition, the heavy influx of government funds nurtured dependency on the state, 
helping to co-opt the women’s anti-violence movement.136 
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While the victims’ rights movement was closely intermingled with and informed by the 
tough-on-crime movement, the two have separate trajectories: the first victims’ rights assistance 
programs were founded in the 1970s, and the 1982 passage of a federal Victim and Witness 
Protection Act spurred the first state constitutional amendments. 
The LEAA funneled much of its budget into projects that addressed the criminal justice 
system’s treatment—or, some thought, mistreatment— of crime victims. Tougher penalties for 
criminals were key to the reimagining of what became called “victims’ rights.”137 The LEAA’s 
belief in the efficacy of a victims’ rights-centered policy led to the administration of pioneering 
studies and surveys to examine the plight of so-called victims. The LEAA’s early embrace of 
victims’ needs and focus on gaining their cooperation put the agency at the center of early efforts 
to build the victim’s rights movement with the funding of programs designed specifically to 
improve the relationship between victims and law enforcement.138  
The victims’ rights movement had grew out of a coalition of a variety of constituencies, 
all of whom were dissatisfied with the criminal justice system. Proponents of victims’ rights 
believed that the so-called victimization rates were much higher than crime rates, and that this 
fact proved that many crimes remained unreported because of victims’ justified distrust of the 
criminal justice system. The first form of redress they called for was victim compensation 
measures, but victims’ rights advocates saw tougher penalties as central to their long-term 
agenda. In addition, convinced that indeterminate sentencing would not deter crimes, victims’ 
rights proponents advocated mandatory minimum sentences, three strikes laws, and truth-in-
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sentencing laws that tried to ensure prisoners would serve out their full terms. The movement’s 
first official body was the National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA), founded in 
1975 to give a voice to the members of the nascent movement.  
Relatively early in the growth of the movement, some feminists saw the utility of allying 
themselves with it. Feminist dissatisfaction with authorities’ handling of rape and domestic 
violence fit easily into the a victim-centric world view, and some feminists believed that 
focusing on women as victims would help women gain funding and mainstream legitimacy.139 At 
the same time, others in the feminist movement worried that the intense focus on victimization 
would come at the expense of a deeper and more critical political analysis and more potent forms 
of organizing.140 Focusing on women as generic victims detracted from concentrating on the 
economic and social specificities of their situation. In addition, such strong emphasis on 
victimization was incongruous with the feminist goal of empowering women.  
Many feminists worried that the “woman as victim” rhetoric would further complicate the 
debate about rape and domestic violence by feeding into the fear born of multiple crime panics 
and the racial backlash that ensued. Indeed, there was something of a racial divide in the 
approach to victims’ rights, with white feminists supporting the movement’s goals far more than 
their black peers.141 Contemporary observers went so far as to accuse white women—whom they 
saw as blind to the inherent racism of right-leaning victims’ rights rhetoric—of using a rape 
scare to advance their political objectives.  
However, there were enough anti-rape feminists who had adopted the victims’ rights 
ideology to allow participants at the 1977 NOVA conference to create NCASA, which would 
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serve as a new national umbrella organization for rape crisis centers.142 The fact that NCASA 
was organized at a NOVA conference was an example of the extent to which the two movements 
already had and would become inextricably linked.  
 
Violence Against Women as a Violation of Civil Rights: MacKinnon and the Anti-
Pornography Ordinances 
 
In the late 1970s legal scholar and activist Catharine MacKinnon, already known for 
significant contributions to ndy,,,,yy7q6ming and prosecuting workplace sexual harassment, 
joined a feminist fight against media depictions of violent acts against women that had ultimately 
zeroed in on pornography as the main offender.143 She was part of an internecine struggle 
between feminist factions, labeled “anti-pornography” and “sex positive,” that began in the late 
1970s and continued through the early 1980s, becoming increasingly acrimonious. The fight 
itself was centered on a range of media representations of violent acts against women, all of 
which it grouped under the umbrella term “violence against women.”  
While many anti-pornography activists professed a link between mass media debasement 
of women and increases in the number and severity of violent sexual acts against them, 
MacKinnon and Dworkin believed that pornography itself was the root cause of all violence 
against women. In Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, MacKinnon wrote, “Pornography, in 
the feminist view, is a form of forced sex, a practice of sexual politics, and institution of gender 
inequality.”144 In the early 1980s she and fellow activist Andrea Dworkin proposed treating 
pornography itself as a violation of women’s civil rights and allowing women harmed by 
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pornography to seek damages through civil lawsuits.145 According to this strategy, women could 
bring lawsuits for damages against producers, sellers, exhibitors or distributors of pornography.  
Together MacKinnon and Dworkin introduced anti-pornography ordinances in several 
cities throughout the country, and versions of the ordinance were passed in Minneapolis in 1983 
and in Indianapolis in 1984, but were blocked by city officials and struck down by courts, on the 
grounds that each violated First Amendment freedom of speech protections. While the anti-
pornography ordinances died after a last gasp effort to have them instituted in Massachusetts in 
1992.146 Several of their distinctive features—the legal argument that sexual violence violated 
women’s civil rights and the merger of several categories of sexual violence into a larger 
overarching group—would find new life in VAWA. 
  
Post-ERA Feminism:  
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back 
Ronald Reagan’s election as president in 1980 marked the ascendancy of the New Right, 
which was openly antagonistic to the feminist movement.147 In many respects, there was an 
outright political backlash against the gains that feminism had made during the previous decade, 
which forced many feminist groups to reorient themselves.148 The Republican Party removed the 
ERA from its platform for the first time in almost forty years, provoking a deep split between the 
                                                
145 Dworkin authored ten books of radical feminist theory including Pornography: Men Possessing Women which 
argued that the pornography industry was directly responsible for violence against women, both because it abuses 
women who work in the genre and because it encourages men to eroticize domination of and violence against 
women. Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (New York: Perigee Books, 1981). 
146 Catharine A. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). 
147 Anne N. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion: A Political Process Interpretation of the Women’s Movement 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 99. 
148 Christina Wolbrecht, “Explaining Women’s Rights Realignment: Convention Delegates, 1972-1992,” Political 
Behavior 24, no. 3 (2002): 237–82.  
49 
two major political parties on the issue of women’s rights.149 In 1981, Reagan closed the Office 
of Domestic Violence.150 
Popular culture, too, contributed to an anti-feminist climate. Susan Faludi’s Backlash 
documents the extent to which the independence of cultural icons in shows of the 1980s such as 
Cagney & Lacey was scaled back to reflect a supposedly more feminine ethos.151 Movies such as 
Fatal Attraction offered a cautionary tale about the dangers of feminism’s boundary breaking.152 
Mainstream acceptance of many feminist ideas, while a boon for the movement in some 
ways, led to a bureaucratization and concurrent political defanging, sapping much of the vital 
energy from feminist efforts at change.153 Throughout the 1980s, distinctions between the liberal 
and radical wings of the movement continued to blur as liberal groups began to address formerly 
taboo topics and radical groups became more institutionalized social service providers.154 
NOW faced the difficult task of refocusing its members’ efforts after the defeat of the 
ERA and changed tack to focus on electoral politics, using a less strident approach for the group 
in particular and the feminist movement in general.155 While from this point on, some of NOW’s 
basic agenda items, particularly reproductive rights and gay and lesbian rights, would become 
more liberal than those of other groups.  
NOW LDEF began to focus more strongly on the educational aspects of its mission. In 
1980, NOW LDEF joined with the National Association of Women Judges to establish the 
National Judicial Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men in the Courts 
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(NJEP). NJEP pioneered the documentation of gender bias in courts.156 NJEP's judicial education 
programs were the catalyst for a series of task forces established by state chief justices and 
federal circuit councils to examine gender bias in their own court systems.  
 In 1984, after a report by a New Jersey task force on gender bias—itself established 
through the work and leadership of NJEP—garnered national attention, the NJEP established a 
task force of its own to encourage each state to examine gender bias.157 The movement to do so 
gained steam when the 1988 joint annual meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices and the 
Conference of State Court Administrators got behind NJEP and urged chief justices to create 
their own state task forces. The group created educational campaigns aimed at members of the 
judiciary around particular issues to promote access to the justice system and equality for women 
and men in the courts.158 In 1982, New Jersey’s chief justice created the first state Supreme 
Court task force on gender bias in the courts. That year, the Conference of Chief Justices and the 
Conference of State Court Administrators adopted resolutions that every state should have a task 
force to examine gender bias and minority concerns in its courts. So popular did these 
conferences become that, in 1989, the first National Conference on Gender Bias in the Courts at 
the National Center for State Courts was held.159 
During the 1980s, NOW LDEF focused its legislative efforts on the decade’s long fight 
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to end employment discrimination Title VII and NOW’s critical issue—reproductive rights—
while continuing to work for the ERA at the state and local level, in spite of the amendment’s 
very public federal death. In 1979, NOW LDEF and the Women’s Law Project had established 
an ERA Impact Project for just this purpose. In 1982, the project won its first state ERA case, 
supporting the right of Pennsylvania women to be volunteer firefighters.160 
 
The Further Mainstreaming of Feminist Ideas About Rape 
During the 1980s, ideas about rape that feminists had introduced during the previous 
decade began to gain traction with the public to an unprecedented degree. The structural 
transformation in sexual crime laws led to a huge increase in the number of rape cases reported 
and brought to trial. Take Back the Night marches, begun in the mid 1970s as a more public 
outgrowth of consciousness-raising groups, continued steadily and became regular features in 
cities and on college campuses. While coverage of rape in the media continued to be problematic 
for feminists, the sheer volume of this coverage expanded greatly.161 Images of rape proliferated 
in film and on TV as well, and became an object of public fascination.162  
Media, scrutiny of rape trials became so intense that, in the spring of 1984, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Criminal Law, of which Biden was a member, held a 
hearing on the impact of media coverage on rape trials to explore a compromise between the 
public’s right to know and the discomfort that new and intense exposure caused rape 
survivors.163 At the same time, the number of rape crisis centers, which had peaked in the late 
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1970s at over 400, had slowly begun to decline in 1977. In a process described by Gottschalk 
and Bumiller, many of these centers had become dependent on government funding and thus lost 
the ability to model the transformative social change they had believed possible in their earliest 
days.  
 
Feminism and Victims’ Rights  
NCASA became fully ensconced in the victims’ rights movement, and began actively 
supporting federal victims’ legislation. In 1982 NCASA supported the passage of the Federal 
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, designed to sensitize the federal criminal justice 
system to victims’ needs and provide legal protection from intimidation of witnesses.164 
It also worked in 1984 for passage of VOCA, which created a federal fund to compensate 
crime victims via the fines paid by criminals, granting priority to survivors of rape or domestic 
violence. Strapped for money, rape and domestic violence groups tapped into VOCA to keep 
their doors open. For example, the Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault received its first 
allocation of federal VOCA funds and used them to allow rape crisis centers to hire full-time 
advocates.165 
Historian Nancy Matthews uses California as a case study to explore the extent to which 
government funding pushed rape crisis centers to embrace the goals of state agencies, such as 
shoring up mental health and assisting law enforcement.166 California is particularly useful as a 
case study because there the life of the LEAA was extended through the creation of the Office of 
Criminal Justice Programs (OCJP), which continued to fund rape crisis centers even after the 
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LEAA’s demise in 1979. The OCJP put pressure on rape crisis centers to forfeit their political 
goals and focus instead on providing more tangible social services, going so far as withholding 
funds from groups that refused to do so. Affiliation with law enforcement allowed rape crisis 
centers to prosper in a way that clinging to the founding principles of the anti-rape movement did 
not. Feminist ideology, which related the frequency of rape to women’s oppression, was both 
marginalized and at times suppressed. The rape crisis centers that profited the most were those 
that more closely affiliated themselves with state-sanctioned goals.167  
Domestic violence shelters fared somewhat better during the 1980s than rape crisis 
centers.168 In fact, by the end of the 1980s, most funding for shelters came directly from the state. 
Both rape crisis centers and domestic violence shelters were forced to apply for and accept 
government funding in order to survive. As the two structures became more dependent on 
government money, they were forced to be more accountable to outside authorities and 
concurrently to focus on temporary rather than long-term solutions to domestic violence.169  
 
The War on Crime Becomes the War on Drugs 
Reagan’s presidency heralded a renewed interest in the law and order rubric. Following 
the lead of his conservative predecessors, Reagan expended a huge amount of energy on what he 
termed “crime in the streets” and argued that policing and social control were essential to the 
government’s real “constitutional” obligation.170 In 1982, Reagan focused the crime fight on 
drugs, officially declaring a war on drugs. His Comprehensive Crime Control Act, passed in 
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1984, was a turning point for federal criminal justice.171 It continued the expansion of the federal 
government’s participation in tacking crime issues that had previously been viewed as the 
purview of state and local governments. Key among its measures were the Bail Reform Act, 
which made possible sometimes-lengthy pre-trial detention of defendants who were deemed 
dangerous, and the Sentencing Reform Act, which created the United States Sentencing 
Commission, an independent judicial agency tasked with determining sentencing guidelines for 
federal courts.172  
During Biden’s tenure, Biden, who had first been elected to his Delaware Senate seat in 
1972, took the first steps toward becoming the Democratic point person in the fight on crime. In 
1984 Biden introduced and, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, helped usher through the 
passage of Reagan’s Comprehensive Crime Control Act.173 Then, in 1986, Biden joined in 
pushing for the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which had been introduced by Senate Majority Leader 
Bob Dole. The bill substantially increased federal penalties for possession and sale of even small 
quantities of the crack cocaine ravaging cities.174 It was Biden himself who proposed the 100-to-
1 sentencing disparity codified between crack and powdered cocaine. 175 Penalties for possession 
of powder cocaine, associated with more affluent residents of mostly-white suburbs, were only a 
fraction as harsh as those for crack, associated with poorer urban blacks.176 Many scholars argue 
that those sentencing differentials have led to significantly higher incarceration rates for 
blacks.177 Indeed, looking back on his decision in 2007, Biden remarked on the floor of the 
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I joined senators (Robert) Byrd and Dole in leading the effort to enact the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986, which established the current 100-to-1 disparity….Our intentions 
were good but we got it wrong….It is…clear that the harsh crack penalties have had a 
disproportionate impact on the African-American.178 
 
Biden's aggressive manner did not win him universal admiration, especially among 
liberals, but many appreciated his determination to make crime a winning issue for Democrats—
the party that had been derided as “soft on crime” since the Goldwater days. “Give me the crime 
issue,” the senator would plead repeatedly to Democratic Party caucuses, one staff member 
recalled, “and you'll never have trouble with it in an election.”179  
Perhaps not coincidentally, Biden’s interest in crime prevention spiked in 1987. After 
bowing out of his bid for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination that September, he 
ensconced himself in the world of law enforcement. His biographer pointedly counters unnamed 
critics who claimed that Biden’s frequent excursions to police organization meetings in the late 
1980s showed an intensive interest in crime prevention that “may have been seen by skeptics as a 
conspicuous effort by Biden to rehabilitate himself in the wake of his…presidential bid.”180  
In 1988, Biden and the Republican vice president, George H.W. Bush, began what would 
become an ongoing tug-of-war over control of the crime issue when Bush made fighting crime a 
key issue of his own presidential election campaign.181  
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The 1990s 
In many ways the early 1990s were a liminal period in American society’s coming to 
terms with the fact of sexual violence against women. The number of groups doing feminist 
advocacy had continued to shrink throughout the 1980s. What few rape crisis centers remained 
had long lost their revolutionary agenda.  
High-profile rape cases continued to receive comprehensive media coverage, as did the 
Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, which included contentious discussion of sexual 
harassment. A media backlash against the idea of date rape also began to gather speed and 
ferocity. Legislation addressing violence against women had both gains and losses. While 
feminist lawmakers were thwarted in their attempts to have gender included in hate crimes 
legislation, anti-stalking laws were put on the books for the first time, opening up the door for 
the inclusion of anti-stalking language in VAWA. 
 
Rape in the Public Consciousness 
A series of highly publicized rape cases involving public figures escalated newspaper and 
TV frenzy around the issue. This began in 1991 with the trial and acquittal of Kennedy scion and 
Rhode Island House of Representatives member William Kennedy Smith. The coverage of the 
1993 trial and conviction of boxer Mike Tyson for the rape of 18-year-old Miss Black Rhode 
Island was detailed and became a national obsession. Media fascination peaked when football 
star O.J. Simpson was shown fleeing the police police on national TV after supposedly 
murdering his wife and her companion. The subsequently sensationalized trial was termed by 
many “the trial of the century” and became even more notorious after Simpson was acquitted. 
During a period when rape and violence against women was becoming ever-more present in the 
57 
public's consciousness, the three cases by such high profile public figures kept the issue in the 
spotlight.  
Sociology professor Neil Gilbert 1991 article “The Phantom Epidemic of Sexual Assault” 
emphasized women’s responsibility for rape and challenged the veracity of the numerous reports 
that documented date rape’s prevalence.182 Many of the criticisms were ostensibly aimed at Mary 
Koss’s 1985 Ms. magazine-sponsored study of date rape but actually took aim at feminism itself. 
There was a class component to much of the criticism. Koss’s study had been of date rape on 
college campuses, hardly an environment or populace representative of American women as a 
whole. Critics seized on this focus on colleges and college students to support allegations that 
feminists did not speak to the needs or desires of the average woman, instead remaining locked 
in self-referential ivory-tower conversations with themselves. Katie Roiphe’s widely disputed 
1994 book The Morning After: Fear, Sex and Feminism, scoffed at Koss’s assertions and tried to 
cast doubt on the idea of date rape’s prevalence.183 
 
Clarence Thomas Hearings 
In July 1991, Biden presided over the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justice 
Clarence Thomas, during which Thomas faced very public allegations of sexual harassment by 
Anita Hill, who testified to his harassment some ten years earlier, when she had worked for him 
at the EEOC. These hearings are often credited with raising national awareness of sexual 
harassment and inspiring the “Year of the Woman,” in which, for the first time, four women 
were elected to the Senate in a single year. After the debacle of the Thomas hearings, in fact, 
Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) said of VAWA, “There was a strong message sent in the last 
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election that women and women’s issues were not being addressed in Congress. That helps 
passage of bills like this.”184 One writer from The New Republic quipped, “Most of the bill’s 
[VAWA’s] co-sponsors seem to view the legislation as merely the latest stop on the road of 
Anita Hill penance.”185  
 
                                                





“SOMETHING ON WOMEN FOR THE CRIME BILL” 
 
The 1968 crime bill provided the legislative template for both the Safe Streets for Women 
subtitle of VAWA and several other sections of the crime bill. Including VAWA in a larger anti-
crime bill made legislative sense because of the convergence of the anti-rape and tough-on-crime 
and victims’ rights movements during the 1980s. The designation of VAWA’s rape provision as 
“Safe Streets for Women” can likewise be seen as logical. The image of streets, which had first 
been used as a metaphor in the 1960s, continued to be resonant in 1990.  
Biden introduced VAWA in June 1990 when he was chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, a position he held from 1987 through 1994, the year VAWA passed. As Nourse 
explained in an autobiographical piece, VAWA was considered “something on women” to be 
added to the crime bill. Although it was not incorporated into the crime bill until 1993, VAWA 
was structured to be part of that act and is best understood in the context of the crime bill’s 
architecture and goals.  
VAWA’s eventual incorporation into a larger piece of legislation focused on reducing 
violence and controlling crime signaled the continuation of the ongoing movement of the public 
understanding of violence against women away from its feminist origins. While feminists had 
stressed empowering women and recognizing systemic, endemic violence against women as 
symptomatic of society’s larger structural flaws those supporting VAWA focused on 
empowering police to do their jobs and treating violence against women as unexceptional 
criminal activity. In the end, VAWA followed broader trends in criminal justice, concentrating 
on more and harsher punishments, mandatory minimum sentences, mandatory restitution for 
victims, and the involvement of law enforcement in community policing. Rather than providing 
60 
funding directly to rape crisis or domestic violence shelters, the bill adopted the 1968 crime bill’s 
block grant formula. 
The opposition to both the fact and theory of VAWA’s civil rights remedy was a clear 
indication that it was only by packaging the bill as a law-and-order measure that it was made 
palatable to those who surely would have rejected it. The civil rights remedy was—in wording at 
least—a nugget of more radical feminism in a law-and-order package. VAWA’s more punitive 
provisions made the civil rights remedy palatable to non-feminists and in turn the civil rights 
remedy made VAWA’s more punitive provisions palatable to feminists. 
In order to situate the provisions of VAWA within their historical and political context, 
this chapter begins with a discussion of the introduction of the bill that would come to be called 
“Biden’s” crime bill.186 Next, the chapter introduces the politicians and policy people who wrote 
VAWA, ushered it through Congress and helped amass support for its passage. Finally, it 
reviews the major components of VAWA, taking a section-by-section look at the provisions of 
the bill in order to prepare for a more in-depth exploration of the particular ideas and ideologies 
embedded in each section.  
 
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act Revisited 
The bill that would come to be called “Biden’s” crime bill, the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act, emerged within the bitter partisan conflict of the late 1980s. This section 
describes the two parties’ initial wrangling over the issue of violent crime—the Republicans led 
by President Bush and the Democrats led by Biden—then briefly surveys the provisions of the 
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crime bill that were at issue. Finally, it touches upon a common theme in both parties’ 
approaches to the violent crime: a latent racism that critics recognized in the crime bill from the 
very beginning. 
 
“Not a Democratic or a Republican issue” 
Beginning in February 1989, Bush and Biden introduced competing crime bills.187 When 
addressing the nation about his crime policy, Bush picked up an earlier refrain of safe streets and 
the emphasis on expanded law enforcement saying, 
…we are determined to enforce the law, to make our streets and neighborhoods safe. So, 
to start, I'm proposing that we more than double Federal assistance to State and local law 
enforcement. Americans have a right to safety in and around their homes.188 
 
Biden, determined to take the issue back from him, argued that recent Democratic anti-
crime legislative initiatives had neutralized crime to the point that “it was not a Democratic or a 
Republican issue.”189 Biden’s bill, introduced in November 1989, proposed $900 million in 
funding for law enforcement to Bush’s $450 million; 1,000 police strike forces to Bush’s 89, and 
1,000 drug agents to Bush’s 272.190 Although the Senate approved Biden’s crime bill in 1990, 
there was too much partisan bickering for it to become law during the Bush administration. 
Biden may have outmaneuvered Bush in claiming the crime issue, but Bush was ultimately able 
to block the passage of Biden’s bill.191 Both Bush’s and Biden’s bills framed the fight against 
crime as a fight against drugs, which Bush called “the gravest domestic threat facing our nation 
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today” and Biden referred to as “the number one threat to our national security.”192 
Bush’s presidency ended before he and Biden could settle their dispute. During his first 
presidential campaign, President Clinton had signaled an emphasis on crime and crime control 
by putting his campaigning temporarily on hold to travel to his home state of Arkansas to preside 
over an execution.193 In the early days of his presidency, however, he shifted his focus from 
crime to healthcare reform, ignoring the advice of his transition staff to create a national crime 
strategy with VAWA as a key component.194 Clinton picked up the issue again only after the first 
100 days of his presidency had passed, as it became clear that his administration would not be 
able to realize his health insurance reform agenda.195 Remarks made to The New York Times by 
Clinton’s first deputy attorney general about Clinton’s revised strategy were a reminder of the 
politicized nature of the war on crime: 
Clinton…emphasized a moralistic message almost to the exclusion of practical measures 
to reduce crime on the streets. It’s been the most careful political calculation, with 
absolutely sublime indifference to the real nature of the problem. School uniforms, 
curfews, sexual predators—he’s appealing to social conservatives.196 
 
Biden’s career-long commitment to tough-on-crime legislation dovetailed nicely with 
Clinton’s renewed interest in fighting crime. The president’s newfound ownership of the crime 
issue increased the likelihood that Biden’s bill would pass.  
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In August 1993, Clinton held a press conference to announce an agreement with 
congressional leadership about the need for and structure of a new crime bill. Clinton did not 
make passage of VAWA a priority, and instead focused his attention on what he viewed as the 
most important sections of the crime bill: community policing, prison “boot camps,” expansion 
of drug courts, safety in schools, and the assault weapons ban.197 Biden reintroduced his crime 
bill again the following September, and saw the bill voted out of the Senate that same November. 
 
Provisions of the Crime Bill 
When the Biden-sponsored crime bill finally passed both houses of Congress in August 
1994, it became the largest crime bill in the history of the nation. It greatly expanded federal 
spending on law enforcement and included the largest-ever expansion of the federal death 
penalty.198 It also provided $30.2 billion in federal funding for anti-crime measures and markedly 
increased federal involvement in municipal and state crime control efforts, including earmarking 
$8.8 billion for the hiring of 100,000 new police officers, $7.9 billion for state construction 
grants for new prisons, and introducing incentives for states to adopt truth-in-sentencing laws 
requiring repeat offenders to serve at least eighty-five percent of their sentences. In addition, the 
bill allotted $7 billion to fund grants to cities, schools, and non-profit crime prevention programs 
to pay for afterschool recreation, tutoring, job placement assistance, and substance abuse 
prevention as well as block grants to local governments for education and research programs to 
prevent juvenile violence, gang participation, and drug sales.  
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Furthermore, the crime bill stiffened criminal penalties in a number of different ways. It 
increased federal minimum penalties for many crimes—including adding new offenses that 
could be punished by death, made a number of these infractions federal crimes for the first time; 
and imposed what is colloquially known as the “three-strikes law”— a mandatory sentence of 
life imprisonment without parole for those convicted of a third serious violent felony.199 
 
Race and the Crime Bill 
From the start, detractors of the crime bill argued that its measures, especially the three 
strikes provision, would inordinately affect blacks and Native Americans. While the bill was still 
in Congress, members of the Congressional Black Caucus had tried to temper the negative 
effects of the crime bill by endorsing a Racial Justice Act addendum, which contained provisions 
reducing racial disparities in death penalty sentences, and bolstering the bill’s crime prevention 
components.200 Their efforts, however, were thwarted.201  
In their study of the intense sparring around the crime bill’s funding for midnight 
basketball games—a small line item in the bill that came to be used as shorthand for crime 
prevention measures as a whole—sociologists Darren Wheelock and Douglas Hartmann argue 
that Republicans scuttled attempts to create a more balanced crime bill by using coded racial 
rhetoric that drew upon deeply entrenched images associating crime with young African-
American men.202 They used veiled references linking race to criminality to subtly undercut 
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arguments for the effectiveness of crime prevention programs.203 Their analysis makes clear the 
extent to which discussions of crime were steeped in and inextricable from inherited assumptions 
about race as well as the opaqueness that characterized conversations about race.  
 
The Introduction of VAWA: “Something On Women for the Crime Bill” 
When VAWA was introduced, it included the civil rights remedy and two additional titles 
more closely aligned with the rest of the crime bill—the Safe Streets for Women and Safe 
Homes for Women acts. VAWA inherited its parent bill’s focus on fighting crime; of the crime 
bill’s $30 billion, $1.6 billion was apportioned to VAWA. Of that, roughly half, or close to $800 
million, was allotted to training grants for law enforcement. 
Because several conflicting narratives exist describing VAWA’s introduction, there is no 
way to know for certain why Biden decided to introduce VAWA when and how he did. It is not 
out of the question that Biden was influenced by other interest in rape and domestic violence on 
Capitol Hill during the spring and summer of 1990. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) 
introduced a House hearing on rape by remarking that it was the “‘in” thing for Congress to be 
talking about rape.”204 Indeed, both rape and domestic violence received a fair amount of 
Congressional interest that spring and fall. In April, Senator Daniel Coats (R-IN) presided over 
the hearing Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home.205 Then in May, Senator Arlen Specter 
(R-PA) introduced a resolution designating October “National Domestic Violence Awareness 
Month.” In September, Coats and Biden together introduced the Domestic Violence Prevention 
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Act.206  
The timing of VAWA’s introduction was certainly influenced by the extent to which the 
issue violence against women had lost so many of its feminist overtones in the political arena and 
had evolved to fit seamlessly into a larger crime bill focused on punishment and prosecution. 
Standing up against violence against women had also become conventional enough that Biden 
could sponsor VAWA and appear feminist with only minimal risk to his mainstream liberal 
persona.  
 
Crafting VAWA  
An examination of the first-person accounts of VAWA’s introduction by Biden, 
Goldfarb, Nourse, and MacKinnon reveals as much about competing claims to ownership of the 
issues VAWA addressed as it does about the actual history of the bill.22 Biden recounted his 
version of VAWA’s introduction in his autobiography, Promises to Keep: On Life and Politics, 
framing the discovery of violence against women as his own. He related, 
I was constantly watching the crime statistics for anomalies and new problems. …While 
looking at Bureau of Justice crime statistics in 1990, I was struck by a particular number. 
The violent crimes perpetrated against men had fallen greatly in the previous ten years; 
the number of violent crimes against young women trended up.  
 
For this reason, Biden continued, “In 1990, I assigned one of my staff on Judiciary [Nourse] full-
time to the problem of violence against women.”207 
Biden not only took credit for conceptualizing the legislation, he also took credit for 
noticing the problem of rape in the first place. He did not situate his story in a feminist past, but 
rather framed it as a tale about numbers and crime. Furthermore, he implied that he had never 
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fully understood the size of the problem of rape before 1990. Neither this account nor any of his 
many public statements to Congress made any significant mention of the decades of feminist 
activism that raised public awareness of rape and necessarily preceded VAWA’s 
introduction. Indeed, VAWA’s murky provenance was relatively divorced from any feminist 
context in Biden’s description, which presented VAWA as having arisen as orphan legislation, 
unencumbered by any previous legislative efforts, or grassroots political organizing. 
This explanation also, misleadingly, set Biden up as the lone man on Capitol Hill fighting for 
women’s rights, disingenuously discounting other legislative attempts to address rape and 
domestic violence.  
The implication behind this telling of this account was that Biden had played a huge role 
in the discovery of the issues of rape and domestic violence. There is a certain political utility to 
this claim. Biden introduced VAWA in June 1990, following Coats’ domestic violence hearing. 
Violence against women had generated a degree of congressional interest, a fact that perhaps did 
not escape Biden. VAWA fit like a puzzle piece into the larger crime bill. Biden could add 
“something on women” to the crime bill and burnish his both pro-woman and tough-on-crime 
credentials simultaneously.  
While understanding the importance of Biden’s contribution to anti-violence efforts, and 
often praising him for his bravery, the staff at NOW LDEF ultimately saw VAWA not as a the 
starting point, but as the culmination of years of work by feminists. In a 1991 action alert NOW 
distributed on the act, the organization wrote,  
For two decades the women's movement has been supporting battered women's shelters, 
staffing rape crisis hot lines and passing laws at the local and state level that attempt to 
address the problem of violence against women. We almost enacted national domestic 
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violence legislation in 1980, but lost in the tide of the Reagan election. …WE MUST 
TRY AGAIN.208 
 
Not surprisingly, NOW LDEF staff conceptualized Biden’s contribution as “an attempt to bring 
national attention and federal leadership to our efforts.”209  
Unlike Biden, when discussing VAWA’s introduction Goldfarb, Nourse and MacKinnon 
focused much more strongly on the civil rights’ remedy’s provision of additional legal redress 
for women rather than on the criminality of rape.  
Goldfarb recounted that her participation in VAWA began with her meeting 
Nourse, to whom she had never before spoken. Goldfarb was thrilled to learn that the federal 
government would throw its power and resources behind improvements in law enforcement, 
prevention, and victim services, but thought that, “most important of all, this legislation would 
declare for the first time that crimes of violence motivated by the victim's gender are a violation 
of the victim's civil rights.”210  
Goldfarb had studied law under MacKinnon and thus was familiar with her legal theories 
about pornography and civil rights. It was these theories that created the scaffolding for the civil 
rights remedy seen by NOW LDEF as VAWA's pièce de résistance. Thus Goldfarb’s account of 
VAWA’s creation duly stressed the civil rights remedy itself, the portion of the bill to 
which NOW LDEF was most dedicated.  
Nourse’s account was included as part of an essay on her “accidental” relationship to 
feminism.211 As she told it, because she was the only woman in the room of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, she was “faced with the vague injunction from the chairman” of drafting “something 
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on women for the ‘crime bill.’”212 Nourse did not mention having received any specific guidance 
from Biden or anyone else on the Judiciary Committee about the form that VAWA should 
take. Thus, she recounted that “…first, I needed some ladies. Having no real ones present, I went 
in search of virtual ladies…In the law library of Congress.”213 There she found a trove of work 
by feminist legal theorists.214 Nourse’s account does not mention speaking to Goldfarb. It does 
make a passing reference to MacKinnon’s work on pornography as a civil rights violation. In her 
rendition, Biden thought of the legislation but she came up with the architecture of it from 
scratch. This account negates the very real presence of a cadre of feminist lawyers in Washington 
at precisely the time she was at the library, giving her all the credit for a piece of legislation that 
was undeniably a collaborative effort.  
In striking contrast to Nourse, MacKinnon contends that she was, in fact, the author of 
VAWA’s civil rights remedy. MacKinnon recounted that she herself: 
…conceived the idea for a federal civil sex discrimination law for rape and domestic 
violence and proposed it to Sally Goldfarb by phone (I was in a taxi in Washington D.C. 
and used the taxi-driver’s phone). It is fundamentally the same theory as the legal claim 
for sexual harassment, which I conceived, and the anti-pornography ordinances, which 
Andrea Dworkin and I conceived and wrote. Sally conveyed the idea for a federal civil 
rights law based on sex to address rape and domestic violence to Victoria Nourse, who 
was working for Biden at the time. I was told by Sally that Biden “wanted to do 
something for women…”215 
 
Whoever actually wrote VAWA’s civil rights remedy was necessarily indebted to 
MacKinnon, whose scholarship had for years focused on violence against women as a violation 
of civil liberties. As MacKinnon herself pointed out, this was essentially the same claim used for 
the anti-pornography ordinances. Whereas the anti-pornography ordinances had asserted that 
because pornography caused violence it was a violation of women’s civil rights, the civil rights 
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remedy claimed, much more simply, that the violence itself was a violation of women’s civil 
rights. In her conception, violence against women is a synecdoche, standing in for all 
discrimination against women. Because of gender-based violence, American women and girls 
are relegated to a form of second-class citizenship. When explaining why she was not more vocal 
at the time about her authorship MacKinnon recalled: 
I stayed silent about it because I didn't want the VAWA stigmatized. The stigma of 
pornography could have been fatal. …I offered drafting language repeatedly through 
Sally in the process...216 
 
Indeed, an association of VAWA with anti-pornography activism would not have worked in 
VAWA’s favor. The ideological background for the civil rights remedy was much more radical 
than that of the rest of the bill. MacKinnon’s participation in its crafting was perhaps, as she 
alludes, kept under wraps because she herself was such a controversial figure. Linking 
pornography and violence and civil rights had been hugely contentious, but largely because of 
the First Amendment implications. Linking violence against women to civil rights, however, was 
not without debate. 
 
The Competition to Shape VAWA 
Wherever the first seeds of VAWA were planted, once Biden introduced the bill to 
Congress the competition to shape its provisions quickly became fierce. When VAWA was 
introduced, it included the civil rights remedy and two additional titles more closely aligned with 
the rest of the crime bill—Safe Streets for Women and Safe Homes for Women. In the four years 
before VAWA was passed, legislators from both parties tried on several occasions to have the 
crime bill absorb large chunks of VAWA. In addition, several Republican rivals of Biden 
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introduced their own competing legislation, and were steadfast in their desire to help shape the 
issue and even to wrest it from Democrats. Chief among these were Senator Bob Dole (R-KS), 
the Senate Republicans’ leader from 1987 to 1995, and Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), who 
became the ranking minority member of the Judiciary Committee in 1993.217 They consistently 
worked to reshape VAWA to fit their own agendas, which frequently meant suggesting the 
addition of more punitive measures, and the removal of the proposed civil rights remedy. Dole 
and Hatch both introduced competing violence against women legislation to try to influence the 
final shape of VAWA.218  
The complicated intersections between the tough-on-crime and women’s rights 
discourses evident in VAWA were something that Biden’s Republican rival in the Senate, Bob 
Dole, attempted to manipulate when discussing his competing bill. While Biden used VAWA to 
prove his status as the Democrat’s go-to man on crime, Dole sought to undercut Biden’s crime-
fighting credentials. While Biden attempted to manipulate traditionally Republican rhetoric to 
forward Democratic aims, Dole tried to wrest ownership of this language back from Biden, 
questioning Biden’s commitment to attacking crime. Dole tried to undermine Biden by 
emphasizing the complicated worlds Biden was attempting to straddle, and the difficulty likely to 
ensue from such a stance, with comments such as these: 
These proposals [in Dole’s “Women’s Equal Opportunity Bill”] have created a dilemma 
for the Democratic leadership in Congress: Supporting these measures would run counter 
to their usual identification with criminal defense interests. However, opposing them 
would mean being on the wrong side of anti-rape, pro-women measures.219 
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Dole also taunted Biden for softening anti-crime provisions in his omnibus crime legislation, 
calling it a “pseudo-crime bill” and arguing: 
The Democrats…unilaterally worked out their own “compromise” bill before the 
meeting, which consistently incorporated measures…that weakened existing law and 
largely discarded important pro-law enforcement measures.220 
 
While Biden wrote comprehensive crime legislation into which he later enveloped 
measures addressing violence against women, the Republicans’ crime bill included violence 
against women measures from the start. Dole made sure to point this fact out, arguing that Biden 
was not truly interested in helping women, and that his own bill was “more pro-women and more 
anti-criminal than any bill introduced by the Democratic leadership.”221 Each time VAWA came 
to markup, Dole and other senators attempted to attach crime-related amendments to it. Several 
of these, such as the death penalty for rape/murders and introduction of a defendant’s prior 
record at trial were ultimately inserted elsewhere in the crime bill VAWA was attached to, even 
though Biden initially thought they were not appropriate additions to the bill.222 
In February 1991, Dole introduced the Women’s Equal Opportunity Act. Like VAWA, it 
included stronger penalties for sexual assault, increased restitution for survivors of sexual assault 
and provisions for the creation of a national task force on violence against women. Unlike 
VAWA, however, in place of a civil rights cause of action for gender-motivated violence, Dole’s 
act included an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to allow penalties for workplace-
related sexual harassment. Its final component was a Glass Ceiling Commission to work on 
expanding employment opportunities for women. The Department of Justice threw its support 
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behind Dole’s bill because of its stronger focus on more effective law enforcement measures.223 
Representatives Susan Molinari, a moderate Republican from New York, and Jon Kyl, a victims’ 
rights-oriented conservative Republican from Arizona introduced Dole’s bill in the House.  
By September 1992, when no action had been taken on the Women’s Equal Opportunity 
Act, Dole reintroduced it in a slightly different form, at the same time remarking that,  
President Bush has always supported and proposed the toughest possible provisions to get 
tough with sexual offenders. The chairman of the Judiciary Committee has also proposed 
legislation on this topic, although it is much, much, weaker than the legislation I 
introduce today, or that which the President has proposed. I ask my friends on the other 
side of the aisle to look again at this legislation, to look again at the epidemic of violence 
against women, and to join those of us who want to pass the toughest legislation 
possible.224 
 
The new legislation’s sexual violence title included increased penalties for rapists and 
mandated testing people charged with sexual assault for HIV, something that the VAWA task 
force strongly opposed. Nourse worked with Hatch to arrange a hearing about his and Biden’s 
bills in Salt Lake City. The grassroots response Hatch saw there was enough to convince Hatch 
to support VAWA’s passage. For the first time, the Democrats had a strong Republican voice to 
push for the bill’s passage.  
At the Judiciary Committee’s business meeting in May 1993, Biden, Hatch, and Dole 
wrote alternate phrasing for the civil rights provision which all three could support, making 
passage of VAWA much more likely.225 The new wording promised to make the bill more 
palatable across the political spectrum. Biden remembered that in November 1993, when VAWA 
had finally garnered much more support, “I knew the crime bill we’d voted out of Judiciary had 
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strong bipartisan support in the Senate that year … So I added the Violence Against Women Act 
to the bill.”226 Working together on the civil rights remedy, Biden and Hatch developed language 
that defined discriminatory motivation and limited the use of the civil rights remedy to 
felonies.227 
Biden attached VAWA to the crime bill while negotiating the terms of the crime bill 
itself. In order to ensure acceptance of VAWA’s addition to the crime bill, Biden cut a backroom 
deal with Phil Gramm (R-TX), the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee.228 With 
Hatch’s encouragement, Gramm agreed to back VAWA if funding for the crime bill came from 
monies gained through the reduction of the size of the federal work force. Ultimately, the Clinton 
administration cut 300,000 people from the government payroll to pay for the crime bill.229  
During the summer of 1994, the House and Senate went into conference to discuss the 
crime bill to which VAWA had been attached. Both the House and Senate passed the bill, which 
President Clinton signed into law on September 13. 
 
VAWA Section by Section 
When VAWA finally passed, it included its original three titles—Safe Streets for 
Women, Safe Homes for Women, and Civil Rights for Women—plus additional titles on judicial 
education and immigrant women’s rights. During the years between its introduction and passage, 
VAWA also gained and lost a title on campus safety, which was added in 1990 but spun off into 
a separate bill in 1992.  
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Subtitle A: Safe Streets for Women230 
The Safe Streets for Women subtitle ostensibly addressed sexual assault. In actuality, 
only its first chapter, “Federal Penalties for Sex Crimes,” addressed this crime alone. While some 
sexual assaults do, indeed, occur on the streets, certainly most do not.231 Mirroring the 1968 
crime bill, this part of VAWA classified crime by geography, a tricky proposition, as rape is not 
usually characterized by where it takes place. This resonance of the street metaphor can also be 
found in other parts of the rest of crime bill, such as the Safer Streets and Neighborhoods title. 
When promoting his crime bill on the floor of the Senate in 1990, Biden bragged, “It starts by 
attacking the crime and drug problem where it is most acutely felt, in the streets.”232 The 
implication of this understanding that rape is something that happens in the “streets” forces 
VAWA to fit into a mold that may not accurately address the issues at hand. While it does indeed 
focus on the criminality of rape, rape more often than not does not take place in the street, and 
there is no reference here to rape as violence particularly geared toward women. 
As part of the larger crime bill, this section did very little to address the particularities of 
rape, and goes much further toward punishing criminals than empowering women. Its law 
enforcement strategies mirrored those first introduced in the 1968 crime bill. Most of the Safe 
Streets for Women subtitle was focused on applying a variety of stricter law-and-order 
measures—including increased penalties for crimes, mandatory sentencing requirements, and 
earmarking of increased amounts of money to fighting crime. Indeed, this chapter of VAWA was 
primarily concerned punishment of criminals and, as such, was part of the larger project of the 
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Safe Streets, Chapter 1: Federal Penalties for Sex Crimes 
Sexual assault was one of several crimes—including manslaughter, arson, and various 
forms of drug trafficking—for which the crime bill mandated increased penalties. The first 
section of this chapter doubled the possible term of imprisonment for “repeat offenders”; those 
with prior convictions for any variety of sexual assault.233 The second directed the United States 
Sentencing Commission to consider increasing federal penalties where more than one person was 
involved in a sexual assault and where federal penalties were lower than state penalties.  
This section included one of only three mentions in VAWA of the disparities in 
understanding and reaction to “stranger” as opposed to “date” or “acquaintance” rape when it 
directed the United States Sentencing Commission to recommend changes to guidelines to 
address disparities between crimes when sex offenders are known to victim and those when he is 
not known. It also directed the commission to ensure that guidelines addressed the “general 
problem of recidivism in sex offenses.”234 This assumption of a higher rate of recidivism for 
offenders was contentious, at best.               
 This title also sought to standardize the mandatory restitution laws across the states. 235 
Restitution to crime victims had become a common demand in the victims’ rights movement, but 
since they were first instated in 1984, they had become a jumble of contradictions.  
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Before the Judiciary Committee marked up VAWA for the last time in 1993, the Federal 
Penalties for Sex Crimes title included increased mandatory minimum sentences for sexual 
assault and aggravated sexual assault. The VAWA task force spearheaded an effort to pressure 
Biden to reconsider this measure. Rather than increasing sentences outright, the section instead 
merely instructed the United States Sentencing Commission to review federal sentences and to 
pay special attention to topics identified by the task force as central.236 
House versions of the Federal Penalties for Sex Crimes chapter imagined the treatment of 
offenders very differently from their Senate counterparts. During the 102nd Congress, the House 
replaced the Senate’s penalties for sex offenders with mandated psychological treatment and 
rehabilitation. The bill also suggested supplementary chemical treatment, elsewhere known as 
“chemical castration.”237 In the 103rd Congress, the House bill removed psychological and 
chemical treatment and replaced it with “Offender Training and Information Programs.” Training 
was designed to assist probation and parole officers with “case management, supervision, and 
relapse prevention,” while Information Programs were designed to ensure that those being 
released from prison received information about sex offender treatment programs.238 The debate 
about the proper punishment of rapists touched upon numerous other debates related to the 
rapists’ identity. Castration had begun to receive attention in the mid-1980s, when it was first 
offered as an alternative to incarceration or as a condition for probation or early release.239 In 
1992, a Texas judge granted a rapist’s request to be castrated, starting such a firestorm of protest 
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that the judge decided to nullify his decision.240 If the rapist rapes because of his inherent nature 
as a rapist, can he be made to stop? Chapter 4 will examine the relationship between the identity 
of the rapist and the variety of approaches to “punishing,” “treating,” and “curing” him. 
As contentious as ideas about what should be done with those convicted of rape in prison 
were ideas of how they should be treated upon their release. The removal of penalties made the 
House version of this section in some ways less punitive than its Senate counterpart. The 
discrepancy between the two versions of this chapter was due to the fact that the part of the 
political conversation about being tough on crime involved the exact measurement of punitive 
ingredients—retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation—that should be included in 
the punishment recipe. The House version of this section included a complicated mix of more-
liberal, leaning toward rehabilitation, and more-conservative, tilting toward incapacitation.  
 
Safe Streets, Chapter 2: Law Enforcement and Prosecution Grants to Reduce Violent Crimes 
Against Women 
 
The law enforcement and prosecution grants—which received the bulk of VAWA’s 
funding— were the aspects of VAWA most obviously indebted to the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act. They shared the 1968 crime bill’s goal of developing and strengthening 
effective law enforcement and prosecution strategies and borrowed from the structure of that bill, 
creating what came to be known as “STOP” grants (an acronym for service, training, officers, 
protection)—block grants that gave funding directly to state and local law enforcement entities. 
These grants emphasized coordinated efforts between law enforcement, prosecutors and 
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community service groups. 241 While states had to certify that programs they developed would be 
coordinated with local, private, nonprofit service agencies such as rape crisis centers and battered 
women’s shelters, community groups had no actual authority over the structure of 
programming.242 Rape crisis centers and domestic violence shelters were locked out of a wide 
swath of funding if they did not want to involve the police in their activities. This lifeline, with 
many strings attached, is reminiscent of the LEAA and OCJP funding studied by Nancy 
Mathews.  
The Safe Streets Act’s focus on training and equipping law enforcement was mirrored by 
this chapter’s allocation of $800,000,000 for training and expanding law enforcement, 
researching and implementing new police policies and expanding data collection systems.  
This chapter’s stated focus on improving law enforcement was in sync with other crime 
prevention sections of the crime bill. For instance, the original language of this chapter, when 
introduced with the rest of VAWA in 1990, had discussed focusing efforts on the areas with the 
highest rates of violent crime against women. That language was moved to a special section on 
high-intensity-crime area grants in subsequent bills and then dropped from VAWA and moved to 
a generic crime prevention section of the crime bill. The high-intensity crime area grants tried to 
create similar kinds of anti-crime programs that involved a broad spectrum of community 
resources, including nonprofit community organizations and law enforcement agencies. 
The stated purposed of this chapter was “to develop and strengthen effective law 
enforcement and prosecution strategies to combat violent crimes against women.” It did not 
specifically mention sexual violence, a fact that further elided VAWA with the rest of the crime 
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bill. Money was earmarked for identifying and responding to violent crimes against women, 
including (but not limited to) the crimes of sexual assault and domestic violence. An early draft 
of this title gave money only to police and prosecutors. The VAWA task force had to push back 
against the assumption that police were in control by lobbying successfully for the addition of 
the possibility for rape crisis centers and domestic violence shelters to receive money directly.243  
 
Safe Streets, Chapter 3: Safety for Women in Public Transit and Public Parks  
Safety for Women in Public Transit and Public Parks, not a part of VAWA’s first draft, 
was added when the bill was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1990. It created 
grants for capital improvements to prevent crime in public transportation and parks by increasing 
the law enforcement presence there and adding more lights and security cameras at bus stops and 
parking lots.  
The 1990 Senate report on VAWA described this chapter as taking “simple, but 
necessary, measures to ensure that women can travel safely in public parks and on public 
transit.”244 While this chapter did allocate a small percentage of its funding toward a study of 
ways to increase safety for women in public parks, very little else in this section applies 
specifically to rape or domestic violence. In fact, this portion of VAWA has as much in common 
with the crime bill’s urban recreation measures as it does with other sections of VAWA itself.245 
The crime bill’s subtitle on urban recreation and at-risk youth included a section on “park and 
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recreation recovery programs.” This component of the bill aimed both to deter crime by 
expanding recreation opportunities for at-risk youth and to increase the security of urban parks 
with lighting, cameras and increased collaboration between park personnel and law enforcement. 
Both sections fit well into the crime bill’s overall goal of further integrating law enforcement 
into community policing efforts.  
 
Safe Streets, Chapter 4: New Evidentiary Rules 
VAWA updated the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), the federal code that governs what 
is and is not admissible as evidence in civil and criminal trials by expanding it to apply to not 
only criminal but also civil cases. 246 Unique to the federal rules, which are normally written by 
the Supreme Court, Rule 412 was originally added to the FRE by Congresswoman Elizabeth 
Holtzman’s 1978 Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978.247 The changes to the rules 
were the subject of ongoing interest to both Congress and the Judicial Conference, the body 
charged with overseeing amendments to the FRE.248 Members of the conference, who had begun 
watching VAWA warily in 1991, created an Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence to 
address the bill. The conference discussed the rule during its annual meeting in 1992 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist objected to what he believed was the amendment’s potential to encroach upon 
the rights of defendants.249 Because Congress, unlike the Judicial Conference, does not need 
Supreme Court approval to amend the rules, it was able to amend Rule 412 without Rehnquist’s 
approval. 
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FRE 413 made evidence of prior sexual criminal activity by the defendant admissible in 
federal sexual assault and child molestation cases. This was true whether the abuse was proven 
or just alleged; under the new rule, if a defendant was accused of having raped someone but 
never convicted of the crime, that accusation could be entered as evidence in a trial. Rule 413 
had initially been part of the Bush administration’s Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act of 
1991. It was later picked up by Dole and Molinari in 1991 and introduced as part of their 
Women’s Equal Opportunity Act, a more-punitive alternative to VAWA.250 While the act itself 
died in committee, many of its provisions were preserved as part of the Sexual Assault 
Prevention Act in 1992 and 1993.251 The Senate eventually passed the proposed rules on 
November 5, 1993 as part of a crime bill amendment to the Clinton crime bill offered by Dole. 
The new rules became a part of the crime bill as a whole, not of VAWA itself. 
Rule 413, by allowing the submission of evidence to prove that a defendant had a certain 
temperament or was “by nature” likely to have committed a particular crime, made a specific 
exception to an earlier rule, which forbade use of evidence pertaining to a person’s character 
traits.252 Several in Congress felt strongly enough that the new rule should be included that they 
were willing to ignore the wishes of the Judicial Conference.253 The House would not vote to 
include these rules because many members felt that the rules should be written by the Judicial. 
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The version of the revised evidentiary rules that was ultimately included was a judicial proposal 
sent to the Congress and adopted as part of the final bill.254  
The underlying premise of Rule 413 was that rapists were criminal by nature, and that 
they committed the crime of rape because of their very characters—a sharp departure from 
feminist understandings of the crime that saw all men as potential rapists.  
 
Safe Streets, Chapter 5: Assistance to Victims of Sexual Assault 
The first section chapter did not provide direct assistance to victims of sexual assault but 
instead allocated funding for rape prevention education to states to distribute to rape crisis 
centers and other non-profits. It authorized grants for education seminars, hotlines, and educating 
professionals and included a provision that twenty-five percent of funding would go to middle 
schools, junior high schools, and high schools.  
Later portions of this chapter included the House-authored provision of funding for 
probation and parole officers to work with sex offenders in case management, supervision, and 
what it called “relapse prevention” after those who had been imprisoned for rape were released, 
as well as funding to ensure that released sex offenders would be taught about community 
treatment programs. 
VAWA placed a great deal of emphasis on education, and assumes that education is 
prevention. This emphasis speaks volumes about the bill’s implicit understanding of cause and 
prevention of rape. VAWA’s section on “relapse prevention” provides essential clues as to the 
construction of the rapist as suffering from an “illness.” 
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Subtitle B: Safe Homes for Women 
The term “homes” delineates as somewhat more clearly defined space than “streets.” The 
fact that there was already a federal funding stream for domestic violence, via the Family 
Violence Prevention and Services Act, coupled with the extent to which the domestic violence 
movement had already organized meant that the task force was able to have a more measurable 
influence on this section of the bill.  
Safe Homes’ ten chapters focused much more specifically on domestic violence than Safe 
Streets’ chapters did on rape. Its most sweeping policy additions were the interstate enforcement 
of restraining orders, mandatory arrest policies, and increased rights for battered immigrant 
women. VAWA mandated that for the first time orders of protection received in one state must 
be recognized by all states.255 
Mandatory arrest policies were particularly controversial because of their monolithic 
approach to an exceedingly complicated problem and the increased amount of power they put in 
the hands of police officers called to the site of a domestic violence incident. Mandatory arrest 
policies were a one-size-fits-all solution to an exceedingly complicated problem. Advocates 
objected to the presumption included in mandatory arrest policies that the benefit of jailing 
abusers was more important than all other victim interests, including autonomy and financial 
support from the abuser. 256 
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Subtitle C: Civil Rights for Women 
The remedy established a federal civil rights cause of action, making it possible for the 
first time for those who believed that violence against them had been motivated by their gender 
to bring private suit in federal court against their attackers for violating their civil rights. In its 
final form, the language of this section required the victim to show that the crime of violence 
committed against her was committed because of gender or on the basis of gender and due, at 
least in part, to a gender-based animus. Congress claimed the authority to enact this subtitle 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The civil rights remedy—particularly that in VAWA’s first version—was in some ways 
anomalous to VAWA’s other titles. It shared their criminal justice focus and was focused again 
on what Matthews calls “managing rape.” In its first iteration it also had different fundamental 
understanding of the crime of rape, implying that the crime was inseparable from male attitudes 
toward women. It used the language of civil rights, not present elsewhere in the bill. Whether or 
not the bill actually created additional civil rights for women was contested, but the fact that it 
could be framed that way was essential to the passage of VAWA as a whole. Furthermore, the 
language of the bill stated that Congress had the right to enact the remedy because of powers 
granted to it by the commerce clause. Inherent in this was the idea that the fear of rape is 
disabling to women. This tacit acknowledgment that women have an ongoing reason to fear was 
a radical understanding of crime. Thus the bill used a radical understanding of rape combined 
with conservative way of addressing its existence. 
The civil rights remedy was a point of contention for a powerful array of outside 
constituencies, including the Department of Justice and the Conference of Chief Justices of State 
Supreme Courts. Resistance to its passage was spearheaded by Rehnquist, whose assault was 
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part of a larger attack upon the expanding federal powers of Congress.257 The Department of 
Justice objected to its supposedly vague language, and the Conference of Chief Justices argued 
that it would inundate the courts with cases.  
Opposition to the civil rights remedy gathered force after Biden introduced VAWA for 
the second time in January 1991. The Conference of Chief Justices was first to act, and adopted a 
resolution that supported the rest of VAWA but specifically opposed the civil rights remedy. 
After this, Rehnquist spoke out against the bill in his year-end report to Congress.258 Later in the 
year, Rehnquist created an Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence to examine VAWA. 
Both Rehnquist himself in his year-end report and the Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based 
Violence took the stance that the civil rights remedy would result in an avalanche of cases that 
would “slow the wheels of justice.” Ultimately, there was a showdown in 1993 at the annual 
meeting of the American Bar Association during which the National Association of Women 
Judges, which NOW LDEF had been able to rally in support of VAWA, was able to prevent the 
American Bar Association from taking an official stand against VAWA’s civil rights remedy.259  
The issue of motivation—its definition, degree, and provability—was central to the 
debate around this title. When VAWA was reported out of the Senate at the end of 1990, it 
included (for one iteration of the bill only) the modifier “overwhelmingly” to describe 
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motivation.260 When MacKinnon learned of this new language, she wrote to Goldfarb urging her 
to reconsider and warned: 
What the perpetrator intends or is motivated by is not only elusive and ambiguous in 
many cases; proof of it is almost totally within defendants’ control. Besides, 
discrimination is not a thought in the head of the discriminator so much as an injury in 
the life of the victim—one done because of who the victim is. The “motive” construction 
tends to make discrimination more a sin than an act more mental than material. In short, 
this language locates the harm in the wrong place and makes this a law that we will not 
be able to use effectively in many if not most gender-based attacks.261 
 
The existing models for determining racial motivation had the potential to limit the civil 
rights remedy’s ability to redress gender-subordinating violence the violence that women 
experience is frequently not accompanied by overt expressions of hatred or hostility that are the 
hallmarks of racial bias.262  
Whether or not a crime motivated by a victim’s gender was automatically a bias crime 
was another point of contention. The dispute about this issue points to the central question of 
whether women should be considered a protected class. When VAWA was introduced, the civil 
rights remedy included language referring to equal protection and immunities that suggested as 
such.263 To make the bill more palatable this language was dropped, substantially limiting the 
reach of the remedy.  
As originally drafted, this title had covered only sex-related crimes—including rape, 
sexual assault and abusive sexual contact. New language incorporated in 1991 expanded the 
definition of crimes covered to include all crimes of violence motivated by gender, not simply 
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sex-related crimes.264 In 1990, both House and Senate versions of the bill had defined the term 
“crime of violence motivated by the victim’s gender” as “any rape, sexual assault, or abusive 
sexual contact motivated by gender-based animus.”265 This language was changed, however, so 
that “crime of violence motivated by gender” was defined as “any crime of violence, as defined 
in this section, including rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact, or any other 
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender.”266 Whereas the first 
definition had assumed that sexual crimes were always motivated by gender, the second assumed 
that some sexual crimes were be motivated by gender while others were not.267 
An agreement made between Biden and Hatch in 1993 created the final changes to the 
wording of the civil rights remedy. Together, Biden and Hatch chose to limit the title’s coverage 
to felonious crimes.268 They also tried to narrow the possibility that there would be an 
assumption made in court that women were attacked because they were women by changing the 
phrase “crimes committed because of gender” to crimes committed “at least in part due to an 
animus based on the victim’s gender.”269 Prior to VAWA’s introduction NOW LDEF and 
Nourse had worked together to negotiate use of the word “animus” with several of the federal 
judges who had previously been unhappy with the wording of the intent requirement of the civil 
rights remedy.270 While meant to clarify the impetus of the violence, this new wording 
sometimes caused confusion; Biden originally used the term “animus” in the sense of motivation, 
while the colloquial use of the word describes a form of hatred.  
There is a continuum between the efforts of Murray’s cohort of feminists to apply the 
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Fourteenth amendment to the rights of women and that of VAWA’s crafters to do the same. 
When discussing the bill Biden and NOW LDEF staff often made direct analogies. In fact, Biden 
said about VAWA that, 
This society has long condemned, in the harshest of terms, hate beatings of 
blacks, Asians, or Hispanics. When the victim has been singled out because of his 
race or religion or the color of his skin, society condemns not only the crime but 
also the intentional deprivation of the survivor's civil rights. This bill extends the 
same protection to the women of America. Crimes committed because of gender 
are not simply random acts of violence. Ninety-seven percent of all sex assaults in 
this country are committed against women. We all know this; indeed, we assume 
it; but we ignore the implications. Crimes committed because of gender should be 
condemned in the same terms as crimes committed because of race or religion—
in terms as strong as this society can possibly muster—as violent deprivations of 
civil rights.271 
 
Likewise, when NOW LDEF’s executive director Helen Neuborne testified in favor of 
VAWA’s civil rights remedy she stated, “Just as a democratic society cannot tolerate crimes 
motivated by the victim’s membership in a minority racial group and must pass special laws to 
combat such oppression, so too we must put into place effective laws to prevent and redress 
violent crime motivated by the victim’s sex.” 272 
Indeed, discussion about the civil rights remedy raised fundamental questions about the 
category of gender, such as if and when women are indeed a separate class and if and when it is 
empowering to view them as such. Murray had eloquently introduced the parallel between the 
rights of women and blacks when the Commission on the Status of Women asked her to 
conceptualize a way forward for women’s rights. The civil rights remedy’s exclusion of blacks 
was for many a cause for worry. Those at the ACLU and LCCR were convinced that a civil 
rights remedy based on gender (but excluding race) would water down other civil rights 
efforts.273 Although the race-sex analogy worked well in theory, as courts turned theory into law, 
the analogy lost what Serena Mayeri calls the “intersectional nuances” it had originally 
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contained. Depending on the context, the race/sex analogy could limit rather than expand 
possibilities. Lost from these decisions was any understanding of the complicated historical 
relationship between racial and gender inequalities.274  
The civil rights remedy left the fate of victims at the intersection of the categories of race 
and gender unclear. Although as early as the December 1992 VAWA task force meetings, 
members of the task force debated expanding the civil rights remedy to include other categories 
such as race and religion.275 In November 1993, Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) 
introduced a bill that provided civil rights remedy for victims of violence motivated not just by 
gender but also by race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.276 
 
Subtitle D: Equal Justice for Women in the Courts 
Equal Justice for Women in the Courts provided funding for the education and training of 
federal and state judges on issues relating to violence against women and treatment of women in 
the courts.277 While the bill was an important addendum to VAWA, its inclusion was a reminder 
of another of the compromises made when feminism stepped into the public agenda. Rather than 
seeking to enact any kind of structural change, the Simon bill called for the education of the 
judiciary.  
NOW LDEF worked closely with NJEP to help prepare this addition, which was 
introduced by Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) in October 1990.278 Simon’s interest in the issue of 
judicial education was piqued by a report issued in April by the Illinois Task Force on Gender 
                                                
274 Mayeri, “‘A Common Fate of Discrimination,’” 1075. 
275 Minutes of the December 15, 1992 Violence Against Women Act Task Force included in a December 17, 1992 
memo from Sally Goldfarb, Ruth Jones and Pat Reuss. NOW Papers. Box 97, Folder 11. 
276 Bias Crimes Compensation Act of 1993. H.R.3670. 103rd Cong. (1993). 
277 H.R. Rep No. 103-395 at 27. 
278 Minutes of the September 25, 1992 Violence Against Women Act Task Force included in a October 1, 1990 
memo from Sally Goldfarb, Ruth Jones and Pat Reuss. NOW Papers. Box 97, Folder 18. 
91 
Bias in the Courts which found that, despite sweeping changes to the way the legal system 
handled violence against women, there remained a persistent institutionalized bias toward female 
litigants and attorneys that jeopardized their right to fair treatment in cases involving divorce, 
domestic violence, and sexual assault.279 NOW LDEF’s partner, the National Judicial Education 
Program (NJEP) had been hugely instrumental in creating the first task forces on court-based 
gender bias. The Illinois task force itself was one of seventeen that had been set up by 1990, and 
was closely affiliated with NJEP.  
In 1994, the year of VAWA’s passage NJEP released a curriculum for judges, 
Understanding Sexual Violence: The Judicial Response to Stranger and Non-stranger Rape and 
Sexual Assault.280 
 
Subtitle F: National Stalker and Domestic Violence Reduction 
This chapter was introduced in the summer of 1994, after the passage of a number of new 
state laws in the early 1990s, and aimed to help Congress assist state anti-stalking measures. 281 It 
gave courts access to existing national crime databases for use in domestic violence and stalking 
cases and money to improve their data collection on domestic violence and stalking cases. 
Stalker measures gave much credence to the idea that criminals can be catalogued, as well as the 
idea that certain crimes are more likely to be recidivist than others.  
Biden’s transformation as a legislator is embodied by his introduction, of this—the first 
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federal anti-stalking legislation. Stalking first gained widespread attention during the early 
1990s. Its emergence as a topic of concern coincided with VAWA’s journey through the House 
and Senate. Biden’s vested interest in VAWA made him poised to act on changing public 
perceptions of violence; it is hard, but not impossible, to imagine Biden’s pushing anti-stalking 
legislation when he first became an advocate for anti-violence legislation. Biden’s public stance 
on stalking was also yet another example of his straddling the feminist and tough-on-crime 
worlds. The idea that stalking merited federal notice was relatively progressive, while the 
measures planned against it were standard anti-criminal fare. 
 
Subtitle G: Safe homes for immigrant women 
VAWA made it possible for battered immigrant women to petition without their 
husbands’ knowledge or consent for conditional permanent residency for both themselves and 
their undocumented children. It also enabled the suspension of deportation proceedings for 
battered women. This section first made its way into VAWA through an amendment introduced 
in November 1992 by liberal representatives Louise Slaughter (D-NY) and Charles Schumer (D-
NY), as well as Republican Morella. 
 
What’s Not There: Omissions From VAWA 
 
The Commission that Wasn’t: The National Commission on Violent Crime Against Women 
The first version of VAWA called for the creation of a National Commission on Violent 
Crime Against Women. The commission was kept in the bill until 1993, when the House 
Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice scaled it back to a 
task force. The commission and the task force had similar responsibilities. Both were charged 
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with evaluating the adequacy of and making recommendations regarding various aspects of local 
state and federal responses to violence against women. By the time VAWA passed, the task force 
had been removed from VAWA itself and folded into the larger crime bill, which included a 
National Commission on Violent Crime. Of the commission’s ten stated goals, only one applied 
specifically to violence against women.282  
 
The Title That Wasn’t: Safe Campuses For Women 
Safe Campuses for Women called for funding for campus education about rape and 
guaranteed survivors the right to know the legal fate of those who had raped them. It was 
included when VAWA was reported out of committee in October 1990. The title was introduced 
because of feedback from anti-rape activists and because, as the Judiciary Committee reported, 
hearings revealed “a special problem of violence, a problem that affects young women on 
campus. Those women are at the greatest risk for the most violent of crimes—rape.”283 
Representative Barbara Boxer (D-CA) explained that the idea behind education grants was for 
the federal government to provide leadership and encourage consistency for the many campuses 
introducing education programs about sexual assault.284 
In May 1991, at the urging of the VAWA task force, Jim Ramstad introduced the 
Campus Sexual Assault Victims’ Bill of Rights, which included the campus-focused sections of 
VAWA and passed as part of the Higher Education Amendments of 1992.285 Safe Campuses for 
Women incorporated a major VAWA theme by viewing rape through the prism of geographic 
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boundaries. The section was true to the rest of bill in terms of its assumptions about the class and 
race of victims of sexual violence: later chapters will examine the extent to which VAWA 
explicitly and implicitly placed a premium on protecting white, educated, middle-class women.  
 
Responses to VAWA 
One rare exception to the relatively uniform media acclaim for VAWA immediately after 
the bill’s passage was a piece written when Ms. Magazine asked law professor Mari Matsuda for 
a feminist analysis of capital punishment and the crime bill. Matsuda bemoaned the crime bill’s 
focus on punishment, explaining,  
It is the things we have asked for all along that will stop crime—quality child care and 
paid parental leave, guaranteed minimum income, universal literacy, affirmative action, 
and free health care, including mental health care.286 
 
While not specifically addressing VAWA’s relationship to the bill as a whole, Matsuda 
saw feminists’ lack of vocal opposition to the crime bill’s reliance on increased death penalties 
as a huge failure on the part of the movement. Matsuda argued that the feminist fight for 
recognition of women as the victims of crime deflected attention from the crimes of the criminal 
justice system itself, compromising the integrity of the movement.287 
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“PASSING FEMINIST LEGISLATION 
WITHOUT APPEARING TOO FEMINIST:” 
THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT TASK FORCE 
    
This chapter examines the strategies employed by NOW LDEF and the task force it 
assembled to help shape VAWA and to garner support for its passage. Often this was a process 
that involved what one member of the task force called “passing feminist legislation without 
appearing too feminist.”288  
When speaking to members of Congress and congressional staff, task force members 
focused on VAWA’s potential as anti-crime, anti-violence legislation and downplayed its 
feminist credentials. Such a rubric appealed to the sensibilities of senators primed to pass 
Biden’s larger crime bill. Reuss, Goldfarb, and other members of the task force knew from the 
beginning of their VAWA advocacy that passing major federal legislation necessitated 
modulating the stridency of their feminist demands to a register audible to politicians.  
A law-and-order argument also appealed to segments of the population willing and 
sometimes eager to accept increasingly punitive law enforcement measures. Support for VAWA 
was fueled in part by a public that saw crime as out of control and favored strong, punitive 
measures as a response. A synergistic relationship developed between the fact that the task 
force’s message helped it solicit support from a much wider range of organizations and the fact 
that a wider audience for the bill helped it appear not quite so feminist.  
Since VAWA’s parts were different enough to make the legislation, in some ways, two 
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bills in one, arguments for its passage were malleable. When targeted at fellow advocates, the 
task force message would more often than not be focused on the transformative possibilities of 
the civil rights remedy. Packaged with law enforcement measures, the civil rights remedy looked 
less activist. Paired together the two parts of the bill each tempered the other. For instance, when 
increased enforcement and penalties were bundled with civil rights measures they appeared less 
draconian.  
Washington-based civil and women’s rights groups were two constituencies that 
remained consistently unconvinced by any argument for VAWA. In fact, almost as soon as 
VAWA was introduced, the WRP and the NAACP LDF began speaking out privately against it. 
While the discord between these groups was based on concern about VAWA, it was also about 
contested understandings of feminism. Who is a feminist? And who speaks for the movement? 
NOW LDEF had always espoused a very particular strain of historically white, liberal 
feminism. It was a category of feminism from which many black women had long felt excluded. 
NOW LDEF’s wholehearted embrace of a civil rights remedy that applied to gender and not race 
was just the kind of divisive strategy that had caused tension before. In the case of VAWA 
traditional tensions were elevated because of the unusual relationship between the civil rights 
remedy and its strange bedfellow—law and order legislation fraught with racist undertones. The 
situation was not helped by the fact that, to lend VAWA legitimacy as a feminist endeavor Biden 
represented NOW LDEF (and NOW LDEF represented itself) as quintessentially feminist and 
able to speak for all feminists.  
False Starts 
  
Before approaching NOW LDEF for help constructing VAWA, Nourse had initially 
contacted a number of so-called inside-the-Beltway women’s groups, all of which refused to 
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support VAWA. Nourse has hinted that their resistance to VAWA could have been due to the 
fact that these groups saw the issue of violence against women as politically dangerous.289  
Neuborne related a similar experience, recalling that after she and Goldfarb agreed to 
help with VAWA, 
I went out and I talked to the other women leaders of women's groups at the time 
to see if they wanted to join with us to really share some of the responsibility and 
work and building that would go on around this issue. And surprisingly, they all 
said no.290 
 
Biden recollected in his autobiography that women’s groups were not initially interested in 
supporting VAWA. “I was a bit surprised at the resistance I met from the inside-the-Beltway 
women’s groups.” 291 Biden himself remembered, 
I knew these groups didn’t entirely trust me because I wasn’t pure on the issue of 
abortion. …But there were other things beyond the groups’ long-held suspicions 
of me. I got the sense that the inside-the-Beltway domestic violence advocacy 
groups were worried that the VAWA would be a distraction from the main 
issues.”292 
 
Reuss attributed feminist groups’ resistance to work on VAWA to the boldness of the 
legislation, remembering: 
They [inside-the-Beltway women’s groups] were just angry that there was one 
more thing that seemed hopeless that some senator wanted to do. They said, 
“Good luck, but we don't even have time to look at it or work on it.”293  
 
According to Joan Zorza, a New York-based lawyer specializing in domestic violence, no one in 
the activist community conceptualized violence against women as a federal issue, so the 
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legislation seemed irrelevant to many at first.294 
Some groups that should have had a vested interest in getting the bill passed either could 
not or would not work directly with the task force. None of these organizations ever publicly 
addressed its initial lack of support for VAWA, so there is no way of knowing for sure what 
motivated it. It could perhaps have been a lack of trust in Biden, as he himself intimated. It could 
have been because these groups believed that VAWA could not be passed, something else that 
Reuss suggested.295 
The women’s groups Biden and Neuborne first turned to have not been publicly named 
anywhere but most certainly included organizations such as the Women’s Legal Defense Fund 
and the NWLC. Their resistance to supporting VAWA was something of a secret hidden in plain 
site. Far from being too distracted to work on VAWA or seeing violence against women 
legislation as irrelevant or hopelessly impossible to pass, members of these groups were, in 
actuality, actively nervous about VAWA’s very real potential to do harm. Cynthia Hogan, who 
replaced Ron Klain as chief counsel to the Judiciary Committee in 1992 remembered, 
The civil rights community doesn't like it [the civil rights remedy] because they think it 
gives a better civil rights cause of action to women than racial minorities have…and the 
women's movement is very closely aligned with the civil rights movement, and so when 
the bill was first introduced, the women's movement did not embrace it and were very 
troubled in particular by Title III.296 
 
Biden’s and the NOW LDEF staff’s professed puzzlement about these groups’ lack of interest in 
VAWA was at least to a certain degree feigned. The NWLC and its allies contacted Biden’s 
office repeatedly to inform the senator of their concerns.297 Their assumed befuddlement allows 
them to acknowledge that there were natural constituents who by all rights should have been 
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engaged with VAWA but weren’t without openly acknowledging the very real threat these 
groups saw in VAWA.  
 
NOW LDEF Takes the Challenge 
Goldfarb stated on several occasions that the passage of the civil rights remedy was her 
top priority. For instance, she explained by letter to Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) 
that, 
Although NOW LDEF informally chairs this task force made up of over 400 
organizational and individual members from all across the United States, our primary 
area of interest and expertise is…the civil rights section that is Title III of the Act.298 
 
While a belief in the importance of the civil rights remedy was the driving force behind 
NOW LDEF’s dedication to VAWA, additional facets of working on VAWA could also have 
appealed to the Goldfarb, Neuborne or Reuss. There was the hope that VAWA would create a 
national platform for an issue with tremendous relevance to women. The allocations discussed in 
VAWA were an order of magnitude higher than those in the 1984 Family Violence Prevention 
and Services Act, the only other federal domestic violence legislation. NOW LDEF may also 
have been dedicated to VAWA’s judicial education portions because of the extensive role that 
the National Judicial Education Program had played in crafting them. 
The relatively recent death of the ERA and even more recent exclusion of gender as a 
category from federal hate crimes legislation lent added urgency to the struggle for establishing 
gender as a privileged category. The civil rights remedy continued the long-term feminist goal of 
extending Fourteenth Amendment protections to women. This was the first time that rape or 
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domestic violence had been addressed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.  
Working on the bill offered NOW LDEF a chance to sit at the table with Biden, the chair 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee. It was an opportunity for NOW LDEF to demonstrate a new 
degree of establishment acceptance and respectability, not just for itself as an organization, but 
also for the women’s movement as a whole.  
Throughout the early 1990s,VAWA both benefitted from and benefitted the slow but 
steady growth in public awareness of rape and domestic violence. Family Violence Prevention 
Fund president Esta Soler, who had actively lobbied for the 1984 Family Violence Prevention 
and Services Act, saw the passage of VAWA as one part of a multi-faceted effort to raise 
awareness of violence against women.299 She hired political strategy firm Bass and Howes to 
“create a national conversation about domestic violence” which included lobbying for VAWA.300 
Other threads in the conversation included a campaign to educate doctors through the American 
Medical Association  and the PSA campaign “There’s No Excuse,” created by Bass and Howes 
in conjunction with the Advertising Council.301 
 
VAWA TASK FORCE BEGINNINGS 
After helping to craft VAWA in May 1990, Goldfarb quickly became aware of the need 
for a coalition to raise awareness of and support for VAWA, and—not sure that anyone else had 
the motivation to do so—in August began to gather one herself.302 After VAWA’s introduction, 
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Goldfarb herself sent out a letter to a variety of organizations, inviting them to the first meeting 
of what would become the National Task Force on the Violence Against Women Act.303 The 
meeting was held in September in NOW LDEF’s New York City offices. The task force would 
continue to meet monthly or bi-monthly through VAWA’s passage in 1994.304 
In early 1991, Neuborne hired Reuss to help expand the task force and to help navigate 
VAWA through Congress. Throughout their years at the helm of the taskforce Goldfarb and 
Reuss used political artistry to help ensure its dynamism and longevity. The task force not only 
met as a whole but also in smaller subcommittees that addressed particularly disputed issues. At 
the first task force meeting, a subcommittee was formed to review federal rape law.305 At 
subsequent meetings religious, sentencing, mandatory HIV and treatment subcommittees were 
all formed. Reuss, in particular, organized lobbying days, arranged meetings with congressional 
staff, and figured out how to get and keep the many different members of the task force invested 
in and involved in the legislative process.  
Representatives from four main constituencies—national domestic violence coalitions, 
women’s rights groups, civil rights policy organizations, and religious organizations—attended 
early meetings.306 For the first two years of its existence, the most active constituencies in the 
task force remained domestic violence coalitions and religious groups. Without their support, 
VAWA would not have begun to build momentum. The task force was able to activate this base 
of supporters, encouraging it to be vocal about its support for VAWA.  
Domestic violence coalitions also brought small groups of women from throughout the 
country to Washington, soliciting feedback from a range of members and giving the domestic 
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violence advocacy population a much more active voice than it would otherwise have had.307 
Karen Artichoker, a domestic violence activist and member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 
remembers being flown to Washington D.C. by the NCADV. At the time, she represented rural 
groups in the NCADV, but she ended up pushing for the inclusion of Native Americans in 
VAWA.308  
Religious organizations, too, were able to make use of already-existing networks to help 
increase awareness of and support for VAWA. The Women of Reform Judaism, a member of the 
religious subcommittee, passed a resolution against violence against women that closely 
mirrored the language of VAWA itself, calling upon Temple sisterhoods to “advocate for the 
passage of legislation at the appropriate governmental levels to combat crimes against women, 
including provisions for increased protection from violence in the home, on the streets and on 
campuses.”309  
 
Task Force Expansion  
 
While the roster for the first task force meeting had been populated with the names of a 
cross section of feminist and civil rights organizations, the roster for the last task meeting before 
VAWA was passed resembled a who’s who of Washington bureaucracy. More constituent 
support was needed, because if women’s groups alone supported VAWA, it would have been 
easier for congressmen to write off the bill as not relevant to them. 
Despite the continued efforts by task force stalwarts, by early 1992 Reuss had already 
begun casting a wider net in search of more varied support for the bill. She was able to mobilize 
organizations whose missions were less directly concerned with rape and domestic violence, 
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including unions such as the AFL-CIO, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, and United Auto Workers. Her efforts benefited from a public that saw crime as out 
of control and favored strong, punitive measures in response.310 
Slowly but steadily, support for VAWA moved further into the mainstream, broadening 
its appeal. At the same time, the Family Violence Prevention Fund’s domestic violence outreach 
to the medical profession began to gain traction, continuing to push the issue further into the 
public domain. The May 1992 issues of The Journal of the American Medical Association 
included several articles about domestic violence, and the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists renewed campaign against domestic violence was in full swing.311  
By the spring of 1993, the task force had both grown and changed considerably. By May 
750 organizations were included on the task force mailing list, compared to 150 in 1991.312 
AFSCME included an editorial by Biden on VAWA in its spring 1993 news service that was 
circulated to 2,500 newspapers nationwide.313 In April, the Family Violence Prevention Fund 
released the results of a domestic violence study it had commissioned.314  
During the last months of 1993, a much more disparate group of organizations than ever 
before participated in task force meetings. In October 1993, the AFL-CIO passed a resolution 
called “Women in America” that included support for VAWA.315 Without mentioning VAWA 
by name, the resolution articulated support for many of VAWA’s individual provisions. It 
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premised its support for these measures on the idea that, “Violence against women is rooted in 
attitudes and structures that demean women and confine them to a subordinate position in 
society.” 316 
When Goldfarb testified at a House Judiciary Committee meeting in November, she was 
able to boast of chairing just the kind of far-flung middle-of-the-road task force it had been 
aiming to create. Goldfarb identified herself saying, “On behalf of the NOW Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, I chair a national task force of hundreds of religious, labor, medical mental 
health, aging, civil rights, women’s, children’s, and victims rights organizations, all of which are 
concerned about the impact of violence on the lives of women and girls.”317 This was truly a 
broad-based feminism. 
By March 1994, the Teamsters Union had sent its first task force representative, and that 
winter task force meeting attendees included representatives from United Airlines and the 
American Psychiatric Association.318 At that point the “There’s No Excuse” PSA campaign by 
FVPF had taken flight and the message of the task force and its allies began to spread throughout 
the nation.319 
 
STRATEGY OF THE TASK FORCE: 
“PASSING FEMINIST LEGISLATION WITHOUT APPEARING TOO FEMINIST”  
 
Talking Points 
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Throughout the years that Goldfarb, Reuss, and others helped maneuver VAWA through 
Congress, they were aware of the delicacy of their negotiations. Too much feminism could 
alienate the politicians whose votes were needed to pass the bill. Too little feminism would make 
it possible for the supporters NOW LDEF was enlisting to become disaffected. The task force 
mustered considerable support for VAWA precisely because it straddled the line between these 
two possibilities, making a case for the bill as anti-crime rather than pro-feminist while 
concurrently stressing the debilitating cost of violence against women. 
Notes taken during a 1992 task force meeting include the observation that “the problem 
in the wake of the [Anita] Hill [and Clarence Thomas] hearings and the Kennedy Smith trial 
[was the] perception on the Hill that feminism was put to vote and lost.”320 The lesson was to 
make sure to use hearings on VAWA to stress the anti-violence aspect of the bill, and to make 
sure the bill was “not a referendum on whether women are oppressed in the United States or a 
vote for or against feminism.”321 Despite the advantages that being able to back major legislation 
offered them, staff of NOW LDEF were well aware of the compromises inherent in framing anti-
rape legislation as anti-crime legislation.  
For instance, task force members who participated in the religious lobbying day realized 
that “members of Congress seem to feel the women’s vote is not an important consideration” 
given the conclusion of the Clarence Thomas hearings.322 They decided, therefore, to “emphasize 
that this is more than a bill for the feminists,” and came up with a series of talking points for 
doing so.323 Key among these was the high economic cost society pays for rape and domestic 
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violence.324 They also argued that domestic violence is “not solely a women’s issue” but also 
affects the family, and that idea went hand-in-hand with the assertion of the importance of 
VAWA as a general crime prevention effort, as opposed to a woman-specific one.  
Other task force talking points included VAWA’s various money-saving or money-
neutral features, such as the medical costs that can be gained from reducing violence, and the fact 
that there was no federal expense associated with the civil rights remedy. Many of VAWA’s 
provisions, such as adding additional lighting to parks and public transportation, were dependent 
on moving monies from already existing budgets (in this case the Departments of Parks and 
Transportation) and not earmarking additional funds. Only when these points were made would 
the task force transition to the idea that men should assume responsibility for the problem of rape 
and domestic violence, and that violence must be eliminated where people learn it. 
To make the most of straddling both sides of the issue, the task force not only chose 
talking points that stressed a very particular version of VAWA, they also worked hard in their 
lobbying to balance the competing interests of those who were moderately tough on crime and 
those who were extremely tough on crime. By using language with various connotations, the task 
force was able to have a wider appeal. 
 
Alliance with the Congressional Caucus on Women’s Issues 
Goldfarb’s December 1992 letter to Schroeder also included a straightforward and 
forthright description of their political alliance, 
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“So glad you’re going to take a lead next year; we look forward to working with you and 
the Congressional Caucus on Women’s Issues.” In return for your support and dedication 
to ending gender-based violence, we pledge to gather sponsors for the bill, provide 
educational materials for both Congress and the public at large, and gather a large and 
diverse group of organizations in support of the House legislation that is known as the 
Violence Against Women Act.325 
 
Goldfarb and Reuss forged an alliance with the Congressional Women’s Caucus (the 
caucus) and were consistently able to relay the task force's recommendations to staff members of 
the leading House co-sponsors. Likewise, they were intimately acquainted with the strategies 
being employed by the caucus itself and thus could respond quickly with pressure on lawmakers 
when needed. 
Reuss was intimately acquainted with the complicated political calculus of passing 
legislation, and thus was able to provide the task force with a much-needed legislative plan. 
According to Bonnie Campbell, then attorney general of Iowa: 
The organizational role that NOW LDEF had played in getting the hearings set up 
and getting the right people there and that might have been the first time I truly 
understood the significant role—leadership role—they played.326 
 
Task force members, worried that Dole would push Biden even further to the right, believed that 
they could maximize their impact by,  
…supporting the Biden bill while letting Biden know that our support is contingent on 
there being no further changes that would either hurt women or create other problems. It 
would also be desirable to get Biden publicly committed to the bill in its current form to 
forestall future compromises with Dole.327  
 
For this reason, they were eager to work with California Rep. Barbara Boxer, who 
introduced the House version of VAWA to draft a bill more liberal than Biden’s. Commenting 
on this, Reuss, recommended that the task force,  
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…work with Boxer to get a bill even better than Biden’s bill. Since Boxer 
identifies herself as a liberal and plans to run for senator in the near future, she is 
in the best position to write the most desirable bill. We can then argue that 
Biden’s bill is our bottom-line compromise position.328 
 
NOW LDEF was asked by the caucus to put pressure on senators and representatives who 
at key points in VAWA’s trajectory. Political scientist Susan Carroll studied the activities of the 
caucus to see at which point in VAWA’s trajectory these had their greatest impact. It is clear 
from the minutes of the task force that no small portion of the influence of the caucus was due to 
the lobbying efforts of the task force. 
 Together the caucus and task force had their most significant collective impact at two 
specific points. First, in November 1993, while VAWA was still in the Judiciary Committee, the 
caucus and task force pressured Judiciary Committee chairman Jack Brooks (D-TX) and Rep. 
Don Edward (D-CA), Chair of the House Judiciary Civil and Constitutional Rights 
Subcommittee, to take action on the bill. Second, while the bill was in final conference, the 
caucus and task force lobbied the conference committee to keep both the civil rights provision 
and the battered immigrant woman provisions in the bill.329 
In addition, task force members tried to influence the shape of the bill with focused 
attacks on what they saw as its weaknesses. Leery of the increased sentences included in 
VAWA’s Safe Streets for Women subtitle, the task force spearheaded the effort to pressure 
Biden to reconsider this measure. Rather than increasing sentences outright, the section instead 
instructed the U.S. Sentencing Commission to review federal sentences, paying special attention 
to topics identified as central by the task force. An early draft of the Safe Streets’ Law 
Enforcement and Prosecution Grants title had given money directly to police and prosecutors. 
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The task force pushed back against assumptions that police are in control by lobbying 
successfully for additional funding to be given directly to domestic violence shelters. 
Members of the subcommittee on mandatory HIV testing tried to intercept Dole’s efforts 
to insert a measure requiring this. An April 1991 letter the task force drafted for its membership 
to send to senators pronounced: 
We agree with members of Congress that women who have been raped should not have 
to live in fear that they have been exposed to the HIV virus by their attackers; and we 
appreciate any efforts to bring to Congress the important issue of rape and AIDS. 
However, we strongly oppose mandatory HIV testing of accused sex offenders. Instead, 
we believe Congress should directly focus on the needs of the survivor herself. 
Immediately after the rape, a survivor should have available to her anonymous HIV 
testing. …By contrast, requiring testing of charged rapists is a misdirected approach to 
this problem, as it will shift the focus of public concern away from the women who need 
these services.330 
 
Goldfarb and Reuss served as matchmakers between domestic violence advocates and 
members of the Congressional Caucus on Women’s Issues. Their alliance with the caucus 
created an entry for a greater domestic violence activist presence in the House and Senate. 
Domestic violence groups were able to take advantage of the opportunities granted them because 
they were relatively well organized and had a strong Washington presence in the form of 
individual lobbyists and a coalition of state activists, the National Coalition Against Domestic 
Violence (NCADV).331  
At least one new domestic violence bill was introduced, modeled on provisions found in 
the Senate version of VAWA and created as a result of the task force’s work with the 
Congressional Caucus on Women’s Issues.332 Furthermore, the idea of including provisions for 
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immigrant women in VAWA was first discussed by members of the task force in in the spring of 
1991 when a subcommittee on battered immigrant women was formed.333 Members of the 
subcommittee surmised that Boxer and Slaughter could and would work together on these 
provisions and that Boxer would prove especially dedicated, as a representative of an area in 
California where immigrant rights carry considerable weight. The task force members and the 
Family Violence Prevention Fund lobbyist worked closely with Senate staff to add the category 
of immigrant women to the Safe Homes provisions of the House version of VAWA.334  
In contrast to this, the domestic violence and rape movements were fractured within 
themselves and often unable to work together because of tense competition for money. NOW 
LDEF tried, with varying degrees of success, to use the VAWA task force tried as a venue in 
which it was possible for them to come together and a platform from which they could speak 
with one voice. 
 
Opposition to VAWA 
Pinzler (of the WRP) and Smith (of the NWLC) both tried initially to discourage 
VAWA’s introduction and, when that failed, to reshape the sections she saw as most harmful 
both through engagement with the task force and independent political maneuvering. Pinzler and 
others at the WRP objected to VAWA’s provisions across the board. Pinzler herself attended one 
of the first VAWA task force meetings and told those present that ACLU policy did not permit 
support of increased criminal penalties. She suggested tabling any and all consideration of 
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VAWA and instead undertaking a comprehensive examination of women and the criminal justice 
system, culminating in drafting original legislation.335 
When her suggestion fell on deaf years, Pinzler continued to find ways to object to 
VAWA. In 1991 the ACLU released a policy memo that enumerated its misgivings. These 
included the fact that VAWA’s civil rights provision provided a remedy for gender-based 
violence without providing a similar one for race, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation. The 
ACLU expressed concern that this could have the long-term effect of watering down the civil 
rights of other groups.336 Finally, the memo took aim at VAWA’s punitive measures, suggesting 
that the problem with law enforcement was not inadequate penalties but rather inadequate 
enforcement of penalties.337 In 1993 the WRP submitted testimony written by Pinzler that 
questioned VAWA’s civil rights title at a House hearing held solely on that topic.338 This time 
Pinzler questioned the civil rights remedy’s undue vagueness, and asked how it would be 
possible for a plaintiff to prove that a rape was carried out due to the survivor’s gender.  
Smith, on the other hand, was most apprehensive about what she saw as the troublesome 
conflation of gender and race in the remedy because it ignored fundamental differences between 
race-based and gender-based violence. The civil rights remedy’s separation of gender from other 
categories oversimplified a multiplicity of crimes. She remembers:  
“This was very complicated for me as an African American woman. You will see this in 
a lot of the black feminist scholarship, problems with white women, how they defined 
what the priorities were and we were just supposed to go along with them…”339 
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In addition, while the civil rights remedy’s possible symbolic value appealed a great deal 
to those at the helm, to Smith its effective use seemed like a fool’s errand. In order for women to 
sue their attackers in court, they would have to have a great deal of money, which meant that at 
its best the remedy would be useful to only a certain few.  
While opposition to VAWA was fragmented, there was a loose network of people and 
organizations opposing it that at times worked together. In 1993 Pinzler’s WRP and Smith’s 
NWLC, as well as the United Methodist Church and the NAACP were listed as supporters on a 
letter objecting to VAWA sent by the members of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe, whose 
interests were represented by the Native American Rights Fund (NARF). The NARF letter was 
in direct opposition to the one written by The Women’s Circle. Unlike The Women’s Circle, 
Chippewa believed that Indians would bear the weight of increased penalties and that this in 
itself was an outcome to be avoided.340 In place of lengthened sentences, the NARF suggested 
mandating treatment.   
While Pinzler came to very few meetings and did not engage actively with the task force, 
in 1993 Smith was part of a task force civil rights subcommittee. Smith recalled that she felt 
comfortable talking about her concerns with other members of the subcommittee, but 
remembered a slightly hostile environment at full task force meetings.341At one point Smith and 
several other lawyers who opposed all or part of the bill, including the United Methodist 
Church’s Hilary Shelton sent a letter directly to the Senate Judiciary Committee. What followed 
was a tense and awkward lunch with Ron Klain, chief counsel for the Judiciary Committee. As 
Smith remembers it, Klain could not see past his assessment that the bill would help women. He 
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was confounded by her concern for the people who would be prosecuted under VAWA, and 
wondered out loud who could possibly be worrying about those who abuse women.342  
The LCCR harbored continued doubts about VAWA’s civil rights remedy and refused to 
give the bill its much sought-after approval.343 Because of the stature and size of the 
organization, it was not clear that the LCCR would not derail VAWA. As late as March 1994, at 
a meeting between Sally Goldfarb as well as a staff person, Amy Allina, from Bass and Howes 
and senators Biden and Boxer, the LCCR was still concerned about Title III. According to Amy 
Allina, Biden’s staff worried that “the civil rights community’s opposition to the title is stronger 
than the women’s community’s support for it.”344 Finally, in April the LCCR wrote a letter of 
muted support for Title III.345 The LCCR agreed to support the House version of VAWA (which 
did not include the civil rights remedy), to commit to the principle of Title III as passed by the 
Senate and to commit to continue working to achieve a consensus on the operative language of 
Title III.346 Toward this last goal, the LCCR created a technical drafting committee to discuss 
expanding civil rights protections to other affected classes and substituting “intentionally selects” 
for “animus.” Throughout the spring of 1994, NOW LDEF continued to reach out to task force 
members on behalf of LCCR, encouraging them to work to craft suitable phrasing for Title III.  
The issue of increased law enforcement measures was a complicated one precisely 
because communities that would be most directly affected by these measures sometimes saw 
them in a positive light. A case in point is the letter written by the members of Women’s Circle, 
a coalition of mostly Native American domestic violence advocacy groups and shelters. In the 
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letter members of the Women’s Circle expressed their support for increased sentences mandated 
in VAWA’s Safe Streets Act: 
We recognize that the law enforcement and judicial systems are disproportionately harsh 
on people of color. We also recognize that the increase in penalties in S.15 will most 
effect [sic] Indian people. However, while we as Indian women stand side by side with 
our brothers in the fight against racial oppression, violence against Indian women is 
causing great and irreparable harm not only to Indian women but to our families and 
communities as a whole. Federal sentences need to be increased because compared to the 
violence committed, no one is being convicted or sentenced, Indian or non-Indian, on or 
off reservations. 347 
 
The members of the Women’s Circle did not come to the decision to support VAWA 
easily. A session of hand wringing preceded their fraught choice. Karen Artichoker, the activist 
from the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, remembers hours of back and forth conversation, “because the 
women were saying they felt like we had to choose between the women that we were serving for 
our work and our own personal experiences with the federal criminal justice system that is 
racist.”348 But finally one woman whose son was in prison turned the tide when she said “we 
can't sacrifice our daughters for our sons…The women in the shelter, they're our daughters.”349  
 
How NOW LDEF Presented its Own Strategy 
For NOW LDEF, Biden was publicly proclaimed a savior and privately viewed as a 
proxy. The fact that NOW LDEF was in good standing with Biden and others in Congress meant 
that the organization could claim ownership of the bill during public events. In order to reify 
their argument that the bill was not too feminist, NOW LDEF members presented themselves to 
various publics as having warm feelings for Biden, not as his antagonist. All those working for 
NOW LDEF expressed the opinion that Biden was a fair player who wanted what was best for 
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women. Behind closed doors, however, it was clear—from comments such as Reuss’s remark 
about passing a bill better than Biden’s—that their feelings for him and his legislation were 
much more complicated.  
Current Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, when discussing her own 
legislative efforts, said, 
Those with whom I associated kept firmly in mind the importance of knowing the 
audience and playing to that audience—largely men of a certain age. ….We 
sought to spark judges’ and lawmakers’ understanding that their own daughters 
and granddaughters could be disadvantaged by the way things were.350 
  
Reuss echoed Ginsburg’s sentiments but took them a step further, calling NOW LDEF’s tactics 
“nice girls manipulating.”351 In public, she and others on the task force played up their gratitude 
to Biden for things they had done themselves. For instance, at a symposium in honor of the 
fifteenth anniversary of VAWA’s passage, then-president of NOW LDEF Irasema Garza praised 
Biden for his staunch support of VAWA. Her words of admiration, however, were quite 
exaggerated. With a comment that virtually erased over two decades of work by feminist 
organizations, Garza said, 
Passage of the VAWA in 1994 was a culmination of Senator Biden’s four-year struggle 
to put the issue of violence against women in the national spotlight. At the public 
hearings he convened in mid-June of 1990, Senator Biden spoke with passion and 
conviction asking the nation to break the silence. He said we have ignored the fight of 
women to be free from the fear of attacks based on their gender. He went on to say that 
for too long we have kept silent about the obvious.352 
 
The public staging of the struggle to pass the civil rights remedy was as notable for what 
it didn’t say as for what it did say. In Strebeigh’s Equal, the main danger to VAWA was 
presented as its derailment by federal judges, who argued that were the civil rights remedy to 
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pass their courts would be flooded with cases. Arguments from civil rights groups were 
potentially just as harmful and arguably more trenchant.353 Strebeigh’s rendition pits a band of 
fearless female lawyers against a host of male lawyers, stressing NOW LDEF’s success against 
great odds and evil interlopers.354 However, he makes little to no mention of the fact that NOW 
LDEF was also facing off against traditionally liberal civil rights groups who questioned the 
remedy’s usefulness and definition of gender in meaningful ways.  
Nourse, too, discussed judges’ opposition to the civil rights remedy in detail but made no 
mention of civil rights groups’ opposition. She related, “if Chairman Biden was going to get 
VAWA, he would have to take on the judiciary.”355 A chauvinistic and needlessly antagonistic 
judiciary making specious claims is a perfect bully to vanquish. A confrontation with the WRP 
or NAACP is much harder to paint in flattering terms. 
 
How grassroots was it? 
 
VAWA was often presented as legislation that grew organically out of the grassroots. 
When speaking on the floor of the House in 1993, Representative Patricia Schroeder said, “this 
bill is the result of grassroots activists on the front lines speaking out; the people in our 
communities have been the primary lobbyists on this bill-not Washington lawyers..”356 
In fact, VAWA originated in Washington as a senator’s project and much of the activism 
that arose to support it was spearheaded by national organizations invested in passing the bill. 
NOW LDEF were quite successful in creating a campaign for VAWA. In doing so, NOW LDEF 
created the demand for the legislation (and not the other way around), harnessing energies from 
the constituencies it recruited to the cause.  
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NOW LDEF staff was circumspect when discussing the organization’s relationship to 
those it helped mobilize behind VAWA. The task force collected enough nationwide support for 
VAWA that NOW LDEF could claim that there was a grassroots movement to pass the bill—and 
by 1993 one existed. However, NOW LDEF was not part of that grassroots. Reuss was 
essentially an inside-the-Beltway operative posing as a grassroots person. According to Reuss:  
…at the moment we never envisioned any—we didn't run shelters, we didn't have 
any—law enforcement got a whole lot of, and still does get prosecutors VAWA 
money, and cities, and states get VAWA money. And so in a funny way we were 
above it.357 
 
NOW LDEF worked on the issues it held near and dear and helped to coordinate 
the efforts of the grassroots members of the task force. Again, Reuss recollected: 
Early on NOW LDEF said “we’ll do the lion's share of the work if you let us have 
the civil rights remedy and the battered immigrant.” And everybody went, oh god 
we didn’t know … about any of that. Sure go ahead, you can have that. And then 
that was…the brilliance of Sally Goldfarb and me was that everybody had a 
say.358 
 
NOW LDEF was also able to call upon NOW, which was membership-based. NOW’s 
imprimatur lent VAWA extra credibility and burnished the VAWA task force’s grassroots 
credentials. Indeed, NOW LDEF continued working almost as closely with its parent 
organization as it did with its child, NJEP, during VAWA’s duration in Congress. Throughout 
1990-1994, NOW supported efforts to pass the legislation. In fact, NOW LDEF and NOW joint 
sent Sally Goldfarb’s first letter seeking support for VAWA.359 Molly Yard, NOW’s president 
from 1987-1991, wrote a letter to the Senate about HIV testing, sent out in support of VAWA 
under NOW’s auspices.360  
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NOW LDEF did, indeed, generate a great deal of grassroots support for VAWA, but the 
original push for the bill was a top-down rather than bottom-up. Other groups perceived NOW 
LDEF’s claim to represent a grassroots movement as disingenuous. While the task force was also 
often presented in the media as grassroots, and indeed received a lot of support from activists 
around the country, VAWA would not have been introduced or passed without the impetus and 
staying power of NOW LDEF.361 NOW LDEF’s leadership role elicited mixed feelings in the 
activists who worked on the task force. On the one hand, activists were extremely grateful to 
have NOW LDEF’s political and organizational firepower behind them, knowing that NOW 
LDEF could do what they could not. Many were particularly pleased at the strong statement they 
believed federal legislation would make.362 
On the other hand, many activists resented the fact that NOW LDEF was laying claim to 
an issue that was seen as belonging to the activists themselves and not to NOW LDEF. As one 
Washington D.C.-based activist remembered,  
There was a group in the domestic violence community who took umbrage at 
NOW Legal Defense being involved. From their perspective NOW Legal Defense 
was not the expert on these issues and so should not be driving the content of the 
bill…They felt like they were not being included as much in the drafting363  
 
While domestic violence groups may have felt animosity toward NOW LDEF and the 
task force, for the most part they were quite actively engaged in the process of shaping and 
gathering support for VAWA. In fact, the size and scope of anti-domestic violence groups’ 
participation was in stark contrast to that of rape crisis groups, which were noticeably less 
represented. Domestic violence advocates, always slightly better funded than rape activists, had a 
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much larger and more complex infrastructure in Washington, but there may have been another 
reason for the disparity in the presences of the two groups.  
 Some members of anti-rape groups disliked the content of VAWA and expressed their 
distaste by staying as far away as possible from the legislation. Kata Issari, co-president of 
NCASA right before VAWA’s introduction and an active member in NCASA’s Women of 
Color Caucus throughout the 1990s, remembered that before she joined the board in 1993 there 
had been a well-established relationship between NCASA and the task force, but “we didn't want 
to deal with any of the legislators or policy makers or criminal justice people….So our choice 
was to step back from it.”364 Her and her like-minded board members’ focus was on serving their 
communities, and their apprehension was based in VAWA’s punitive aims. Issari remembers,  
I think those of us that were this kind of young strident group on the board didn’t feel that 
VAWA was valuable, especially because there was a strong criminal justice element to it. 
And then as now, criminal justice was going to disproportionately target men of color, 
and disproportionately underrepresent the needs of women of color. So there was a lot of 
feeling that VAWA was not going to address the needs or be beneficial, and in fact could 
potentially be problematic for our constituents365 
 
 
Race, Gender and the Civil Rights Remedy 
 
The first words spoken by NOW LDEF staff about VAWA on the official record were 
those of NOW LDEF’s executive director Helen Neuborne. At the June 1990 Senate hearing 
held in conjunction VAWA’s introduction Neuborne stated, “We are here today to confront the 
fact that an epidemic of violence directed against women is depriving half of America's citizens 
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of their most basic civil rights.”366 Because she was referring to the threat of violence rather than 
the violence itself, this statement was certainly slightly hyperbolic. The threat of violence 
inarguably proscribes women’s lives, but it is much less clear exactly which civil rights the 
threat of violence removes. Biden himself said about VAWA that, 
This society has long condemned, in the harshest of terms, hate beatings of 
blacks, Asians, or Hispanics. When the victim has been singled out because of his 
religion or the color of his skin, society condemns not only the crime but also the 
intentional deprivation of the survivor's civil rights. This bill extends the same 
protection to the women of America. Crimes committed because of gender are not 
simply random acts of violence. …Crimes committed because of gender should 
be condemned in the same terms as crimes committed because of race or 
religion—in terms as strong as this society can possibly muster—as violent 
deprivations of civil rights.367 
 
It was harder to prove that violence against women is committed because of gender than 
because of race. Violent racist acts can be fundamentally different from violent sexist acts. That 
women can be of all classes, all races, and all religions further complicates the process of 
determining motivation, making it even more difficult to isolate gender as the catalyst for a 
violent attack. 
VAWA had been crafted to fit into the larger crime bill. Securing additional rights for all 
classes of citizen was a much larger—and perhaps unrealistic—legislative goal than securing 
them for women. One of civil rights groups’ biggest concerns about the civil rights remedy was 
that the qualifications put on violence by the remedy (that it had to be a felony, that the 
motivation of the attacker had to be proven) were too strict.368 Civil rights groups feared that 
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VAWA’s civil rights remedy would create a standard that eroded civil rights generally.369 It was 
bittersweet and perhaps slightly cynical that VAWA used a direct analogy between gender and 
race to secure gender-based rights for women that would not be available for victims of race-
based crime, especially since the passage of the civil rights remedy was largely symbolic. 
Normally, the designation and proof of a civil rights violation leads to a lawsuit filed at the 
expense of the federal government. With the civil rights remedy, the survivor—if she could 
assemble the financial and legal resources—gained only the right to bring her own suit. If she 
won she theoretically would have received monetary damages, but only provided the defendant 
had enough money to pay these. Thus the remedy was seen by WRP’s Pinzler as essentially “do 
it yourself” justice; the plaintiff would receive no help from the government and have little 
chance of prevailing.370 
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 CHAPTER 4  
VAWA’S MALLEABLE UNDERSTANDINGS OF RAPE  
 
Introduction 
Chapter 4 provides a close textual reading of both VAWA’s drafts and the bill’s 
final version as well as of the bill’s collateral materials—the reports and hearings that 
make up its official historical record. It seeks to uncover the assumptions about women’s 
vulnerability, the identity of the rapist, and the role of politicians embedded in both the 
bill’s language and measures.371  
The bill melded rape and domestic violence into a single class “violence against 
women” which had not appeared in previous legislation. VAWA’s use of this category 
helped semantically merge rape and domestic violence with the other forms of violence 
addressed in the crime bill as a whole, and contributed to wresting of the crime of rape 
from its feminist roots. This construction led to a deepening of women’s presentation as 
generic crime victims.  
Once women were portrayed as such, the extra provisions they received in 
VAWA gave them special, or über, victim status. Women’s rendering as victims in the 
bill paralleled the performative representation of women’s vulnerability and deference in 
reports and during hearings.           
The content and structure of VAWA’s Safe Streets for Women subtitle, moored to 
the framework of the 1968 crime bill, assumed rapists had an essentially criminal nature. 
The title’s placement of rape in “the streets”—a category that still held resonances from 
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its origins in Johnson’s racially-charged anti-crime legislation—lead to a very particular 
representation of the rapist as a black criminal inhabiting the streets.  
This interpretation necessarily merged anti-rape efforts with other anti-crime 
activities, further enmeshing anti-rape efforts into the structure of anti-criminality. 
Furthermore, female victims at the mercy of criminal rapists were to be rescued by 
redeemer politicians—like those in the House and Senate who wrote and sponsored 
VAWA. 
 
The Category of Violence Against Women 
One of the goals of feminism had been to show that rape was a crime of violence, 
not a crime of passion.372 Unfortunately, VAWA took this idea to extremes while past 
legislation had addressed only rape or domestic violence. Through the category of 
violence against women, VAWA blurred the boundaries between the two crimes 
themselves and, by emphasizing the violence in each, excised the sexual meaning of both. 
Of course there are ways that this combination makes sense conceptually—rape and 
domestic violence are by definition “violence against women.” However, using the term 
as shorthand for both in the context of addressing other forms of violence changed their 
meanings in fundamental ways.  
Indeed, as early as 1981, Catharine MacKinnon had suggested that the use of this 
category would create a heightened opportunity for co-optation of feminism by the 
criminal justice movement. She worried that pressing rape into the category of “violence” 
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erased the inherently sexual nature of the crime.373 MacKinnon blamed the melding of 
rape, sexual harassment, pornography, and domestic violence into the category of 
violence against women on women themselves. She argued that since women were afraid 
to appear prudish and “against sex,” they focused on the violence of rape, ignoring its 
intricate mix of violence and sexuality. The problem with this construction was, in 
MacKinnon’s words, “So long as we say that those things are abuses of violence, not sex, 
we fail to criticize what has been made of sex, what has been done to women through 
sex...”374 That construction, as MacKinnon also points out, did not allow for the 
exploration of the possibility that sexuality, as socially constructed in our society through 
gender roles is itself a power structure. It also prevented women from asserting that they 
were fighting for the affirmative control of their own sexuality.375 At issue was not only 
the nature of the violence against women itself, but its relationship to women’s self-
determination and their ability to control access to their own bodies. 
While use of the phrase “violence against women” grew dramatically in the mid-
1970s, it had never before been used in a piece of state or federal legislation.376 Ron 
Klain, the Judiciary Committee legal counsel, credits himself for adding this construction 
to VAWA, but does not say why he decided to use it.377 Presumably it was to allow both 
rape and domestic violence to fit more easily into a bill about other violent crimes.  
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The Senate Judiciary Committee report, The Response to Rape: Detours on the 
Road to Equal Justice, succinctly exemplified the erasure of the particularity of rape and 
domestic violence in its introduction: “The purpose of this report is to help us recognize 
that ‘violence against women’ is simply ‘violence.’”378 To a certain degree this statement 
is shorthand for the idea that it is imperative to take these crimes as seriously as other 
forms of violence. It is a tacit acknowledgement that the grievous effects of rape and 
domestic violence described by the report were worthy of government intervention. Such 
a statement emanating from a Senate committee was important in and of itself. Indeed, 
VAWA has been seen by some as a symbolic act, meant primarily for educative 
purposes.379 Throughout VAWA’s sojourn in Congress, politicians discussing the bill 
minimized the differences between violence against women and violence against other 
citizens. For instance, when introducing the June 1991 Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearing Violence Against Women: Victims of the System, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) 
remarked, 
Crimes of violence, whether committed against an elderly pensioner or a child 
abused by a drug-addicted parent, or against women, the subject of this hearing, 
are happening in every corner of the country.380  
While this statement makes sense in the context of VAWA’s inclusion in the 
crime bill, it is discordant in a feminist context, since the categories of victims of 
violence are not analogous. While violence perpetrated against a child by a drug-addicted 
parent and violence against women are both violence, they differ from each other in 
fundamental ways. Once the particularities of rape and domestic violence were removed 
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and the meanings of the two had been elided, the next step was folding both into the 
larger category of violence and excising the sexual characteristics of both. Former model 
Marla Hanson’s testimony, given at the June 1990 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, 
Women and Violence, is an illustration of the idea that under VAWA violence against 
women could and did include violence that perhaps had sexual undertones but was 
neither rape nor domestic violence per se.381 Hanson had her career destroyed by her 
landlord, who hired thugs to slash her face after she refused to date him. Several points of 
intersection can be found between the crime against Hanson and actual cases of rape and 
domestic violence, so her testimony was not entirely irrelevant. But the fact that Hanson 
was chosen to testify indicates the extent to which the boundaries of violence against 
women had been stretched to include a great deal more than rape and domestic violence.  
In December 1992, VAWA task force members discussed the fact that VAWA’s 
visibility had “brought wider attention to issues of violence generally.”382 Several 
members worried, however, that the issue of violence against women could get lost, or 
that other kinds of violence could be presented in a way that hurt women.383 
 
Language of the Safe Streets for Women and Civil Rights for Women Subtitles  
VAWA further fused sexual violence against women to other kinds of violence 
against them by not specifically narrowing the focus of the two sections ostensibly 
written to address rape and sexual violence respectively: the law enforcement chapter of 
the Safe Streets for Women subtitle and the civil rights remedy. For instance, Law 
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Enforcement and Prosecution Grants to Reduce Violent Crimes Against Women—the 
second chapter of the Safe Streets for Women subtitle—had aimed to strengthen law 
enforcement strategies to combat “violent crimes against women.”384 The first version of 
VAWA specified that violence against women included sexual assault, while its final 
version stipulated that violence against women included both sexual assault and domestic 
violence.385    
The first version of VAWA had contained this definition of crimes of violence 
motivated by the victim’s gender: “any rape, sexual assault, or abusive sexual contact 
motivated by gender-based animus.”386 The definition in the final version, introduced in 
1994, excluded any mention of rape, sexual assault, or abusive sexual contact and instead 
defined a crime of violence motivated by gender as simply “a crime of violence 
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an 
animus based on the victim’s gender.”387 This change guaranteed that the civil rights 
remedy no longer applied to sexual violence alone, but also to any kind of felonious 
violence against women. This final characterization, like the category “violence against 
women” melded different kinds of sexual violence against women and combined sexual 
with asexual violence. According to Nourse, it was this omission made sure that “the 
presumption that sexual crimes were gender-motivated was deleted from the bill.”388 This 
deletion removed both the specificity of different crimes of violence, as well as the 
specificity of crimes aimed at women.  
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Women as Victims I: Über-Victim Status 
To some extent the success of the victims’ rights movement was responsible for 
the elision of meanings in VAWA. While the representation of rapists in VAWA 
fluctuated, that of women was fairly consistent. Funding for VAWA’s Law Enforcement 
and Prosecution Grants chapter defined the term “victim services” as a nonprofit, non-
governmental organization that assists domestic violence or sexual assault victims, 
including rape crisis centers, battered women’s shelters, and other sexual assault or 
domestic violence programs.389 Throughout VAWA, rape survivors are referred to simply 
as victims–not rape victims. Women who have experienced domestic violence are 
likewise termed victims. 
Because much of the crime bill focused on victims’ rights, Nourse consulted 
victims’ rights groups when writing VAWA, and several parts of VAWA were written 
with victims in mind. VAWA’s insertion into the crime bill and adoption of the language 
of victimization meant that women in VAWA became über-victims. As Hanson, the 
model whose face had been slashed, testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee: 
I was suffering more from the stigma of victimization than from the actual 
violation…It had never occurred to me to be ashamed at being attacked…until the 
courts, the press, the society began to…question if I were the architect of my own 
suffering.390  
 
Several Senate Judiciary Committee reports exemplified the textual presentation of 
women as singularly victimized. To underscore the need for federal intervention, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee first published Violence Against Women: The Increase of 
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Rape in America in March 1991.391  The report began with the underlined assertion that 
“American women are in greater peril now from attack than they have ever been in the 
history of our nation.”392 
Violence Against Women: A Week in the Life of America followed in 1992 and, by 
providing intricate details of a week’s worth of violence against women, attempted to 
corroborate assertions of an epidemic.393 Both reports were noteworthy for exaggerated 
language and morbidly violent descriptions of violence against women. Both reports 
combine a pronounced focus on particularly gruesome crimes and crime statistics 
framing the ordinary as extraordinary. For instance, the first section of Violence Against 
Women: The Increase of Rape in America presented the inflammatory claim that, “The 
picture is bleak: there is an epidemic of rape spreading across the county.”394 It included 
the subsection “The Rape Problem is Immense…And Growing.”395 Nowhere did the 
report acknowledge the possibility of a relationship between the existence of rape crisis 
centers, more discussion of rape, and greater reportage of the crime.  
 Violence Against Women: A Week in the Life of America included a so-called 
“timeline of violence”—twenty pages of barebones sketches of violence against women 
culled from information gathered during one week spent surveying hospitals, rape crisis 
centers, and domestic violence shelters across the country. The report asserted that the 
timeline was the “tip of the iceberg” and, to convey an increased sense of urgency, 
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pointed out that only 1/100th of the violent attacks against women reported to the police 
every week had been included and that,  
If we were to include every reported incident, our timeline would be more than 
2,000 pages long—just for a single week. And if we were to add all the 
unreported crimes, our timeline would extend to more than 7,000 pages.396 
 
Number of pages is certainly an unusual and perhaps histrionic way to measure 
violence against women. The report itself is oddly impersonal, nowhere mentioning the 
cost of the violence on the lives of the women themselves. In addition, the report includes 
no first-person accounts, which furthers the removal of women’s perceived agency. 
The idea of women as victims folded neatly into the larger victim discourse. 
Many of those who gave testimony during VAWA hearings had also participated in 
victims’ rights groups. Many oblique and explicit references to women as victims in other 
hearings and reports were also included. This framed women as the victims not only of 
violent crimes men experience but also of the special category of crime termed “violence 
against women,” rendering them über-victims. As The Response to Rape, Detours on the 
Road to Equal Justice explained, “Women in America suffer all the crimes that plague 
the Nation—muggings, car thefts, and burglaries, to name a few. But there are also some 
crimes, including rape and family violence, that disproportionately burden women.”397 
Philosophy professor Ann Cahill’s observation that, “A significant element of the woman 
victim’s experience of rape is directly related to the constitutive element of a power 
discourse that produces her body as violable, weak and alien to her subjectivity” is 
particularly relevant here. 398 In the case of VAWA, the power discourse was lodged in 
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the materials presenting the bill, which depicted not only women’s bodies as violable and 
weak, but also women themselves as such.  
Often women’s victimization was presented implicitly through their portrayal as 
disembodied human beings. For instance, the timeline that makes up the bulk of Violence 
Against Women: A Week in the Life of America includes brief three-to-four sentence  
vignettes for each reported incident.399 The only information consistently provided in 
each sketch is the time and location the attack took place as well as the age of the woman 
attacked and, if applicable, what happened to her children while she was being assaulted. 
The inundation of story snippets lessens the overall impact of the information 
being presented. The graphic nature of the stories, combined with the fact that the women 
depicted are anonymous and disembodied contributes to extent to which the stories 
themselves take on a tone of pornographic titillation. Like pornography, the timeline 
includes extreme depictions of sexualized force against anonymous women. The lack of 
any specificity when referring to these women changes them from human beings into 
bodies—in this case, bodies that are the target of violence. Physically, Violence Against 
Women: a Week in the Life of America decontextualized crime and focused on body 
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Tuesday, September 1, 1992        
 12:45 a.m., rural California. A woman with five children (11 months old to 11 years old) is 
physically abused by her husband. He punches her in the head with his fist. She sustains bruises. She 
escapes and runs to a friend’s house for the night. She reports that she is afraid to call the sheriff because 
her husband threatens to take their 11-month-old baby (10)  
Late afternoon, Maine. A woman in her early twenties is thrown out of her trailer home by her live-in 
boyfriend as her two sons, ages 2 and 3, watch. Bruised and cut she attempts to leave with her sons. The 2-
year-old child is taken from her hands by her boyfriend as she is ordered to leave and threatened with 
further physical violence. (11) 
Early evening, a town in Michigan. A 44-year-old woman is beaten by her husband when he returns home 
from work. She reports that he has choked her and beaten her with his fists and various household objects. 
Their two young children are present.(12) 
Wednesday, September 2, 1992        
 10:00 a.m., a small city in Connecticut. A 35-year-old mother of three is raped by her daughter’s 
21-year-old boyfriend. He has a knife and cuts her during the assault.(13) 
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parts. There was no attempt made to discern a pattern or make any broader conjectures 
about the nature of the violence.  
The presentation of women as vulnerable paralleled the performative 
representation of women’s defenselessness during several other VAWA hearings. For 
instance, the 1990 Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, Women and Violence, included 
testimony by two women, both of whom had been raped in their teens or early 
twenties.400 The first, Christine Shunk, was twenty-five years old at the time of the 
hearing and testified about being raped twice. The first rape, she described, was an 
acquaintance rape that took place during her freshman year at college; the second 
occurred two years later when, having transferred schools, Shunk was raped by a stranger 
outside her dormitory. Nicole Snow, the other woman who testified, was twenty-one 
years old at the time of the hearing and testified about being raped when she was a 
fifteen-year-old high school student. The testimony of the two drew attention to their fear 
and emphasized their deference to Biden. During the initial interaction between Biden 
and Snow, Biden emphasized the apprehension Snow must be feeling and she, in turn, 
reminded those listening that Biden was the one who could allay her fear: 
Biden: You are not scared, are you? 
Witness [Nicole Snow]: Yes, I am scared too….You have the power to make it 
less frightening for survivors and you have the power to make it a lot more 
frightening for rapists.401 
Shunk, likewise, began her testimony saying, “I am terrified, so please be patient with 
me.”402 Snow later summoned the government as protector:  
The answers aren't all that difficult, and the solutions are palpable—it has to come 
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from the top. It has to come from our government’s acknowledgement, protection 
through laws and support. And Senator Joseph Biden’s bill is the first step.403 
Several Senate reports pointed out women’s sense of what they termed “double 
victimization,” referring to the extent to which the disbelief women face at the hands of 
the judicial and criminal justice systems is experienced as another victimization.404 It is 
true that women have historically faced hostility and disbelief when bringing rape 
charges, however feminism has tried to address this issue by empowering women. In 
contrast to this, during hearings on VAWA, women’s victimization was presented as 
immutable.  
Sociologist Jennifer Wood calls the legitimization of government power to punish 
through protection symbolic violence, because it gives a voice to those in whose name it 
is authorized to speak. She argues that, 
A protection racket is at work in the development of these crime policies, in that 
they enhance the state’s power to punish, a power that is hidden behind the 
idealized images of…particular victims who are represented as powerless. The 
victims’ powerlessness becomes the state’s alibi for the violence that the state 
commits in the victims’ names.405  
 
Women as Victims II: Rape as Epidemic 
Much of VAWA’s legislative history—including numerous hearings and 
reports— employed the recurring trope of a rape epidemic. The claim that the frequency 
of rape had increased exponentially was repeated not only by many who testified during 
VAWA’s evolution, but also by members of congress weighing in on VAWA on the 
floor of the House and Senate and referenced in testimony by lobbyists including those 
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from NOW LDEF. For instance, the 1991 report Violence Against Women: The Increase 
of Rape in America, included this statement by Biden, “Today’s findings…document the 
spread of a rape epidemic across the country.”406 Furthermore, the report’s first chapter 
was aptly titled “Women in Danger: the National Rape Epidemic.”407 
By presenting a picture of burgeoning violence against women across the country, 
VAWA’s proponents were better able to make an argument for the necessity of the 
federal action called for by VAWA. However, there was no overwhelming evidence to 
support the idea that there was more rape, and the fact of rape’s frequency hadn’t been 
enough to motivate the introduction of new legislation earlier. To make the case for 
VAWA’s importance, it was useful to argue that something unique was happening at this 
particular time. The tactic of manipulating public opinion by emphasizing unusually high 
or depraved sexual happenings is not unique to VAWA. In fact, several historians have 
documented the connection between sex panic and increased punitive measures.408 
The subtext of the proposition that VAWA was being introduced to fight an 
epidemic was that it was not being introduced because feminism had reached a saturation 
point or because rape was horrific and always had been. It was the crime itself that 
appeared to have changed, not the public perception of the crime. Rape and domestic 
violence were indeed the subjects of a very public hearing, but by focusing on unprovable 
claims of an epidemic, politicians and advocates subtly undermined feminist 
accomplishments.  
This argument was presented as part of a larger claim that there was a crime 
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epidemic; there was more crime in general, and especially more crime against women. 
Again, women were framed as especially victimized. Sometimes the idea that there was 
an epidemic of rape was paired with the idea that reporting about rape was unreliable, but 
no mention was made of the inherent contradiction between these two ideas. For instance, 
Mary Koss, the sociology professor who conducted the 1985 study of date rape with Ms. 
magazine, focused the majority of her testimony during a 1990 Senate hearing on an 
explication of the problems with the Department of Justice’s National Crime Survey.409 
The Justice Department, Koss explained, often gathered data about rape in situations 
where those being questioned were not free to answer (for instance, asking children about 
sexual abuse by family members with those family members in the room). Despite this, 
there was virtually no acknowledgment that the mushrooming amount of information 
available about rape—coupled with the nationwide push to open rape crisis centers to 
facilitate the reporting and prosecution of rape—may have affected the rate at which rape 
was reported. Violence Against Women: The Increase of Rape in America’s lone mention 
of data discrepancies was in reference to under-, not over-reporting; when discussing 
Montana’s reported decrease in the crime, it asserted, “…we have reason to believe that 
Montana’s impressive decrease is due more to reporting problems than a ‘real’ drop in 
the number of rapes.”410 
There is also the possibility that Biden was goaded by the controversy 
surrounding VAWA to embellish statistics. This prospect becomes more likely if one 
compares his bold claims of the inflation of rape pre-VAWA with his equally bold claims 
of deflation after the bill’s passage. During a 2002 hearing Biden remarked, 
                                                
409 S. REP. NO. 101-939, pt 2. 
410 S. REP NO. 522-3. 
 136 
Federal dollars, federal leadership, federal commitment, and, most importantly 
federal-state collaboration are making a real difference in the lives of women in 
America. ...Since its passage, there has been a 41% decrease in the rate of 
intimate partner victimization of women. …Since then, we have also seen a 
similar drop in the rates of criminal rape and sexual assault during the same time 
frame, almost a 43% decrease.411  
 
Throughout reports and hearings, the increase in the incidence of rape was consistently 
presented as nationwide, in order to emphasize the need for federal action. For instance, a 
section of Violence Against Women: The Increase of Rape in America was titled, “Rape 
is an American Problem,” and included statements like the following: “While we have 
surrounded ourselves in gender-specific violence, women in no other nation or culture are 
more likely to be raped than those around us.”412 The report claimed that, “All corners of 
the country—and everywhere in between—have been plagued by...record-breaking 
increases.” It further argued, “...This means that in 1990, American women were more 
likely to be raped than ever before...”413  
The purported increase in the frequency of rape was also consistently presented as 
uniquely American—with the understanding that other countries were not experiencing 
skyrocketing rape numbers to the extent that the United States was. Nowhere did the 
reports question the political situation in Europe or examine whether any of the factors 
that had led to increased reporting in the United States existed elsewhere 
The reports were all but mum on why rape was increasing exponentially and why 
the numbers were so inflated in the United States.  
Feminists themselves, meanwhile, sometimes repeated the epidemic catchphrase 
to buoy support for VAWA in the conservative, male-dominated milieu of the House and 
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Senate. For instance, a NOW LDEF petition sent to Don Edwards (D-CA), for a hearing 
on VAWA, referenced an “epidemic of violence.”414 When testifying at a House 
Judiciary Committee hearing in 1993, Goldfarb said, “Currently, there is an epidemic of 
violent crime against women, and women and girls are targets for many types of violence 
because of their sex.”415 Those working behind the scenes for VAWA also used the 
specter of an epidemic, even when communicating with other advocates. In a letter to the 
NOW’s political liaison, Ginny Montes, Neuborne wrote, “The sooner we can get 
heightened national programmatic assistance to women, the sooner we can begin to stem 
the epidemic of rape and domestic violence.”416 
 
Women as Victims III: Fighting the Fear 
Another belief frequently expressed by VAWA’s lawmakers was that there was 
an inherent connection between the increase in the frequency of rape and the imperative 
for women to be afraid. The 1990 report Violence Against Women: The Increase of Rape 
in America asserted, 
It is easy to understand why women in this country do not feel safe. At one point, 
their fears were confined to dark, secluded alleys. Now women must worry about 
crowded offices, local restaurants, and comfortable homes. For women, there is 
no longer any place that they can call “secure.”417 
 
This statement is not entirely logical. Women's fears were never confined to alleyways. 
What was new was not the form rape had taken, but an increased willingness to discuss 
the crime that had led to a national conversation about what constituted rape.  
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A 1993 hearing on violence against women in rural areas, called Violence Against 
Women: Fighting the Fear, underscored the need for fear: 
Today as never before, women are forced to live in fear. This report shows just 
how “real” that fear is. Knowing that 1 in 5 women will be raped at some point in 
her life, each woman must ask herself—every day of her life—“will it be me?” 
and if so, “will it happen today?”418  
 Fear is only one of a number of possible responses women can have to the prospect of 
rape. It is certainly not the only response, a point made clear by the fury-driven Take 
Back the Night marches of the 1970s. By implying otherwise, the Judiciary Committee 
reports chose to define women’s experiences for them and usurp a narrative privilege 
over women’s lives.419 VAWA dictated not only how the state should respond to rape, 
but how women should respond to it as well. 
 
Women as Victims IV: Women as Family Members 
Another way that lawmakers reinforced women’s victim status was by referring to 
them not as citizens of the world, but as family members—highlighting men’s jobs 
outside the home and women’s roles inside it. When introducing Violence Against 
Women: The Increase of Rape in America, Biden stated, “Through S.15, the Violence 
Against Women Act, I hope to implement the much needed programs that will help 
reverse current trends. Otherwise, the raging epidemic will brutally touch the lives of 
hundreds of thousands more mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters...and their 
families.”420 
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Biden was not the only one who employed the construct of women as family 
members. Many other politicians used a similar formulation. For instance, when Senator 
William Cohen (R-ME) offered his support for VAWA on the floor of the Senate in 
1990, he stated: 
Women throughout the country, in our Nation's urban areas and rural 
communities, are being beaten and brutalized in the streets and in their homes. It 
is our mothers, wives, daughters, sisters, friends, neighbors, and coworkers who 
are being victimized…421 
 
Echoing this point of view, the 1990 Judiciary Committee report on VAWA 
lamented, “…in New York, one program turns away approximately 100 battered women 
per week. It is shameful, but this society has invested more in our pets than our 
wives…there are three times as many animal shelters as shelters harboring battered 
women”422  
Speaking at the June 1990 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Strom Thurmond 
reflected that: 
These disturbing statistics [of violent crimes against women] are not the only 
evidence of the seriousness of this problem. The simple fact that our daughters 
and wives fear walking down city streets alone or entering their homes at night 
reminds us of the reality of violent crime. 423 
 
Descriptions of rapes in Violence Against Women: A Week in the Life of America 
included very little information about the women being attacked, but often made note 
which women were mothers, with inflammatory statements like this: “Maine woman is 
raped by her husband as their children cry outside the bedroom door.”424 
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This emphasis on women as mothers and daughters assumed women were being 
helped because of their relationship to men, not because of their own status as American 
citizens. It also took for granted that women were not in Congress themselves; the “our” 
in Thurmond’s statement referred specifically to the men in the room while he was 
speaking and, more generally, to the men in power. Men, it was implied, would be the 
ones to pass new laws; women would be the ones to be helped. As such, male politicians 
were active helpers, while women were the passive recipients of their aid.  
Presenting rape and domestic violence as important crimes because they could 
happen to people’s families belittles their seriousness. The inference here is that if these 
crimes happened to women who were not the family members of politicians, they would 
not be so bad. This rendering would prove particularly paradoxical when applied to 
domestic violence. For years, many senators and congressional representatives who 
supported VAWA argued that domestic violence had been considered a second-class 
crime because it happened inside the home.425 Thus, at the same time that those 
politicians who supported VAWA argued that it should be passed to protect their 
mothers/wives/daughters they argued for an understanding of domestic violence as not 
just a “family matter.” 
Representative Schumer introduced the hearing Domestic Violence: Not Just a 
Family Matter with these words, “Our first goal [at this hearing] is to let you know that 
the next woman beaten by her husband could be your daughter, your friend, your 
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colleague, or your neighbor.”426 By uttering this statement, Schumer indicated the danger 
of his own casual androcentrism and underscored the fact that he himself was guilty of 
the very perception he was trying to change. A Senate report on VAWA explained, 
Our country has an unfortunate blind spot when it comes to certain crimes against 
women. Historically, crimes against women have been perceived as anything but 
crime-as a “family” problem, as a “private” matter, as sexual 
“miscommunication.” That tradition of ambivalence has led to oxymoronic labels 
such as “date rape,” and “domestic violence,” both of which suggest that the 
violence described is somehow less violent or less harmful or less serious if it 
takes place in a social setting or at home.427  
 
VAWA, while presented as progressive, often solidified ingrained ideas about 
women’s roles and their relationship to society.  
 
Women as Victims V: Young and White 
The first Senate report on VAWA proclaimed: “While rape rates are increasing, it 
is the young who are at the greatest risk: women aged 16 to 19 are the most likely to be 
raped. “428 One expert testified: “The women between the ages of 18 and 24 are among 
those most likely to be raped. And a large portion of these young women are in 
college.”429 Statements such as this, combined with the fact that VAWA originally had a 
campus rape component, hint at an assumption that the average rape survivor is young, 
educated, and white, a “fact” not necessarily born out by statistics.  
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When these women such as Christine Shunk and Nicole Snow testified, their 
youth and education was stressed. Both women were young and college-educated, which 
made them ideal victims. 
 
Who Was the Rapist? 
Conflicting Ideas of the Rapist 
VAWA inherited some implicit understandings of the rapist’s identity from the 
1968 crime bill’s language. In addition, the bill frequently reflected tension between a 
host of pre- and post-feminist portraits of the rapist. While VAWA’s Law Enforcement 
and Prosecution Grants title did include a definition of sexual assault, there was no 
definition of the rapist, so ideas about his identity must be deduced from VAWA’s 
various measures.430 The image of the rapist as an aberrant criminal coexisted with that of 
him as mentally ill or spiritually sick as well as with the feminist redefinition of him as an 
everyman—and of rape as a reflection of a fundamental power imbalance between men 
and women. A woman testifying at a 1992 hearing perfectly captured the friction between 
the different “kinds” of rapists when she said, 
One group is the kind that Ms. Poland [a witness] and I are dealing with, people 
that have a mental illness and some sort of twisted perception, whatever that is. 
And then I think there is another group. I don’t think everybody that does this is 
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crazy. I think there is another group that does this because it has something to do 
with men’s privilege and they think it is O.K. to do this to women, and while I 
wouldn't call them well-balanced people, I wouldn't call them crazy.431 
 
The Rapist as a Black Street Criminal 
VAWA’s geographic partitioning of crimes was an updated version of similar 
apportioning found in the 1968 crime bill. VAWA also borrowed several of that bill’s 
strategies toward such crimes. This format suffused VAWA with the racial undertones 
prevalent in the 1968 crime bill. Classifying crime by geography is a tricky proposition, 
as violent crime against women is not otherwise categorized by where it takes place. 
Because they based VAWA’s Safe Streets for Women subtitle on the 1968 crime bill, the 
authors of VAWA were forced, in effect, to pour sexual assault legislation into the mold 
that had been created to address so-called street crime. Because of the historically fraught 
idea of danger linked to streets, VAWA’s Safe Streets measures can be viewed as the 
confluence between ideas about crime as located in the streets and perpetrated by poor 
blacks and the overlapping historical image of the rapist. “Safe streets” would be those 
rid of poor blacks. When promoting his crime bill on the floor of the Senate in 1990, 
Biden proclaimed, “It starts by attacking the crime and drug problem where it is most 
acutely felt, in the streets.”432 
Even the Safe Streets for Women subtitle’s provisions for lighting in parks and on 
public transportation were slanted toward crime that occurred in cities—the bill aimed to 
increase safety specifically in urban parks. The idea that better lighting would prevent 
rape was perfectly in sync with the idea of a criminal rapist jumping out of the shadows 
                                                
431 Senate Judiciary Committee, Hearing on Antistalking Legislation. United States Sentate 102nd Congress, 
2nd Sess. S. REP. N0. 102-37 (1992). 
432 Statement of Senator Biden.136 Cong. Rec. S6636, (May 21, 1990). 
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to attack, and statements such as these underscore the orientation of the bill not just 
toward streets, but particularly toward urban streets.  
 
The Rapist as Sick 
VAWA also included traces of the sick rapist whose history was chronicled by 
Estelle Freedman. For instance, the Safe Streets for Women subtitle earmarked money to 
assist probation and parole officers who worked with released sex offenders with “relapse 
prevention.”433 The possibility of relapse implies that the desire to rape is a disease, and 
that a cure is possible—in this instance through some form of therapy. It is not clear in 
this context whether there is an implication that the rapist can be cured or just prevented 
from attacking again. This idea did not sit well with several on the House Judiciary 
Committee.434 Schumer, for one, complained that he was opposed to treatment programs 
because rapists should be treated as criminals.”435 
 
The Rapist As Everyman 
The civil rights remedy included the idea of animus, a word which assumes that 
some violence against women (including but not limited to rape) is committed because of 
the way certain men feel about women and some is not. As Wells and Motley make clear, 
before the animus requirement was added, the remedy made the assumption that violence 
against women (rape in particular) was committed because of the way that all men feel 
about all women. It did this by applying to crimes committed “because of gender or on 
                                                
433 HR 1133, 103rd Cong. (1994). 
434 Ibid., 13. 
435 Minutes of December 15, 1992 task force included in memo from Sally Goldfarb, Ruth Jones, Pat Reuss 
Dec. 17, 1992 Re: Violence Against Women Act Task Force. 
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the basis of gender.” This language was a tacit acknowledgement of systemic misogyny, 
placing emphasis on society, not on individual men. The remedy’s language was 
changed, however, so that it applied to crimes were not only because of gender but also 
committed “at least in part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender.”436 Wells and 
Motley contend that this change was meant to indicate a requirement that each individual 
perpetrating violence against women have gender-bias as his motivation.437 While this 
language still included an implicit acknowledgement of gender bias, it was not an 
assumption that all such crimes were committed because of gender bias. Ultimately the 
civil rights remedy made manifest the idea that only some men—consciously or 
unconsciously—harbor gender bias that is expressed when committing rape and domestic 
violence438   
VAWA’s education provisions suggested that rape was not the act of a hardened 
criminal but the mistake of a confused or errant individual. Safe Streets for Women, Safe 
Homes for Women, and Equal Justice for Women in the Courts all earmarked monies for 
education. Twenty-five percent of the money in the Safe Streets for Women subtitle was 
allocated for teaching middle school, junior high school, and high school students. All of 
the education dollars at Safe Homes were funneled toward creating model programs for 
primary school through college-aged students. VAWA’s education efforts were based on 
the implicit assumption that the rapist was not a criminal but instead a misguided or 
unlearned person. The inclusion of education measures implied that rape is a learned 
behavior, not behavior that happens because of a mental abnormality, or because of an 
inherent bias against women.  
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Whereas more radical feminists had long insisted that men were aware of the 
nature of their crimes when they raped, mainstream liberal feminists incorporated the 
idea that a lack of understanding undergirded some of men’s violence, a problem 
education could correct. In a 1991 VAWA task force meeting, members theorized that 
Dole could be sponsoring the Women’s Equal Opportunity Act, a bill to the right of 
Biden’s, simply because he needed to be educated about the nature of rape. “It is unclear 
what Dole’s rationale is for introducing legislation on violence against women…if 
Senator Dole can be educated as to the nature and extent of the problem, he could 
potentially be an ally.”439 
There is a basic incongruity between the idea that the rapist was an aberrant 
criminal and that education could help prevent rape. If the rapist were, indeed, deviant, 
than it would be a waste of money to educate him about the crime of rape. The Safe 
Streets and Safe Homes subtitles were vague about the content of the educational 
programs, mentioning only that the education should help to prevent rape. This was in 
contrast to Equal Justice for Women in the Courts, with its very specific course of study 
for judges.440  
 
Retributive Justice 
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VAWA’s emphasis on the criminality of rape was of a piece with its focus on 
retributive justice as the answer to the crime. VAWA imagined the path toward helping 
women as largely dependent on federal policing and prosecution, with punishment as a 
recurring motif. In a hearing on the trajectory of rape legislation, Biden said: 
The first step in altering our attitudes toward this violence is to understand the 
failures of our laws and policies in this regard. Our criminal laws must be judged 
by their effectiveness in responding to the injustices done to victims of 
violence.441  
This focus on punishment was based on an assumption that justice could be served by 
responding to violence against women after it had occurred—an abandonment of the 
feminist premise that societal power relations must be restructured to prevent rape.  
VAWA’s concentration on punishment, therefore, cannot be separated from either its 
conceptualization of rapists as criminals, or its presentation of women as helpless victims. 
VAWA’s civil rights remedy reinforced the idea of the rapist as angry and violent. 
The changes in its language that were made to subdue mounting opposition to the original 
wording limited coverage of the remedy to felonious acts.442 This new language butted up 
against one of the key goals of state rape law reform, which had been to rid rape law 
of the resistance requirement. The concept that extra violence is needed to make a rape a 
violation corroded the idea that rape in itself was a violent act. 
The idea of the rapist as particularly recidivist, integral to pre-feminist portraits of 
him, continued to hold sway in VAWA. The underlying premise of the idea of rapist-as-
recidivist was that rapists were criminal by nature, and that they raped because of their 
essential characters.443 Feminists countered that because of a gendered power imbalance, 
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society construed women as inherently available for men’s enjoyment, giving every man 
the potential to rape.444 
This earlier conception was implicit in the Safe Streets for Women subtitle’s 
Federal Penalties chapter, which specified that the review of the sentencing guidelines it 
called for pay particular attention to what was termed “the problem of recidivism in cases 
of sex offenses.” It was also implicit in the newly created FRE 413, which made evidence 
of prior sexual assaults by a defendant admissible in federal sexual assault cases, whether 
the sexual assault used as proof was proven or just alleged. As scholars Wells and Motley 
point out, this rule is premised on the idea that past behavior accurately predicts future 
conduct—particularly in the case of those accused of rape.445  
 
Politicians as Saviors I: Biden as Protector 
It was this focus on women and the ramifications of their behavior that led to their 
presumed need for male guardianship. In Sex Panic and the Punitive State, cultural 
studies theorist Roger Lancaster writes about the staying power of America’s national 
guardian myth, which “casts white men as protectors of white women and children.”446 
Biden and other congressmen who worked on VAWA consciously or unconsciously 
bought into this myth, expressing their custodial status in a number of ways. 
Biden often took credit for an extensive array of achievements surrounding 
VAWA, conspicuously downplaying what feminists had accomplished to make the 
legislation possible. One of his expressed aims for introducing VAWA was bringing 
violence against women the attention of the American public. With statements such as: 
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“One of the things we have to change is the attitudes about rape. I don't know how to do 
it unless we start to discuss it,” he wiped out twenty-plus years of feminist activism that 
had already brought rape and domestic violence to the attention of the American people. 
Indeed, he exhibited a neglectful ignorance of the fact that feminists had put these crimes 
violence into the public eye as well as of the proliferation of rape crisis centers and 
domestic violence shelters that grew out of feminist activism. 447 Biden’s contention that 
he discovered the issue of violence against women is therefore either negligent or 
disingenuous.  
Biden’s tactics allowed him to claim expertise on rape and domestic violence. His 
assertions about bringing violence against women to the attention of the public were 
somewhat self-serving. The general public’s pre-existing awareness of rape was essential 
for widespread acceptance of VAWA’s relevance. An already sizeable group of anti-rape 
activists provided Biden both with his expert witnesses and with the cognitive map with 
which to navigate the landscape of responses toward violence against women. 
Incongruously, Biden presented VAWA as in line with feminist demands while 
simultaneously minimizing the actual contributions wrought by feminist activism around 
those demands. In so doing, he both helped define the contours of the Senate and House 
dialogues about rape while reviving rape as an important legislative subject.  
When appearing at hearings for VAWA, Biden stressed that, as victims of their 
attackers, women should passively wait for Congress to protect them. Biden was not 
entirely ignorant of the juxtaposition between protected and protector, and referred to it 
when he described telling his wife about VAWA for the first time. Biden recounted in his 
autobiography that, 
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She [Jill] was getting ready…when I turned to her and explained how excited and 
proud I was about the act we were writing. I was half-expecting—and surely 
hoping—that my wife would give me a big hug and tell me how proud she was of 
me. But after a long silence she said, ‘Why are you doing that? We don’t need 
protection.’”448 
 
Politicians as Saviors II: The Appropriation of Feminist Arguments 
Sometimes, in contrast to their understated subversion of feminism, Biden and 
other politicians used extravagant “feminist-style” claims to buttress the case they made 
for VAWA. Often their declarations were made with exaggerated anger, to drive home to 
the listener the extent of their supposed outrage at women’s treatment.  
For instance, during the Senate Judiciary Committee’s August 1990 hearing on 
VAWA, Biden questioned Christine Skunk and Nicole Snow, both of whom spoke as 
survivors of acquaintance rape. Biden expressed distaste for the fact that both of these 
women felt a sense of guilt after their attacks. He proclaimed,  
“I think that it is real important for one basic message to go out, and for 
everybody to understand it. There is no circumstance ever, ever, ever, ever—no 
circumstance ever where a man has a right, for any reason, to use force on a 
woman. Never, never. Whether he is a husband, a date, an acquaintance,  
no matter what.”449 
The outrage Biden expressed allowed him to separate himself from the kind of men who 
do use force against women and allowed him to position himself as impervious to the 
sexism that befalls so many others. In this instance Biden further positioned himself in 
opposition to the rest of the world: 
I think the saddest thing and the most important thing that both of you have said 
here..is that each of you said something that I hope the whole damn country 
listens to…Why in God’s name should you have any sense of guilt?450 
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When Snow explained that women “don’t ask to be raped,” Biden responded,  
Say that again. No matter what, no matter what, no woman asks to be raped. 
Never. Right?....Say it again, so everybody hears it, because people do not seem 
to get that message.451 
 
Biden separated himself from “people,” implying that the problem is with the general 
population, of which he is not a part. He also implied that if the general population heard 
his message often enough, people would change their behavior. By default Biden’s 
statements implied that the legislation he was there to discuss was itself feminist.






TAKING WOMEN OUT OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 
VAWA has been reauthorized three times since its original passage in 1994—in 
2000, 2004 and 2013. Just as in the first version of VAWA, the largest budget item in 
each of VAWA’s reauthorizations has been that which reauthorized the STOP grants 
created in 1994.452   
VAWA’s reauthorizations have broken the mold set by VAWA in several ways. 
They do not share their parent law’s overt reference to streets as the location for rape. In 
addition, because they are no longer tethered to a larger crime bill, they have collected 
components that have been able to free themselves slightly from the tough-on-crime 
stranglehold that held the first version of VAWA. To some extent, the later bills are able 
to place violence against women in a larger context. For instance, by providing economic 
support for domestic violence survivors, the most recent VAWA reauthorization takes a 
stab at addressing the economic issues surrounding that crime. In addition, each 
reauthorization has expanded the groups covered by VAWA. In spite of these changes, 
the fact that most funding goes to law enforcement ensures that they all perpetuate its 
most damaging characteristics.  
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Since its original passage, VAWA’s vocabulary and approach have become 
further embedded in the language used by the federal government when addressing rape, 
domestic violence, and other violent sexual crimes. Since a divided Supreme Court 
declared VAWA’s civil rights remedy unconstitutional in 2000, the remaining portion of 
VAWA are those which hew much more closely to the goals of the rest of the crime 
bill.453 With the death of the civil rights remedy gone is the public discussion of violence 
and its relationship women’s civil rights. 
With the addition of new crimes, such as stalking, covered by successive versions 
of VAWA, even more violent sexual crimes against women have combined into the 
single category of violence against women without reference to the individual 
characteristics of each. Women construed as victims are once again necessarily targeted 
for protection. And once again the fiscal focus of these bills is not always but most often 
on the crimes in question after they have been committed.  
The experience of Karen Artichoker, the member of the Rosebud Sioux who 
penned the letter sent by the Women’s Circle in 1991 encouraging passage of Safe 
Street’s increased federal sentences, serves as a poignant reminder of the extent to which 
VAWA has put control of rape crisis and domestic violence centers in the hands of law 
enforcement. 
Artichoker was flown to Washington, D.C. to consult with other activists from the 
NCADV as well as congressional staff. Her participation in crafting and lobbying for 
major federal legislation was a first—for Artichoker certainly, as she’d never been to 
Washington DC before she arrived to work with fellow activists on VAWA—but perhaps 
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for Washington DC as well—rarely if ever before had the country called upon its Native 
American feminist activist citizens to pitch in for the good of the polity.  
The inclusivity of NCADV made it possible for her to come to the Capitol, and 
the connections forged by NOW LDEF made it possible for her opinion to be heard and 
recognized. Indeed, when she wrote the letter that was sent on behalf of The Women’s 
Circle to the Judiciary Committee in support of VAWA’s law enforcement chapter, 
Reuss made a point of taking her up to Biden and introducing her. Artichoker remembers 
that Reuss told Biden, “This is Karen and she's the one that wrote that letter that got the 
Navajos off your back.”454  
But Artichoker’s communion with Reuss and Biden was short-lived. It became 
painfully clear to her fairly quickly that her initial hopes for meaningful legislative 
change had been misplaced. Worse still, it seemed that a bad deal could truly be worse 
than no deal at all. 
She remembered the first time the true meaning of the language of VAWA’s 
funding provisions was made manifest. She had returned to South Dakota and looked 
over the plan for the state’s allocation of its STOP funding. She was speaking to a South 
Dakota legislator. 455  
But we hated the state’s STOP plan. We had Governor [Bill] Janklow here then. 
So we said we wouldn't approve it. And then they said, “Well you don't have to 
approve it. According to the legislation we just have to let you see it. But you 
don't have to approve it.” Janklow called my counterpart. He really – it was really 
cops and prosecutors and buried the whole shelter piece we just hated it. 
 
And then slowly, she realized what had happened to the language of the act as a whole. 
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But the co-opting is a pretty hard pill to swallow. I remember saying to the 
violence against women office, when I'm reading grants I said, is there any -- I 
mean I notice when I’m sitting here visiting with all of you federal officials, that 
none of you say the word woman, you always say victim. “This is the Violence 
Against Women Act. I said, is it okay to use the word woman?”... And then one 
of them finally said, “Well you can, Karen, but we can't.” So they've really kind 
of taken the woman out of the Violence Against Women Act.456 
 
Artichoker was not alone in feeling that she’d somehow been tricked by VAWA’s 
final shape. VAWA has made it possible for the federal and local governments to insert 
themselves into anti-rape efforts at a level not seen before. Grants encouraging arrest 
policies encouraged the incarceration of black men and women alike. 
VAWA’s measures have contributed to the unyielding focus on incarceration and 
increased policing as the main approach toward violent sexual crimes against women. 
Part of the country’s drift toward more and longer sentences, VAWA has contributed to 
American incarceration rates that are dwarf those of every other industrialized country; 
even though the United States has less than five percent of the world’s population it 
houses almost a quarter of the world’s prisoners.457 The racial disparities in the makeup 
of the prison population are harrowing. Blacks now constitute nearly 1 million of the total 
2.3 million people incarcerated; they are incarcerated at nearly six times the rate of 
whites with 1 in 100 African-American women in prison.458 
In response to this, a group of anti-rape activists “fed up with the existing 
organizations that couldn’t (or wouldn’t) address violence faced by women of color” 
created INCITE! in 2000 “to develop political projects that address the multiple forms of 
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violence women of color experience”.459 The INCITE! statement of purpose identifies 
“violence against women of color” as a combination of “violence directed 
at communities,” such as police violence and “violence within communities,” such as 
sexual and domestic violence.460  
With the growth public awareness, in 2003 Ms. magazine published a report 
examining the relationship between feminism and incarceration. It was a very public 
acknowledgement of the missteps that the anti-rape and domestic violence movements 
had made. The report’s authors asked several trenchant questions, including the 
following:  
Can we prevent violence against women through a broader agenda that invests in 
education, employment, housing, and other basic needs? What might it look like 
if communities had resources to explore effective interventions and services that 
would keep decision-making power within the community…?461 
 
The publication was indicative of the growing mainstream acceptance of a 
particular strain of criticism of the anti-violence movement and was part of a growing 
chorus calling for reform. In her 2006 book Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a 
Break From Feminism Janet Halley devised the term governance feminism to describe 
what she sees as “fierce turn in American feminism toward the state” and a powerful 
tendency toward “criminalising and illegalising as many of the bad things that men did to 
women as feminism could articulate.”462 An unintended result has been that feminism 
"has lost a certain power of critical thinking”463 Even more recently, Elizabeth Bernstein 
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modified Halley’s phrase slightly to discuss what she terms carceral feminism.464  
Such criticisms have fueled a long-overdue public conversation—a conversation 
had by people such as Brenda Smith and Isabel Katz Pinzler and the membership of the 
LCCR while VAWA was being debated, but then only behind closed doors. Tragically 
this discussion is too little too late, as the basic theoretical and funding structures put 
solidly into place by VAWA have become standard fare. Indeed the success of VAWA’s 
framework—still called feminist but so far removed from many of the original tenets of 
the movement—is confirmation of Beth Richie’s observation that anti-rape and domestic 
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